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CPYRGHT

**SEEING RED**



WASHINGTON POST

19 May 1970

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# Pravda Condemns Peking on Indochina

By Anthony Astrachan  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, May 18 — Pravda thundered a broad condemnation of China today in what some analysts saw as evidence that Peking had said "no" to some specific but still unrevealed Soviet proposal for cooperation in Indochina.

The polemic in the Communist party paper was a clearly authoritative, 6,000-word unsigned editorial. It covered virtually every point in dispute between the Soviet Union and China. Among other things, it accused Peking of trying to split Moscow from Hanoi and other national liberation movements.

At a press conference May 4, Soviet Premier Kosygin hinted at a Soviet proposal for a joint response to the "escalation of U.S. aggression in Indochina." He said the escalation "makes even more imperative the need for . . . cohesion of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peaceful forces."

Moscow analysts saw other signs that the Soviets were proposing cooperation with Peking.

## End of Lull in Polemics

One was a two-week lull in polemics, which ended with the Pravda outburst today.

Others included the return of Soviet border negotiator Vasily Kuznetsov to Peking May 3; the moderation of Soviet leaders' comments about Peking in major speeches, a Chinese-language broadcast from Moscow on May 7 appealing for Sino-Soviet co-

operation of the kind that "solved the Indochina question in 1954," and the two trips that North Vietnamese party leader Le Duan made from Moscow to Peking this month.

Some observers saw a similar sign in Moscow's failure to reply to fierce denunciations by Peking's three major publications on the centenary of Lenin's birth, April 22, and on May Day. Today's Pravda article replied explicitly to these denunciations. Other observers said delays of 17 and 25 days might be normal for an authoritative response.

"In Asia," Pravda said, "the Chinese leadership has been conducting for some years a course of undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking conflicts between states, of isolating the national-liberation struggle of nations from their allies—the socialist community countries and the international communist and workers movement."

## China Blamed for Discord

This language referred not only to the vital Moscow-Peking-Hanoi triangle but also implicitly blamed China for the Vietnamese-Cambodian discords ("conflicts between states") which facilitated the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Cambodian head of state ("undermining the progressive regimes").

Some analysts read this as another indication that Moscow was still in no hurry to recognize Sihanouk's government in exile, which has been recognized by both Peking and Hanoi. Sihanouk is resident in Peking and appears to be a

piece in Mao-Tse-Tung's game, at least for the moment.

Another Pravda accusation read to some observers like a strong hint that Peking was interfering with Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam.

It said that certain "friends of the people" in Peking were painting Soviet-bloc support for liberation movements as a "socialist imperialist policy," and that they "even had the nerve to concoct monstrous lies about 'Soviet neo-colonialism.'"

## No Joint Action

Such behavior shows the imperialists that Peking "does not intend to have joint actions with the USSR and other socialist countries against the imperialist aggression," Pravda continued.

Refusal of joint action was not just a sin of omission, Pravda said. "It encourages the imperialist circles to engage in their anti-popular plans and designs, and another proof of this is the recent events in Indochina."

Read one way, this blames Peking for the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. Read another way, it confirms that Moscow saw the U.S. move as an attempt to exploit the Sino-Soviet quarrel in a particularly irritating way.

The Pravda article went on to claim that the Chinese were trying to undermine relations between Warsaw Pact and Comecon members. This unusually explicit statement seemed to refer principally to Romania, which has remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet

quarrel and has refused to join in some Warsaw Pact and Comecon activities.

Romanian head of state and party leader Nicolae Ceausescu arrived in Moscow tonight with a party delegation for talks "on agreement reached" between him and Soviet party leader Brezhnev, the Soviet news agency Tass reported. Reports from Bucharest said Ceausescu saw the ambassador of Albania, China's only European ally, this afternoon. Relations with China might be one of the topics under discussion.

Pravda recited oft-told figures to show that the Soviet economy is both higher-level and faster-growing than the Chinese. This showed that the Soviets really get annoyed at the use made by Peking propagandists of Brezhnev's admissions that all is not perfect in the Soviet economy.

This passage, like the earlier one on China's charge that Russia is socialist-imperialist, gave the Soviet public a rare glimpse of the kind of thing that Peking says about the USSR.

Running throughout the editorial were references to discrimination against both foreign neighbors and national minorities within China, many of whom are also minorities within the Soviet Union.

Pravda charged that China was subjecting these peoples to dispersal, cultural repression and military rule. It contrasted this with its version of the economic and social development of the Soviet central Asian republics.

# The Washington Post

THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1970

## China Dunning the Red Guards for Cost of Rampages

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Washington Post Foreign Service

**HONG KONG, May 19—**Chinese youths are being compelled to compensate the Peking government for the damage they caused as Red Guards during Communist leader Mao Tse-tung's convulsive Cultural Revolution.

This new regulation, being enforced in Canton, Shanghai and other cities at present, reveals the extent to which the authorities are cracking down on young radicals formerly encouraged to destroy so-called feudal and bourgeois vestiges throughout China.

The disciplinary measures appear to be part of a widespread effort by the army, the main power in most of China's provinces, to stabilize the country after years of turmoil.

Among its other actions aimed at restoring order, the army is reported to be arresting former Red Guards and other Maoist militants for extremist activities during the upheaval. Many of those arrested, including figures once prominent in the Cultural Revolution, have been brought before "people's tribunals" and publicly executed.

Thousands of youths are being sent to remote rural and border regions on the pretext that they will become imbued with a true "proletarian spirit" by working as peasants.

### Case of Repayment

One instance of former Red Guards being required to reimburse the state for damages they caused three years ago has been disclosed by a Hong Kong Chinese resident who is in contact with his family in Canton.

About three months ago, the resident recounted, he received an urgent telegram from relatives requesting the equivalent of \$400, a considerable sum by Chinese standards.

The Hong Kong resident cable the money on the assumption that his relatives must have been in dire straits.

This week, the resident here was informed of the reason for the plea through a friend who returned to Hong Kong from a visit to Canton.

He was told that five nieces and nephews had joined Red Guard organizations in late 1966, when the Cultural Revolution was gaining momentum in Canton, and were active in the campaign then being carried on to smash traditional Chinese relics.

Like other Red Guards at the time, these youths evidently broke into schools, museums, libraries and private homes, destroying antiques, religious articles such as ancestral tablets and books by "reactionary" authors.

### Youths Made to Work

When the army moved in to curb these excesses, the resident here was advised, two of his nephews were sent out to a village to work as farm laborers.

Since then, apparently having investigated the activities of the different radical factions during that period, the Canton authorities presented the parents of the Red Guards with a bill for the damage. The authorities reportedly threatened the parents with imprisonment unless the bill was paid.

The father of one of the families, the resident here said, is a schoolteacher who earns the equivalent of \$25 a month. Unable to pay his debt, he appealed to his Hong Kong relative.

Western analysts here suspect that the authorities in Canton and other cities may be acting on behalf of people who were persecuted in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution.

This would suggest that many of the local elites supposed to have been overthrown in Mao's purge have regained—perhaps never lost—their influential positions.

### Influence Remains

Former Red Guards who have defected to Hong Kong in recent months have told of other cases in which the government has tried to bill youths for the expenses they incurred at the height of the Cultural Revolution.

From August through November 1966, more than 10 million youths were urged to travel to Peking for Red Guard rallies as well as visit other cities to spread the revolution.

The Red Guards believed that their food, lodgings and train fares were being paid by the state, which had exhorted them to "exchange revolutionary experiences," as the slogan went.

But one youth who arrived here not long ago from nearby Kwangtung Province said that the authorities had presented him with a bill for nearly \$200 for the trips he had made in 1966.

The efficiency of the government accounting system even during that chaotic period is reflected in the fact that, according to this former Red Guard, his bill was itemized to include expenses he had incurred while visiting Peking, Shanghai and Chungking. The youth, whose father is a construction engineer, expressed the hope that his family would not be held responsible for his debts.

## Afghan Priests Protest Lenin, Miniskirts

By ADAM CLYMER  
[Sun Staff Correspondent]

Kabul, Afghanistan—The miniskirt may not be winning favor in Baltimore, but it has plenty of support among the mullahs, or Muslim priests of Afghanistan.

The mullahs may need any allies they can find, even in Paris fashion houses, for they are not only fighting short skirts but also taking on Lenin, patron saint of Afghanistan's giant northern neighbor, the Soviet Union.

### Lenin Centennial

In the last two weeks normally placid Kabul has seen marching mullahs, and what appeared to be a counter demonstration by leftist students, whose placards only affirmed support for an airport workers' strike, because no one attacks religion

directly in this Muslim kingdom.

The stir began with Lenin just before centennial observances for his birthday April 22, which the Afghan government joined Soviet representatives in celebrating.

*Purcham*, a leftist weekly devoted a special 12-page issue to Lenin, including a rhapsodic poem lauding Lenin with the work "droud" (peace be upon him), a benediction ordinarily reserved here for the prophet Mohammed.

For the first couple of days the mullahs protests concentrated on *Purcham*, with demands that it be shut down and the poet tried for blasphemy, for which the penalty is death.

### Demands Broadened

But soon their demands broadened into attacks on miniskirts (even in Kabul the shortest

skirts to be observed on women are no more than an inch above the knee), a wine factory established with Italian help, liquor licenses, coeducation, sending Afghan women abroad for schooling, and general moral decay.

The stir, with repeated demonstrations outside Parliament, sent diplomats here scurrying to their history books to refresh their memories on the unrest which forced King Amanullah to abdicate in 1929. His efforts at modernizing Afghanistan were sharply attacked by the mullahs then, but tribal unrest may have had more to do with his departure.

### Warning To Left

The diplomats were also asking why the government was tolerating the unrest and what was behind it. Certainly many of the participants saw it as a way of warning leftists to pull in their horns.

The general assumption has been that the government feels it can turn off the stir whenever it wants. "No one is getting panicky," King Mohammed Zahir Shah observed dryly during a recent interview.

Indeed the pace of demonstrations slackened considerably last weekend. Sebghatullah Mojadedi, one of the protest leaders, credited the King's support with what he claimed was a statement—a ban on *Purcham* prosecution of the weekly, and a promise of government action, as yet undetermined, about short skirts and the wine factory.

### Two Issues Missed

The government hasn't announced anything about an agreement however, although *Purcham* has now missed two issues.

Mr. Mojadedi thought the stir would not end until the government announced the pact publicly. Even then, he said it was important for the mullahs to work harder at religious education, "to build a great strong wall against communism" among Afghan youth.

On skirts, he said he was willing to compromise; "If it is under the knee, it is all right."

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## Bruce Blossat / Slaughter by VC



A SOUTH VIETNAMESE farmer tripped over a piece of wire sticking out of the sand, so the story goes, as he was walking in the dunes near the South China sea east of the city of Hue. Thus he opened another chapter of grisly details about the Red massacre of thousands of civilians during the fabled Tet offensive of winter, 1968.

Angry, the farmer tugged on the wire. Out came a bony hand and arm and, ultimately, the whole body of a buried civilian whose hands had been wired behind his back before he was killed. At this and other similar sites, known now as the Sand Dune Finds, were uncovered the bodies of 808 other Hue civilians slaughtered by the Viet Cong.

Those discoveries occurred between March and July in 1969. Two months later, another find — of 428 bodies — was made in the remote Da Mai creek area 10 miles south of Hue. And last November, in another desolate sector east of Hue near the fishing village of Luong Vien, some 300 additional bodies were dug up in the Phu Thu salt flats.

It is estimated the latter find may finally come to 1,000, since some 1,946 Hue civilians are still unaccounted for and the checking at Phu Thu is evidently extremely difficult.

THE populace of Hue was not startled to learn of these 1969 finds. Post-Tet estimates placed the number of missing near 5,800. Nearly 1,000 are presumed dead from accidents related to the bitter battle in which U.S. and South Vietnamese forces retook the city. Right after the fighting ceased, 1,200 massacred civilians were found at 19 sites in and near the city itself.

The newest and most graphic account of the Red Hue massacres is provided in a work called "The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror," by Douglas Pike, United States Information Service officer presently stationed in Tokyo but a longtime resident of Vietnam, a recognized authority on the VC and author of two penetrating books on the subject.

WHAT is the point of our dwelling on this grim business right now? The real points are two:

A good many Americans, some of them highly influential, are saying that if Hanoi's regulars and the VC were to triumph in South Vietnam, there would be no "bloodbath" visited upon the South Vietnamese.

But these are merely declarative assertions, inescapably lacking in supportive proofs. Those who speak thus, cannot read the future.

But we can read the past for signs. And Mr. Pike's overall judgments, already reported in dispatches from Saigon, are that the Red massacres in Hue were no random killings by panicky troops or guerillas but were systematic extermination of key civilian population elements.

The slaughter was highly selective, beginning with an actual black-list of administrative leaders, then embracing intellectuals (hated for their utter contempt of communism), a broad range of people called "social negatives" — Hanoi's jargon for people tied to the old order — and, finally, witnesses who could identify the many secret VC who surfaced at the time of Tet.

The second point, made by Mr. Pike but striking me with particular force, is how little the world — and self-styled humanitarian liberals in this country — have made of the horror at Hue. As Mr. Pike writes:

"There was no agonized outcry. No demonstrations at North Vietnamese embassies around the world. (The late) Lord Russell did not send his 'war crimes tribunal' to Hue to take evidence and indict."

Unquestionably the gruesome finds at Hue rank with the worst Nazi atrocities of World War II. The people of Hue were numbed into deep sadness and near-silence for months.

Unlike the famed assassinations by VC to intimidate villagers, these murderers meant to hide their killings. Helicopters had to destroy a canopy of tall trees to get access to the Dai Mai creek burial sites.

But now the "Humanitarians" know. Yet where are their voices? Is their quotient of outrage exhausted in assault upon America's role in Vietnam?

# VC Would Liquidate 3 Million If It Won, U.S. Expert Contends

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, May 14—One of the U.S. government's leading experts on the Vietcong has written a paper predicting that "if the Communists win decisively in South Vietnam, all political opposition, actual or potential, would be systematically eliminated."

The author of the paper is Douglas Pike, who has written two books on the Vietnamese Communists and is now a United States Information Service officer in Tokyo. He wrote "The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror," a 125-page monograph earlier this year. The U.S. mission here plans to release it soon.

Pike's work seems to be a rejoinder to those who have mocked suggestions that the Communists would wipe out thousands of their opponents if they took over South Vietnam. Pike says that if the Communists win the war here decisively ("and the key word is decisively," he writes), the result will be "a night of the long knives" to wipe out all conceivable dissidents—perhaps 3 million persons.

Pike contends the massacre would go on in secret, after all foreigners had been expelled from Vietnam. "The world would call it peace," Pike writes.

He cites a list of 15 categories of citizens who would be murdered, saying such a list of categories is often found in captured documents. Pike notes a statement by Col. Tran Van Duc, one of the highest-ranking Communists ever to defect to the Saigon regime, that "there are 3 million South Vietnamese on the blood debt list."

Pike's predictions are the most dramatic aspect of his paper. Most of it is devoted to an analysis of the Vietcong's present and past uses of terror. A major section analyzes the 1968 massacres at Hue.

"It would not be worthwhile nor is it the purpose of this monograph to produce a word picture of Vietnamese Communists as fiendish fanatics with blood dripping from their hands," Pike writes. Rather, he says, he wants to describe how the Vietcong use and justify terror as a crucial part of their war strategy.

Current Vietcong doctrine, Pike contends, calls for terror for three purposes: to diminish the allies' forces, to maintain or boost Communist morale, and to scare and disorient the populace. He says the enemy seems to be moving more and more toward a terrorist strategy as part of a new kind of protracted war. (Official government terrorist statistics show a sharp increase in kidnappings, assassinations and other terrorism in recent months.)

In central Vietnam, Pike writes, Vietcong units are given terrorist quotas to fulfill. As an example, he cites intelligence information that special Vietcong squads in parts of two provinces were told to "annihilate" 277 persons during the first half of 1969.

In the most detailed analysis of the killings at Hue yet published, Pike writes that "despite contrary appearances, virtually no Communist killing was due to rage, frustration or panic during the Communist withdrawal" from Hue, which the Vietcong held for 24 days in February 1968.

"Such explanations are often heard," Pike continues, "but they fail to hold up under scrutiny. Quite the con-

trary, to trace back any single killing is to discover that almost without exception it was the result of a decision rational and justifiable in the Communist mind."

According to Pike's analysis of the Hue massacres, the Communists changed their minds twice after seizing the city on Jan. 31. At first, Pike writes—he claims, captured documents show this—the Vietcong expected to hold Hue for just seven days.

During that first phase, Pike says, the Vietcong purposefully executed "key individuals whose elimination would greatly weaken the government's administrative apparatus. . ."

After they held on more than seven days, Pike's theory continues, the Communists decided they would be able to stay in Hue indefinitely. Prisoners, ralliers and intercepted messages at the time confirm this, according to Pike.

In this euphoric mood, he writes, the Communists set out to reconstruct Hue society, eliminating not just specific individuals, but whole categories of citizens whose existence would hinder creation of a new revolutionary society. Perhaps 2,000 of the estimated 5,800 persons killed at Hue were slain during this second phase, Pike suggests.

Eventually, Pike continues, the battle turned against the Communists in Hue and they realized they would have to abandon the city. This realization led to phase three, Pike writes: "elimination of witnesses." The entire underground Vietcong structure in Hue had probably revealed itself by this time, and now had to protect itself by eliminating many who could later turn them in to government authorities, Pike theorizes.

For this reason, citizens taken from their homes merely for political indoctrination had to be killed when the Communists decided to flee Hue, Pike suggests.

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 1970

D A T E S    W O R T H    N O T I N G

June 27-29	Rome	Conference on Portuguese Colonies sponsored by the (Communist) World Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization.
July 15	Cuba	Target date for Castro's promised 10 million ton sugar harvest. Completion of the harvest was scheduled for just prior to the 26th of July, the Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, and was supposed to be followed by a Christmas in July to make up for holidays Castro suspended during the past year. Castro has now announced the 10 million ton goal will not be met.
July 15-19	Helsinki	9th Congress of the (Communist) International Association of Democratic Lawyers -- meeting on the eve of the anniversary of the Geneva accords on Indochina.
July 21	Southeast Asia	Anniversary of the Geneva Accords and Indochina Armistice Agreement, 1954.
August 6	Hiroshima	25th anniversary of the dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, World War II.



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June 1970

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(24 April - 22 May 1970)

1. Last Gasp of the Lenin Centenary

After nearly two years of build-up and several days of adulation, the joyless jubilee for Lenin's centenary of 22 April is over. Communist leaders, including those from 66 non-ruling parties (Moscow's figures) have departed leaving the Soviets with the very same problems they had hoped to solve or to lessen with their costly, tedious anniversary-year programs:

nationalism remains a major force, both in the Satellites and non-ruling parties, despite all that the Soviets said Lenin said about the necessity for proletarian internationalism;

the need to galvanize the Soviet people into greater productivity to pull the Soviet Union out of the industrial and agricultural doldrums is unchanged.

All ruling parties were represented except China and Albania. All spoke but the substance was thin and the words familiar. Each speaker used Lenin's writings as a quarry (the Guardian weekly suggested) from which to dig out words to justify his own Party's already well-known policies. President Tito of Yugoslavia, conspicuously absent, had his say in an 18 April Pravda article. Citing Lenin against rigidity of doctrine, Tito defended his nationalistic approach to socialism and challenged Soviet claims that the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty is pure Leninism. President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania emphasized his country's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet polemical battle. It is significant that these two leaders who have taken their countries furthest from Soviet domination, probably are most popular, personally, at home. At the other extreme was Czechoslovakia's Party Secretary Gustav Husak who thanked the Soviet Union for the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion and the occupation of his country! Others mouthed platitudes according to the degree to which they rest under the Soviet thumb.

Host Brezhnev's three-hour speech called for strengthening the Warsaw Pact, defended the invasion of Czechoslovakia which was formalized into a doctrine bearing his name. In a display of the Great Russian chauvinism against which Lenin had warned, Brezhnev lashed out at deviationism, nationalism and Red China and other such evils. There was nothing new, no hint of accommodation to the national needs of other parties with other cultures, not the slightest suggestion that the CPSU understands problems of rising expectations in Communist countries and of the technological revolution in the world or that it is able to provide the leadership to solve them. There was nothing to convince the Soviet citizen he would have anything more to eat or purchase than past promises; or that he would gain any greater control over his own life.

Around the world, Lenin celebrations were used to beat the same old enemies and defend the same old policies. Communist China, to be different, celebrated alone by stepping up polemics against the CPSU, which China has accused for the past ten years of betraying Leninist principles. The Peoples Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Daily of 22 April carried a joint 3-page article of name-calling while claiming, as always, to be the sole interpreters of the "universal truths" of Marxism-Leninism (see attachment).

"Celebrations" planned by non-ruling Communist Parties and Soviet embassies were marked by non-enthusiasm and non-attendance from Brussels to New Delhi. Ritual speeches, exhibits and receptions were arranged, papers were published, but few -- either Party members or public -- seemed to care enough to listen or attend.

Perhaps the only significant event of the whole Lenin centennial was an angry attack by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) on the CPSU for violating the most fundamental thesis of Lenin that Party unity must be preserved at all costs and that "splitters" must be severely dealt with. Akahata, theoretical journal of the JCP, delivered the blast in its 5 May issue, on the grounds that Soviet officials had supported the splinter Communist group identified with Yoshio Shiga by attending the centenary celebrations put on by the splinter faction. Some years ago the JCP broke relations with the CPSU because of the latter's clandestine support to the splinter group, but in 1968, relations were somewhat repaired when the Soviets agreed to withdraw this support. The JCP now reminds the Soviets of their bargain and accuses them of betrayal.

## 2. Burial Rite for the Czechoslovak Experiment

Under slogans chosen by the Czechoslovak Central Committee for the occasion, Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders held another cheerless celebration, the 25th anniversary of the Soviet "liberation" of Czechoslovakia which wound up with the 6 May signing of a new 20-year joint treaty of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance." The treaty is like a burial rite, a final gesture to mark the end of the Czechoslovak experiment which started with the ascendancy of the Dubcek leadership in January 1968 and which was ended by the Soviet invasion in August 1968.

While this treaty closely resembles other USSR-Warsaw Pact treaties, the few additions and perhaps the deletions, are significant. The key new paragraph is the long-feared incorporation of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty. The Soviets would doubtless like to incorporate this feature into all future treaties with the East European Communist regimes. How or whether the Brezhnev Doctrine is included in the initialed but still unsigned Soviet-Rumanian treaty will be of special interest and will be of immediate and extreme concern to all Communist regimes.

To understand what the treaty means, not merely what it says, a glossary of Communist euphemisms and circumlocutions might be useful for non-Communists. While the Brezhnev Doctrine, of course, is not mentioned, every good Communist will recognize that notorious doctrine in these words from the Preamble: "Confirming that the support, consolidation and protection of socialist gains achieved at the price of the heroic efforts and selfless labour of each people,

are a common internationalist duty of socialist countries..." (our underlining). Thus, any Communist country, if not itself the victim of Soviet-ordered intervention, is obligated to assist Soviet forces to dethrone a neighbor or attack a "deviationist." This proviso implicitly strengthens the possibility of Soviet adventurism in international disputes, the current quarrel with Communist China being the most immediate example. Earlier treaties had described the relationship to the USSR as according to "principles of socialist internationalism." These "principles" which are also mentioned in Article 1 of the new treaty, are understood to mean that binding decisions will be handed down by the CPSU to other Communist Parties. That principle and its domestic counterpart "democratic centralism," are a basic control weapon of the CPSU and continually under attack by Yugoslavia and by dissidents in many non-ruling parties.

Article 10 includes the obligation of each party to consider an attack on the other as "an attack against itself," to offer "every assistance, including armed assistance" to the other regardless of the quarter from which the attack is mounted. The Warsaw Pact treaty and other Soviet bilateral treaties with its Satellites expressly limit mutual defense obligations to Europe. By omitting this limitation in the current treaty, the way is open for use of Czechoslovak troops to assist the USSR anywhere in the world, Communist China being the outstanding possibility at this time.

Another new addition is Article 4, which provides for direct "ties between bodies of state power and the public organizations of working people...": sanctification for close Soviet inspection, and even supervision, of Czechoslovaks at every level. It undoubtedly means the presence of a Soviet advisor in every key area of Party and government and the type of "shadow" government which prevailed in the pre-Dubcek era.

The Soviet Union apparently thought better of consecrating a "mutual friendship treaty" with agreement for armed occupation of the "friend's" territory. Without public sanction the military occupation may be considered somewhat extra-legal but that is a nicety of little value to the Czechoslovaks. By omitting any mention of troops the USSR has avoided any awkward precedents in the wording of treaties following future occupations.

### 3. Rumania: The Next Beneficiary of "Normalization?"

The Soviet-Czech treaty signed on 6 May can be taken as the signal that the Soviets are finally satisfied that they have "normalized" Czechoslovakia, nearly two years after their invasion. All outstanding differences have been ironed out; no more issues requiring "negotiation" or compromise.

The Soviets may now be addressing themselves to a "normalization" of Rumania. At least, that seems to be the import of the news that the Rumanian leaders suddenly and unexpectedly were summoned to a meeting in Moscow with Soviet leaders on 19 May. A Soviet-Rumanian treaty was initialed two years ago; again and again the formal signing has been postponed. The main reason may be that the Soviets wish to achieve a normalization à la Czechoslovakia before they signal their satisfaction by signing a treaty. But there are a host of differences which will be difficult to flatten out: the appli-

cability of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the applicability of the Warsaw Pact beyond Europe (e.g. to defend against Chinese attack), the holding of maneuvers on Rumanian soil, relations with China, integration of East European economies with that of the Soviet Union, the role of CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Aid) and other transnational mechanisms, etc. A brief communique after the short visit gave no suggestion that any of the problems had been ironed out.

With Soviet troubles multiplying on many Communist and diplomatic fronts, especially relations with China and the awkwardness of their situation with respect to Cambodia, Soviet patience with Rumanian "obstructionism" may very likely run out, so that rumors of a Soviet forcible attempt to bring the maverick Rumania into line are more plausible than they have been for many months. The question that is raised is whether the Soviets will continue to treat the Rumanian sickness with the therapy of persuasion, pressure, bribery, etc. or whether they will resort to the surgery of another invasion.

#### 4. Community of Communist Dissidence

##### a. Garaudy Accuses the PCF of Abetting Czech Stalinization

With Roger Garaudy's long pursued quarrel with the French Communist Party (PCF) leadership and with his expulsion from the Politburo, his ouster from the PCF was no surprise. On 30 April Garaudy was ousted by his Party cell, a move which was then, as expected, ratified on 20 May by the Central Committee. The real news came in Garaudy's letter (published in Le Monde) to his cell secretary acknowledging the cell's action (the original and a translation are attached). Garaudy set off a major scandal when he revealed in his letter that in late 1969 the PCF leaders had sent to the post-Dubcek leadership material which would help in the campaign to denigrate and punish Dubcek. Garaudy pointed out that the current pro-Soviet Czech leadership had publicly thanked the French for their help in the "normalization" program.

George Marchais, acting Secretary General of the PCF, at first denied the accusation, but when Garaudy used French radio to read the Czechoslovak leader's acknowledgement of PCF help and announced that the transcript of the Waldeck-Rochet/Dubcek exchange would be published in full in the French Communist dissident magazine Politique Aujourd'hui on 20 May, Marchais capitulated and had the document published in the regular French Communist daily L'Humanité. Among the more damaging statements in the transcript was Waldeck-Rochet's warning about the danger of reviving the Social Democratic Party.

The lesson will not be lost on the French non-Communist left with which Marchais claims he wishes to cooperate. Waldeck-Rochet's warning to Dubcek that it is better to do without the existence of social democratic parties reveals the true, as distinguished from the public, attitude of Communists toward the non-Communist left.

Finally, it might be noted that the PCF's shameful collaboration in Czech "normalization" (re-Stalinization) is symbolic of the PCF's gradual and now apparently complete about-face from a gesture of independence in its con-

demnation of the Czechoslovak invasion to a posture of total subservience to Soviet ends. The PCF, too, has been fully normalized.

b. Communist anti-Soviet Film: "L'Aveu"

The PCF's difficult position as a result of the Garaudy exposé is not made easier by the fact that the French public is flocking to see a film, L'Aveu (The Confession), made by a Greek Communist, Constantine Costa Gavras, on the notorious Stalinist mass purge trials in the early 1950's centered on the Czech leader Slansky. For a time, during the Dubcek era (until April 1969), it was acceptable to condemn Stalinism, as this movie does, but now that Czechoslovakia and the PCF are normalized, L'Humanité finds it necessary to condemn the film as anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. The attached article in the English edition of Le Monde of 13 May, gives a detailed account of the film and the PCF's attitude toward it.

c. Austrian Communist Prager Bids Farewell to the Party

Theodor Prager, a long-time member of the Austrian Communist Party, adds his name to the growing roster of prominent ex-Communists. In Prager's case, as his simple and quiet testimonial appearing in the April issue of Politique Aujourd'hui shows, the Austrian Communist Party's continuing serving of Soviet rather than its own ends was the essential feature he could not condone. (Prager's "Farewell to the Party" is attached.)

WASHINGTON STAR  
18 April 1970

## Pravda Prints Article by Tito Lauding Lenin

CPYRGHT

BALTIMORE SUN  
23 April 1970

### Brezhnev's Speech

In honor of Lenin's hundredth anniversary Leonid Ilch Brezhnev made a speech that ran on for three hours. If one may judge by the summaries and excerpts, it was a dull speech and unenlightening. Perhaps an important one, though, because it was the fourth Brezhnev speech to be televised in eight days—a spate of speaking which seems to remove at last any doubts that he's the man calling the Kremlin tunes and pulling the Kremlin strings. (How successfully and for how long remain conjectural.)

Naturally, he routinely reproved China for its "nationalism" and abandonment of Leninist principles. (Just as naturally and routinely, Peking, also celebrating the birthday, denounced him as "Khrushchev the Second," leader of a "hegemonic social-imperialist" regime.) He had the familiar hard things to say about the United States and the capitalist West of "racists, colonialists and militarism"—with here and there a small

CPYRGHT

easy touch of truth as when he referred to "the black stream of narcotics addiction and pornography." He spoke in praise of the

1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia—and why not, since the official justification of it goes by the name of the "Brezhnev doctrine"?—and he belted, as could be expected, for Communist "unity" and "solidarity," which can be safely taken to mean acceptance of Russian and Brezhnevian leadership.

There were just two points of some interest. One—perhaps also plausibly routine though we hope not—was that Moscow continues to be eager to "halt the arms race . . . and get outstanding issues between states settled on a reasonable foundation by negotiation." The second—vague but portentous—was that there would soon be major decisions to determine the ways of development (in Russia) over a considerable period of time." That teases world curiosity.

But the speech didn't really add up to three-hours worth. Lenin's successor, at third or fourth or fifth remove, was hardly equal to the occasion or its subject.

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 April 1970

# Ceausescu Indicates Rumania Would Not Give Soviet Union

## Military Support Against Red China

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 19—Nicola Ceausescu, President of Rumania and head of that nation's Communist party, today indicated that while his country sought continued good relations with the Soviet Union it would not lend it military support in case of war with Communist China.

His statement on relations with the Soviet Union appeared in an article he wrote for Pravda, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, as leading Communist officials from around the world began arriving here for this week's celebrations in honor of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin.

From all indications, virtually every Communist party except China's will be represented at the largest assembly of top Communists since last June's meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow. Following the formal ceremonies on Tuesday and Wednesday, the Communists are expected to confer with Soviet leaders and among themselves on various world problems.

Mr. Ceausescu, who Rumanian sources said would arrive tomorrow with other East European leaders, was the latest in a series of guest authors in the Pravda series on Lenin. Yesterday, President Tito of Yugoslavia outlined his country's view of Communism in Pravda.

Mr. Ceausescu, who has differed with Soviet leaders on many policy questions while still maintaining correct relations, reasserted his view that every Communist country must chart its own course, an indirect criticism of Soviet efforts to pressure its Eastern European allies to follow its policies.

Repeating Rumania's hope that differences in the Communist movement can be straightened out by negotiation—an allusion to the Chinese-Soviet negotiations—he underscored his refusal to allow Rumania's Warsaw Pact forces to be used against Communist China.

In the last year, Rumanian sources have said that the Soviet Union has been trying to get support from its Warsaw Pact allies to show that any

Chinese-Soviet conflict is really a clash between the Warsaw Pact and China.

But Mr. Ceausescu, after stating Rumania's desire to cooperate with other Warsaw Pact countries, said that its armed forces were always ready "to make their contribution in defense of the interests of socialism and peace from any imperialist aggression."

### Cuban Leader Arrives

If Mr. Ceausescu's remarks indicated continued differences with Moscow, the arrival of President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado of Cuba underscored the improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations in the last year.

Mr. Dorticos had been scheduled to represent Cuba at the 1967 anniversary in Moscow marking the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. But differences on ideological and economic issues led Premier Fidel Castro at the last moment to substitute the Public Health Minister for Mr. Dorticos, in effect snubbing the Russians.

Relations have improved as a result of Mr. Castro's less aggressive policy in Latin America and agreement on the

basing of Cuba's economy primarily on sugar.

The most important leader to arrive so far, from Moscow's viewpoint, was Le Duan, the First Secretary of the North Vietnamese party, and the man thought likely to replace Ho Chi Minh as the dominant figure in Hanoi.

Also arriving today was Choi Yong Kun, the head of state of North Korea. Both North Vietnam and North Korea are trying to remain neutral in the Chinese-Soviet rift, and are being actively courted by Moscow and Peking.

Presumably, Mr. Duan's presence will give Soviet leaders an occasion to have a full discussion of the situation in Southeast Asia, as well as the various proposals for a new Geneva conference.

Any question that the Soviet leadership has been changed was disposed of today with the traditional posting of portraits of the 11-man Politburo in various parts of Moscow. They all were accounted for in the usual order, led by General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

NEW YORK TIMES

23 April 1970

## CP/ROH Lenin Centennial Ended With a Speech by Kosygin

MOSCOW, April 22 — The 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth was officially commemorated today with pomp, speeches and a pledge by Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin that the Soviet Union would guard the peace and aid the struggle against imperialism.

With more than 6,000 Soviet and foreign Communist leaders applauding Mr. Kosygin brought to a close with a promise that the Soviet Union would be true to Lenin's teachings.

As the music struck up, the Politburo and the audience sang the "Internationale," the party anthem, before depart-

ing for a reception. Some of those present, including several of the dais, looked as if they did not know the words, but the enthusiasm of others compensated for them.

The singing of the anthem was one of the high points in a finale to the Lenin celebrations, which began more than a year ago and ended today on his birthday. He was born in the Volga River town of Simbirsk, now known as Ulyanovsk after his original name, Ulyanov.

The day started with the party leaders assembling at the mausoleum in Red Square. They laid a wreath at the en-

trance and then went inside to pay respects to Lenin, whose embalmed body in a glass-encased casket is visited yearly by millions.

The leaders then walked to the Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin for the second day of speeches honoring Lenin. Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party chief, gave the principal address yesterday in a wide-ranging speech lasting three hours.

The two dozen speeches today were shorter, about 15 minutes each. Most of them followed a familiar pattern, extolling Lenin, the Communist movement and the fight against

imperialism. Some lavished more praise on the Soviet Union than others. One or two even suggested criticism of Soviet policy.

By late afternoon, many delegates were evidently having trouble keeping awake, but they were roused to attention by a military honor guard that marched down the aisles to a Red Army march. A major general in the strategic missile command then pledged that the armed forces would defend the Soviet Union and its allies against attack.

While the Communist functionaries were holding their meeting, several thousand chil-



dren, most of them looking about 10 to 12, assembled in Red Square to lay wreaths at Lenin's mausoleum and hear words about Lenin. This rally was perhaps the most colorful of the day's events.

Most Soviet citizens celebrated Lenin's anniversary at work. There was no holiday today, although enterprises were said to be indulgent about absences. The sunny day brought peasants into the city carrying some of the season's first crop of early vegetables. Not far from the Kremlin, about 65 people lined up to buy cucumbers in a farmers'

market.

As night fell, heavy rains returned for the second day. But the firework display was held as scheduled and Lenin's image was borne into the sky by a blimp.

For Western diplomats, the most significant development was Mr. Kosygin's concluding remarks. He has been in the background lately because of a bout with influenza and Mr. Brezhnev's publicized appearances.

The fact that he spoke for only 10 minutes did not seem to raise his prestige in diplomats' eyes. He said:

"To act in the spirit of Lenin means to consolidate unity and cohesion of all the

revolutionary and liberation forces of our time in the struggle against world imperialism, to consolidate above all, cohesion of the socialist countries, which are the main detachment of the world revolutionary process.

Despite Mr. Kosygin's call for unity, which echoed what Mr. Brezhnev said yesterday, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania reminded the Communist gathering that his country differed in its outlook from that of the Russians and others of their allies.

Not only did he affirm Rumania's neutrality in the Chinese-Soviet dispute, but he un-

derscored Rumania's view that the national interests of every Communist state must be protected and that there should be "strict observance of the norms and principles of relations between fraternal parties."

Mr. Brezhnev has not denied that national interests should be protected, but has consistently rebuked those who lay too much stress on nationalism, thereby weakening, he said again yesterday, the unity of the international movement.

The Rumanians fear that Soviet calls for tightened economic and military cooperation may endanger their independence.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 May 1970

## Chinese Excerpts, and Text of Soviet

## Broadcast

Following are excerpts from an editorial entitled "Leninism or Social Imperialism?" which appeared April 22 in official newspapers of Communist China, and the text of a Chinese-language broadcast transmitted by the Soviet Union to China on April 25. The translations were supplied by Western monitoring services.

### Chinese Editorial

Throughout the world, the Marxist-Leninists, the proletariat and the revolutionary people are commemorating this date of historic significance with the highest respect for the great Lenin.

After the death of Lenin, Stalin inherited and defended the cause of Leninism in his struggles against domestic and foreign class enemies and against the right and "left" opportunists in the party. He led the Soviet people in continuing the advance along the socialist road and in winning great victories. During World War II the Soviet people under the command of Stalin became the main force in defeating fascist aggression and made magnificent contributions which will live forever in the history of mankind. We Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will never forget that it was precisely in Leninism that we found our road to liberation.

The development of world history as a whole has proved that Lenin's revolutionary

teachings are correct and that the banner of Leninism is invincible. But history has its twists and turns. Just as Bernstein-Kautsky revisionism emerged after the death of Engels, so did Khrushchev-Brezhnev revisionism after the death of Stalin.

### Khrushchev Ouster Recalled

Eleven years after Khrushchev came to power, a split occurred within the revisionist clique and he was replaced by Brezhnev. More than five years have elapsed since Brezhnev took office. And now it is this Brezhnev who is conducting the "commemoration" of the centenary of Lenin's birth in the Soviet Union.

Lenin once said: "It has always been the case in history that after the death of revolutionary leaders who were popular among the oppressed classes, their enemies have attempted to appropriate their names so as to deceive the oppressed classes."

This is exactly what the renegade Brezhnev and his ilk are doing to the great Lenin. In their so-called theses on the centenary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, they have the impudence to distort the great image of Lenin, the revolutionary teacher of the proletariat, and pass off their revisionist rubbish as Leninism. They pretend to "commemorate" Lenin, but in reality they are appropriating the name of Lenin to press

forward with their social-imperialism, social-fascism and social-militarism. What an outrageous insult to Lenin!

### 'Betrayal of Leninism'

Today our fighting tasks are thoroughly to expose the betrayal of Leninism by the Soviet revisionist renegades, to lay bare the class nature of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, point out the historical law that social-imperialism, like capitalism imperialism, will meet its inevitable doom, and further promote the great struggle of the people of the world against U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and all reaction. Here is the tremendous significance of our commemoration of the centenary of the birth of the great Lenin.

As is well known, it is precisely on the fundamental question of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat that the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has betrayed Leninism and the October Revolution.

Far back, when Khrushchev began to reveal his revisionist features, Comrade Mao Tse-tung acutely pointed out: "I think there are two 'swords': One is Lenin and the other Stalin. The sword of Stalin has now been abandoned by the Russians. As for the sword of Lenin, has it too now been abandoned to a certain extent by some leaders of the Soviet Union? In my view, it has been abandoned to a considerable ex-

tent. Is the October Revolution still valid? Can it still be the example for all countries? Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] says it is possible to gain political power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is opened, Leninism by and large is thrown out."

### Usurpation of Power

How was it possible for the restoration of capitalism to take place in the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world, and how was it possible for the Soviet Union to become social-imperialist? ... This was mainly a product of the class struggle in the Soviet Union, the result of the usurpation of party and government leadership by a handful of party persons in power taking the capitalist road there, in other words, the result of the usurpation of the political power

of the proletariat by the Soviet bourgeoisie.

In socialist society the class struggle still focuses on the question of political power. Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out: "Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army and various

spheres of culture are a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."

#### Khrushchev Denounced

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev, a capitalist-roader in power hiding in the Soviet Communist party, came out with a surprise attack in his "secret report" viciously slandering Stalin and by every kind of treacherous maneuver usurped party and government power in the Soviet Union. This was a counterrevolutionary coup d'état which turned the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and which overthrew socialism and restored capitalism. Brezhnev was Khrushchev's accomplice in the counter-revolutionary coup d'état and later replaced him. Brezhnev's rise to power is, in essence, the continuation of Khrushchev's counter-revolutionary coup. Brezhnev is Khrushchev the second.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out: "The rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie." "The Soviet Union today is under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the German fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type."

#### New Type of Bourgeoisie

Since the Soviet revisionist renegade clique usurped party and government power in the Soviet Union, the Soviet bourgeois privileged stratum has greatly expanded its political and economic power and has occupied the ruling position in the party, the government and the army as well as in the economic and cultural fields. And from this stratum there has emerged a bureaucrat monopoly capitalist class, namely, a new type of big bourgeoisie which dominates the whole state machine and controls all the social wealth.

Utilizing the state power under its control, this new-type bureaucrat monopoly capitalist class has turned socialist ownership into ownership by capitalist-roaders and turned the socialist economy into a capitalist econ-

omy and a state monopoly capitalist economy. In the name of the "state," it unscrupulously plunders the state treasury and embezzles at will the fruits of the labor of the Soviet people in every possible way. Indulging in luxury and debauchery, it rides roughshod over the people. This new-type bureaucrat monopoly capitalist class is lording it over the people of different nationalities in the Soviet Union and has set up its own small counterrevolutionary czarist court.

#### 'Exorbitant Taxes' Alleged

Brezhnev and his like extort exorbitant taxes in total disregard of the lives of the people, follow Hitler's policy of "guns instead of butter" and accelerate the militarization of the national economy to meet the needs of social-imperialism for arms expansion and war preparation.

The Soviet revisionist renegades have not only squandered a vast amount of the wealth accumulated by the Soviet people through decades of hard work, but have also humbly begged for loans from West Germany, a country defeated in World War II, and are even selling out the country's natural resources and inviting Japanese monopoly capital into Siberia.

By "party leadership" they actually mean political control over the broad masses of the party members and the people by the handful of social-fascist oligarchs. By "discipline" they mean suppression of all who are dissatisfied with their rule. And by "centralism" they mean further centralizing the political, economic and military power in the hands of their gang. In short, they are putting all these signboards up for the purpose of strengthening their fascist dictatorship and preparing for wars of aggression.

#### Betrayal Is Charged

Beset with difficulties at home and abroad, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique is resorting more and more openly to counterrevolutionary violence to buttress its reactionary rule, which betrays Lenin and the October Revolution. In the Soviet Union of today, special agents and spies run amok and reactionary laws and decrees multiply. Revolution is a crime, and people are everywhere

being jailed on false charges; counterrevolution is a merit and renegades congratulate each other on their promotion. Large numbers of revolutionaries and innocent people have been thrown into concentration camps and "mental hospitals." The Soviet revisionist clique even sends tanks and armored cars brutally to suppress the people's resistance.

Now the Soviet revisionist new czars have restored the old czars' policy of national oppression, adopted such cruel measures as discrimination, forced migration, splitting and imprisonment to oppress and persecute the minority nationalities and turned the Soviet Union back into the "prison of nations."

It vociferously preaches militarism, national chauvinism and racism and turns literature and art into tools for pushing social-imperialism. In denouncing the dark rule of the czarist system, Lenin indicated that police tyranny, savage persecution and demoralization had reached such an extent that "the very stones cry out." One can just as well compare the rule of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique with the czarist system castigated by Lenin.

#### 'Fetter Upon Fetter'

It talks glibly about practicing "internationalism" toward its so-called fraternal countries, but in fact it imposes fetter upon fetter, such as the "Warsaw Treaty Organization" and the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance," on a number of East European countries and the Mongolian People's Republic, thereby confining them within its barbed-wire "socialist community" and freely ransacking them.

It has adopted the most despotic and vicious methods to keep these countries under strict control and stationed massive numbers of troops there, and it has even openly dispatched hundreds of thousands of troops to trample Czechoslovakia underfoot and install a puppet regime at bayonet point.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has taken over Khrushchev's military strategic principle of nuclear blackmail and energetically developed missile-nuclear weapons, and at the same time redoubled its efforts to expand conventional

armaments, comprehensively strengthening its ground, naval and air forces, and carried out the imperialist "gunboat policy" throughout the world.

They have been increasing military expenditures still more frantically, stepping up their mobilization and preparation for wars of aggression and plotting to unleash a blitzkrieg of the Hitler type.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has encroached upon Chinese territories such as Chenpao Island and the Tieliekti area and made nuclear threats against our country.

Hitler once raved about "the right to rule." Dulles and his ilk also preached that the concepts of national sovereignty "have become obsolete" and that "single state sovereignty" should give place to "joint sovereignty." It is clear that Brezhnev's theory of "limited sovereignty" is nothing but an echo of imperialist ravings.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has emasculated the proletarian revolutionary spirit embodied in Lenin and concocted the theory of "international dictatorship" as the "theoretical basis" for military intervention in or military occupation of a number of East European countries and the Mongolian People's Republic.

In exposing czarist Russia's policy of aggression a hundred years ago, Marx pointed out: "Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the guiding star of this policy — world hegemony — will never change."

Czar Nicholas I once arrogantly shouted: "The Russian flag should not be taken down wherever it is hoisted." Czars of several generations cherished the fond dream, as Engels said, of setting up a vast "Slav empire" extending from the Elbe to China, from the Adriatic Sea to the Arctic Ocean. They even intended to extend the boundaries of this vast empire to India and Hawaii. To attain this goal, they "are as treacherous as they are talented."

The Soviet revisionist new czars have completely taken over the old czars' expansionist tradition, branding their faces with the indelible stigma of the Romanov dynasty. They are dreaming the very dream the old czars failed to make true and they are far

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 April 1970

## Peking Says Soviet Has Betrayed Lenin

Special to The New York Times

**HONG KONG, April 21 —** Communist China today delivered a major attack on the Soviet Union to mark the centenary of the birth of the man to whom both countries owe allegiance.

Peking charged that Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin, had been betrayed by the present Soviet leaders.

"Like the U.S. imperialists," it said, "the handful of oligarchs of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism have become another arch-criminal preparing to start a world war."

These charges were made in an article ascribed to the editorial departments of three Peking publications — Jenmin Jih Pao, the party paper; Hung Chi, the ideological journal, and Chiehfang Chun Pao, the army paper.

The article had high praise for Lenin and his dictatorial successor, Stalin. But it said the activities of the present chief of the Soviet Communist party, Leonid Brezhnev, and his associates were "an outrageous insult" to Lenin.

### An Ideological Onslaught

The editorial, a long indictment under seven chapter headings, was the most intensive ideological onslaught by Peking against Moscow in more than two years.

The border clashes last year between Soviet and Chinese troops carried the long-standing dispute between Peking and Moscow beyond the realm of purely ideological affairs. The commentary today concerned itself with ideological issues and gave no hint as to how border talks, which have been in progress between Soviet and Chinese representatives since October, were progressing.

In February a Soviet broadcast monitored here said the talks showed that Moscow cherished peace. In January a Hong Kong paper, Ta Kung Pao, which speaks for Peking, said two months of negotiations had "failed to produce any results."

more ambitious than their predecessors in their designs for aggression. They vainly attempt to occupy more Chinese territory, openly copying the old czars' policy toward China and clamoring that China's northern frontier "was marked by the great wall."

At home the rule of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism also rests on a volcano. Class also rests on a volcano. Class struggle develops independently of man's will and must lead to revolution sooner or later.

Like Hitler's "Aryan master rule," the "pan-Slavism" of the Soviet revisionist new czars is exceedingly reactionary racism. They publicize these reactionary ideas only to serve expansion abroad by the handful of reactionary rulers of their "superior race."

Two hundred years ago, eulogizing the "achievements" of the wars of aggression of Tsarina Catherine II, a Russian poet wrote: "Advance, and the whole universe is thine!". Now the Soviet revisionist new tears have mounted the horse of the old tsars and "advanced." They are dashing about recklessly, unable to rein in and completely forgetting that their ancestors were thrown from this same horse and that thus the Russian empire of the Romanov Dynasty came to an end. It is certain that the new tsars will come to no better end than the old tsars. They will surely be thrown from their horse and dashed to pieces.

The Soviet people are a great people with a glorious revolutionary tradition who were educated by Lenin and Stalin. They will under no circumstances allow the new czars to sit on their backs for long. The mighty current of people's revolution is bound to break through the ice of revisionist rule, and the spring of socialism will surely return to the land of the Soviet Union!

### Soviet Broadcast

New China News Agency  
Not long ago an N.C.N.A. report, from Mao Tse-tung's birthplace, Shaan-shan, said that six of his relatives—two brothers, wife, son, cousin, and nephew—had devoted their lives to the revolution,

and that visitors stand silently in tears before these revolutionaries' portraits in the exhibition hall. Dear listeners, do not be ashamed of shedding such tears.

Mao Tse-tung's close relatives, particularly one of his wives and his eldest son, really had bitter and deplorable destinies. Do you know whether or not Mao Tse-tung has seen the portraits of his relatives who have already died? If so, did he also shed tears?

You need not doubt that Mao Tse-tung's eyes are always dry. Generally speaking, he has no desire to recall his first legal wife, Yang Kai-hui, his eldest son, Mao An-ying, and other martyred relatives or see their portraits. Why? Now let us analyze this question.

In the past the Chinese press reported that after the autumn uprising in 1927, Yang Kai-hui remained in the countryside to carry out armed struggle. However, this is a story from the revised archives. As a matter of fact, Yang Kai-hui was forced to stay in the countryside or, to put it more correctly, was abandoned by her husband and left to her own fate.

### 'Did Not Blink an Eye'

She did not participate in armed struggle. According to a witness's account, when Mao Tse-tung learned that Yang Kai-hui had been shot to death by Kuomintang elements in Changsha in 1930, he did not blink an eye.

Incidentally, Mao Tse-tung has no patience concerning a long marriage. This became more obvious after his second legal marriage. He had an open love affair with an actress in front of his wife, Ho Tze-chen; this actress later became the celebrated "our respectful comrade Chiang Ching."

Now let us talk about Mao's other martyred relatives. Mao An-ying, Mao's eldest son, returned from the Soviet Union, in 1941, where he received formal Marxist-Leninist education. Mao Tse-tung, with his pseudoscientific junk, discovered during arguments with his son that the foundation of his own theory was basically unsteady.

For this reason, he hated his son. Moreover, that stubborn anti-Soviet element, of course, could not forgive his son's friendly sentiments toward the Soviet Union—which gave him a proper education and world outlook. Therefore, Mao An-ying was sent to the countryside and later to the Korean front. He was killed there under mysterious circumstances.

Mao Tse-tung's brothers, Mao Sse-tan and Mao Tse-min, and cousin Mao Tse-chiang openly expressed disgust toward their relative. They despised Mao Tse-tung's cruelty, selfishness, and lust for high position in the Government. For this reason, they did not maintain normal family ties with him. Their revolutionary activities basically had nothing to do with Mao. The story of Mao Tse-tung's nephew [Mao Chu-hsun] is the same as that of the other relatives.

The Peking propaganda machinery has made ridiculous fabrications alleging that these people were Mao Tse-tung's comrades-in-arms and were loyal to him. It has also alleged that Mao Tse-tung's eminent leadership guided them in the struggle against the enemy or, to put it more precisely, they devoted their lives to Mao's cause—what blasphemy!

We have reviewed Mao Tse-tung's relations with his close relatives in detail because they explain, to a large extent, what kind of person the "great leader" is, as well as expose his inborn contempt for people. His attitude toward other people is clear enough, as perceived from the fact that he was unmoved by the deaths of his close relatives and that he even deliberately let them die.

Mao Tse-tung considers all the Chinese people a mass of inanimate objects—he may arbitrarily humiliate them, force them to suffer hardship or even let them die. Mao's cruelty and shamelessness can also be perceived from his statement that half of the Chinese population will die and the other half will continue to reproduce. He is unconcerned about the fate of his relatives or the multitudes.

# Text of Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance

CPYRGHT

*We publish below the text of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which was signed in Prague on May 6.*

*For the USSR, the treaty was signed by Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and for Czechoslovakia, by Gustav Husak, first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and Lubomir Strougal, Chairman of the Government.*

## THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

Reaffirming their loyalty to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Co-operation, concluded on December 12, 1943, and prolonged on November 27, 1963, which played a historic role in the development of friendly relations between the peoples of the two states and laid a firm foundation for the further consolidation of fraternal friendship and all-round co-operation between them,

Being profoundly convinced that the inviolable friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, cemented in the joint struggle against fascism and further deepened in the years of the building of socialism and communism, and also the fraternal mutual assistance and all-round co-operation between them, based on the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and the immutable principles of socialist internationalism, accord with the paramount interests of the peoples of both countries and the entire socialist community,

Reaffirming that support for, and the consolidation and protection of, the socialist gains achieved at the cost of the heroic efforts and selfless labour of each people, are the common internationalist duty of socialist countries,

Consistently and unswervingly coming out for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of all the countries of the socialist commonwealth, based on the community of their social systems and ultimate aims,

Fully resolved to observe strictly the obligations stemming from the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955,

Stating that economic co-operation between the two countries is facilitating their development and also the further improvement of the international socialist division of labour and socialist economic integration within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,

Expressing the firm intention to enhance the cause of strengthening peace and security in Europe and throughout the world and to oppose imperialism, revanchism and militarism,

Proceeding on the basis of the aims and principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter,

And taking into consideration the achievements of socialist and communist construction in the two countries, the present situation and the prospects for all-round co-operation, as well as the changes that have taken place in Europe and throughout the world since the conclusion of the Treaty of December 12, 1943,

Have agreed on the following:

### ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties, in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, shall further strengthen the eternal and unbreakable friendship between the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and shall develop all-round co-operation between the two countries and render one another fraternal aid and support, proceeding on the basis of mutual respect for

state sovereignty and independence, equality, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs.

### ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties, proceeding on the basis of the principles of friendly mutual assistance and the international socialist division of labour, shall further develop and deepen mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral economic, scientific and technical co-operation with the aim of developing the national economy, achieving the highest scientific and technical level and efficiency of social production, and improving the material wellbeing of the working people of their countries.

The two sides will contribute to the further development of economic ties and co-operation, and to the socialist economic integration of member-states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

### ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties shall further develop and expand co-operation between the two countries in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, the press, radio, the cinema, television, public health, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

### ARTICLE 4

The high contracting parties shall further facilitate the expansion of co-operation and direct ties between organs of state power and public organisations of working people with the object of making the peoples of the two states better acquainted with one another on a reciprocal basis and bringing them closer together.

### ARTICLE 5

The high contracting parties, expressing their unswerving determination to advance along the road of building socialism and communism, shall undertake the necessary measures to defend the socialist gains of the peoples and the security and independence of both countries, shall strive for the development of all-round relations among the states

of the socialist community and shall act in the spirit of consolidating their unity, friendship and brotherhood.

#### ARTICLE 6

The high contracting parties proceed from the assumption that the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, was reached under the threat of a war of aggression and the use of force against Czechoslovakia, was a component part of Hitler Germany's criminal conspiracy against peace and a flagrant violation of the principal standards of international law, and, therefore, was invalid from the very outset, with all the consequences stemming from this.

#### ARTICLE 7

The high contracting parties, consistently promoting a policy of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems, shall make every effort to safeguard international peace and the security of the peoples from encroachments by the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction, to lessen international tension, to stop the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament and the final abolition of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, and to render support to countries that have become free from colonial domination and are advancing along the road of strengthening their national independence and sovereignty.

#### ARTICLE 8

The high contracting parties shall

press jointly to improve the situation and ensure peace in Europe, to consolidate and develop co-operation among European states, to establish good-neighbourly relations between them and to create an effective system of European security on the basis of the collective efforts of all European states.

#### ARTICLE 9

The high contracting parties declare that the immutability of the state frontiers in Europe, formed after the Second World War, is one of the main prerequisites for ensuring European security. They express their firm determination to ensure, jointly with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, and in accordance with it, the inviolability of the frontiers of the member-states of that Treaty, and to take all the necessary measures to prevent aggression by any forces of militarism and revanchism and to repel the aggressor.

#### ARTICLE 10

If one of the high contracting parties is subjected to armed attack by some state or group of states, the other contracting party, viewing this as an attack against itself, shall immediately afford it every assistance, including armed assistance, and shall also support it by all means at its disposal in implementation of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The measures taken on the strength of this Article shall be immediately reported by the high contracting parties to the United Nations Security Council and they shall act in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

#### ARTICLE 11

The high contracting parties shall inform each other and consult with each other on all important international questions involving their interests and shall act on the basis of their common position, agreed upon in accordance with the interests of both states.

#### ARTICLE 12

The high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

#### ARTICLE 13

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to be carried out in Moscow at the earliest possible date.

#### ARTICLE 14

The treaty is concluded for 20 years and shall be automatically prolonged for the next five years unless one of the high contracting parties gives notice of abrogation 12 months before the corresponding period expires.

Done in Prague on May 6, 1970, in two copies, each in the Russian and Czech languages, both texts being equally authentic.

NEW YORK TIMES

7 May 1970

## Soviet-Czech Pact Signed; Backs Brezhnev Doctrine

CPYRGHT

PRAGUE, May 6 (Reuters)—Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union today signed a new treaty of friendship that endorses the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine used to justify the 1968 invasion by Warsaw Pact nations.

The text of the treaty, made public by C.T.K., the Czechoslovak press agency, was signed by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the party leader, and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin for the Soviet Union, and by Dr. Gustav Husak, the party chief, and Premier Lubomir Strougal for Czechoslovakia.

slovakia.

The signing came on the first visit to Czechoslovakia by the Kremlin leaders since they ordered the 1968 occupation, to stop the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek.

The preamble of the treaty has the paragraph: "The defense of socialist achievements that were gained by the heroic efforts of the people of each country is the common duty of socialist countries."

The defense of socialism was the justification, Mr. Brezhnev gave for the intervention. He

said Mr. Dubcek's democratization movement had endangered socialism.

Informed sources said there was concern by other East European allies of Moscow about the treaty, which not only alludes to the right of intervention in another member of the pact, but commits Czechoslovakia to possible military support to the Soviet Union outside Europe.

This is provided for in Article 10, which says that in the case of "armed attack against one of the high contracting parties by any state or group of states,

the contracting parties will regard it as an attack against themselves and will immediately extend all assistance including military assistance."

The article did not limit this assistance to Europe, and is likely to spark speculation about a Czechoslovak commitment to any further deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and China.

Article 2 says both sides will contribute to the further development of economic integration among the members of Comecon, East Europe's trading market.



CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST  
20 May 1970

# Romanian, Soviet Talks Solve Nothing

By Anthony Astrachan  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, May 19—An unexpected Soviet-Romanian summit meeting ended today, apparently without agreement.

Tass quoted an official report as saying the talks were held in a frank and comradely atmosphere. In Communist jargon this is about as cool as talks can be.

The Soviet news agency said the two sides exchanged opinions on the problems of the international situation and the world Communist movement. They also "exchanged mutual information on the progress of building socialism and communism in their countries" and reaffirmed their striving for friendly relations.

Informed sources said this meant they failed to agree on economic, military or foreign relations.

The sources said Soviet party chief Brezhnev had summoned Romanian head of state and party leader Nicolae Ceausescu to Moscow very suddenly. Ceausescu was in Moscow just a month ago for the centenary of Lenin's birth.

Brezhnev's invitation came after Romania refused to approve the establishment of an international investment bank last Thursday at the 24th meeting of Comecon heads of government in Warsaw. Seven other states approved it.

The invitation also came

after Romania said three times last week that it regarded the Warsaw Pact as an alliance meant solely for defense against an "imperialist" attack in Europe.

It came at a time when the Kremlin had decided to mount a new broadside against China, with whom Romania

has polite relations. The attack was published in yesterday's Pravda. It accused China, among other things, of trying to undermine relations between Warsaw Pact and Comecon members—a clear reference to Romania.

These events may have influenced the immediate timing of the Soviet-Romanian summit. It also came after months of verbal exchanges between Moscow and Bucharest which some analysts saw as evidence that the Soviets were putting new pressure on the Romanians to conform to Kremlin standards.

Observers here thought Moscow might well expect the American invasion into Cambodia to divert world opinion from pressures on Romania that might look as though another Czechoslovakia were in the making.

In an editorial today that was otherwise devoted purely to economic questions, Pravda noted that "U.S. aggression in Indochina gives added urgency to the need for strengthening the unity of socialist countries."

[In Washington, American officials said they felt the situation to be serious but that they had no hard information. They also said there had been no reports of any military movements in the Romanian area.

[These officials expressed amazement that Ceausescu would leave his country at a

time of major floods, about which the Council of Ministers has been having emergency meetings daily. They suggested that Ceausescu may have been given an ultimatum to make the trip.]

The makeup of the delegations showed the seriousness of the summit and the probability that it dealt with economic and military matters.

Ceausescu brought with him Emil Bodnarus, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Manea Manescu and Mihai Gere. All sit on at least two of the three top Romanian party organs; Ceausescu and Niculescu-Mizil are on all three.

Many observers thought one item under discussion would be the new Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty, which was initiated two years ago but has never been signed. Informed sources say the Soviets now want major changes. The treaty, framed in the lull before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, omits the requirements for mutual consultation, Soviet-style economic cooperation and mutual defense against all comers on all continents that marked the treaty between Prague and Moscow signed early this month.

The Soviets have been pressing for closer integration of the East European economies. It was presumably no accident that Pravda published an editorial today for the Romanians to read on the social, economic and political benefits that have accrued to Comecon members.

The editorial emphasized the need for greater coordination of national economic plans to make possible more specialization in production and a long-range program for economic integration. The Ro-

manians have made plain their distaste for either on Soviet terms, which in the past have subordinated East European countries' needs to those of the USSR.

Observers believe the international investment bank may well turn out to be another example of this tendency.

The Soviets have also been pressing for closer integration and broader horizons for the Warsaw Pact armies.

Krasnaya Zvezda, the armed forces newspaper, said today that Warsaw Pact defense ministers would meet in Sofia, Bulgaria, later this month to consider "raising the defense might" of the pact members.

The ministers may also want to set the site of the next pact maneuvers. Romania is under pressure to provide the site. Maneuvers were last held there in 1962. Rumania is reluctant to admit foreign armies to her soil—even "allied" armies.

Romania has been a target for Soviet propaganda for six years, since she began taking a line independent of Moscow on foreign policy, foreign trade and economic development. She was particularly opposed to the "Warsaw Pact invasion" of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

[Yugoslav officials deduced from the makeup of the Romanian delegation and other factors that bloc economic and military questions, and also bilateral ones such as a new friendship and mutual assistance treaty, were on the agenda, Dan Morgan reported from Belgrade. Yugoslav and other East European officials all expressed surprise at the sudden meeting.]

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

21 May 1970

# Kremlin corrals Romanian maverick for urgent talks

CPYRGHT

By Eric Bourne

Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu's surprise visit to Moscow had all the circumstance of a new test of wills over his country's independent-minded postures in Communist-bloc relations.

The "out-of-the-blue" disclosure of the trip came in the briefest of Bucharest announcements May 18, giving no hint of the business at hand.

But the hurried departure, just when Mr. Ceausescu was very preoccupied with the worst flood disaster for two centuries in northern Romania and Transylvania, suggested considerable urgency in the need for talks with Soviet leaders. It also followed two recent political events which again pointed up Mr. Ceausescu's difference with Kremlin leaders.

These developments concerned the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, the East bloc's council for economic aid and cooperation.

In both spheres Romania has adopted an independent, individual position indicating strong reservations (a) on the scope and organization of the military alliance and (b)

on the degree to which Comecon efforts to promote economic integration among its eight member countries shall be allowed to override what Romania regards as priority national interest.

Its latest reminder of refusal to be too tightly bound by the Warsaw Pact came in a series of articles following the signing of the new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty a fortnight ago.

In Warsaw last week, Romania stood alone and aside from a decision by other Comecon governments to establish a common capital-investment bank.

On neither point can the Kremlin leaders be pleased. It seems altogether likely that it was they who requested an early meeting with the Romanians to sort out conflicting views.

The all-party nature of Mr. Ceausescu's team and the absence of government leaders was another sign that vital party relations were to be discussed.

The Associated Press reports from Moscow that the meeting between Mr. Ceausescu and Soviet Communist Party chief

Leonid I. Brezhnev and President Nicolai V. Podgorny was held in a "frank and comradely atmosphere."

In Communist terminology the term "frank" means there was disagreement.

Romania's reservations toward Soviet desires to "strengthen" the Warsaw Pact have been consistently upheld.

Recently Mr. Ceausescu responded to renewed Soviet hankering for a combined "fire brigade" force under pact command with a blunt statement that Romanian forces would operate only under Romanian command.

Romania also has resisted any extension of obligations beyond those it accepts as written into the pact when it was formulated — in response to NATO — 15 years ago this month.

Article 10 of the new Czech-Soviet treaty stipulates that the signatories would regard an attack on one as an attack also on itself, requiring immediate assistance and support by all means at its disposal, "including military assistance."

Moreover the Czechoslovak treaty is the first to incorporate the principle of "limited sovereignty" which can justify military intervention in any Communist country which seems to be straying "off the line" — as in Czechoslovakia in '68.

Romania, not a party to the Soviet "rescue" operation on that occasion and which unequivocally condemned the invasion, continues strenuously to reject this dangerous doctrine.

The wider Czech commitments have given rise also to speculation that Russia expects help, under the treaties with its East European allies, in the event of its own involvement in war with China.

To what extent this might be so cannot be confirmed or assessed. But the implication has been strong enough to cause the Romanians repeatedly lately to emphasize their view—as they did right after the recent Prague treaty—that the Warsaw Pact is strictly a defensive alliance designed to defend member countries against "imperialist attacks in Europe."

They unmistakably underline those two words "in Europe."

An article by Defense Minister Ion Ionita published in Scinteia, the party newspaper, May 7, another in the Army newspaper, and a third again in Scinteia, May 14, all stressed the Romanian position on these specific aspects of the alliance.

The Romanian leaders in fact challenge the whole concept of "limited sovereignty" providing for the "defense of socialism." They reject the Soviet claim that the Communist states must therefore draw closer together.

The party's authoritative theoretical review Lupta de Clasa recently rebutted at length the Russian argument that "bourgeois propaganda and ideology" can exert such an influence on the East European countries and their people as "to divert them from socialism."

Here again was a forceful denial of the claim that the Warsaw Pact must needs be tightened up more. Romania itself is awaiting signature of a new treaty with the Russians. Its original 20-year alliance ran out Feb. 19.

After protracted negotiation early last year it was reported that a draft for renewal was completed and agreed.

Since then there have been frequent indications that signing was imminent. It still is unsigned, however.

CPYRGHT

## M. Roger Garaudy est exclu de sa cellule

A la demande du secrétariat du parti communiste et après examen d'un document élaboré par les soins de M. Roland Leroy, membre de cette instance, la cellule du P.C.F. de Chennevières-sur-Marne (Val-de-Marne) vient de décider à une faible majorité l'exclusion de M. Roger Garaudy.

La sanction prise à l'encontre de l'auteur du *Grand Tournant du socialisme*, dont *l'Humanité* de ce mardi ne fait pas état, doit être soumise, conformément aux statuts du parti, à la ratification du comité de section, du comité fédéral, et enfin du comité central, dont la prochaine session est fixée aux 20 et 21 mai.

## DE MAI 1968 AU « GRAND TOURNANT DU SOCIALISME »

Le premier désaccord important entre M. Roger Garaudy, alors membre du bureau politique, et les autres dirigeants du P.C.F. date des événements du printemps 1968. Dans un article de « Démocratie nouvelle », début juin, et au comité central réuni le 8 juillet à Nanterre, l'analyse de M. Garaudy sur le mouvement de mai s'écarterait déjà de celle de ses amis politiques, M. Georges Marchais notamment.

Le désaccord allait s'amplifier avec les événements de Tchécoslovaquie, en août 1968. Au plus fort de la crise, M. Garaudy déclarait à l'agence tchécoslovaque C.T.K. que les dirigeants soviétiques avaient porté un coup redoutable au mouvement communiste, et parlait de « rechute du stalinisme ». Le bureau politique du P.C.F. désavouait le 27 août cette interview, qui constituait « une ingérence inadmissible dans

les affaires intérieures des partis frères ». M. Garaudy revenait à la charge d'abord dans une lettre adressée, le 2 septembre 1968, à M. Waldeck Rochet, secrétaire général, ensuite dans la préface du livre « La Liberté en sursis, Prague 1968 », recueil de textes des dirigeants communistes tchécoslovaques. M. Lucien Mathey, membre du comité central, reprochait alors à M. Garaudy, dans un article de « l'Humanité » du 5 octobre, de « rompre avec la discipline léniniste du parti communiste (la « Pravda » devait reproduire cet article).

Nouvelle incartade de M. Garaudy en août 1969 : il estimait, dans une interview accordée à l'hebdomadaire yougoslave « Komunist », que la conférence internationale des partis communistes et ouvriers, qui s'était tenue à Moscou, n'avait pas été

dié les problèmes fondamentaux posés au mouvement communiste. Cette appréciation lui valait un blâme public du bureau politique.

Le comité central entendait M. Garaudy le 14 octobre 1969 à Ivry et rejetait une nouvelle fois ses thèses. La préparation du 19<sup>e</sup> congrès et la publication, au mois de décembre, du livre « le Grand Tournant du socialisme », soulignaient le divorce de plus en plus flagrant entre l'auteur et le parti. Le bureau politique condamnait sévèrement, le 19 décembre, les thèses contenues dans l'ouvrage du directeur du Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes (C.E.R.M.). Dans la tribune de discussion ouverte par « l'Humanité » en vue du prochain congrès, celui-ci reprochait à ce journal, le 2 janvier 1970, de lui faire dire le contraire de ce qu'il avait écrit.

« La Nouvelle Critique », revue des intellectuels du P.C.F., estimait, dans son numéro de janvier, que M. Roger Garaudy avait, dans « le Grand Tournant du socialisme », quitté le socialisme scientifique pour « une utopie réformiste ».

Au congrès de Nanterre, du 4 au 8 février, M. Garaudy avait la possibilité d'exposer ses idées, mais sans être vraiment entendu. Il était évincé du bureau politique et du comité central. Quelques jours plus tard il publiait, sous le titre « Toute la vérité », les éléments du contentieux qui l'opposait au P.C.F., et « l'Humanité » lui reprochait encore, au début de mars, de poursuivre « de façon insidieuse son entreprise de dénigrement du parti communiste ». Le 27 février, M. Guy Besse avait remplacé l'écrivain contestataire à la direction du C.E.R.M.



7 May 1970

## EXCLU DE SA CELLULE

# M. Roger Garaudy déclare : « j'essaierai de servir notre parti comme toujours »

CPYRGHT

L'Humanité publie ce mercredi, en quatrième page, une courte information relative à la situation de M. Roger Garaudy, qui a été exclu, le 30 avril, de la cellule communiste Gabriel-Péri, de Chennévières-sur-Marne (Val-de-Marne), par 8 voix contre 5 et 1 abstention (le Monde du 6 mai).

L'organe central du parti communiste ironise sur les « nouvelles spéculations » de la « presse anticommuniste », rappelle les articles des statuts

« J'ai partagé, jeudi, la tristesse de toute la cellule, y compris de ceux, dont tu étais, qui venaient de voter mon exclusion, et qui se sont montrés si fraternelles à mon égard. L'initiative de cette mesure ne venait pas de notre cellule, puisque la décision a été prise après la lecture, que tu as faite, d'un long document émanant du secrétariat du parti, et concluant : « Il est incontestable que son exclusion est maintenant inscrite dans les faits. »

« J'ai pu, au cours de la réunion de cellule, réfuter au moins les mensonges les plus flagrants de ce document venu « d'en haut », et donner même la preuve matérielle de la fausseté de tel ou tel d'entre eux. Ce qui demeure, c'est qu'un problème de discipline était posé : refuser mon exclusion eût été non seulement s'opposer à la directive de la plus haute instance du parti, mais reconnaître la mauvaise foi délibérée de son argumentation. Je comprends parfaitement que certains camarades aient reculé devant cette prise de position, et que huit d'entre eux — contre cinq et une abstention — aient voté l'exclusion.

« Je les comprends, car je sais, pour l'avoir défendue depuis déjà trente-sept ans — depuis mon adhésion à notre parti — ce qu'est la discipline, sa nécessité et la force qu'elle nous donne dans le combat quotidien contre le patronat et contre l'Etat, seule l'organisation de classe, celle du syndicat et celle du parti, a planté l'espoir de briser l'engrenage du régime qui broie ou dévore la vie de chacun. Et cette organisation ne peut naître, vivre et se développer que par la discipline de tous.

« C'est donc nécessairement un drame lorsqu'il faut faire publiquement la critique de son propre parti. Je ne l'ai fait que parce qu'il m'était impossible de faire autrement : depuis trois ans j'ai formulé mes critiques « à l'intérieur » du parti, mais sans pouvoir briser le « huis clos » du bureau politique et du comité central. Jamais il ne m'a été possible de porter ce débat dans tout le parti, c'est-à-dire

dans toutes les cellules, à la base, considérée sans doute comme « mineurs », et incapable de connaître la vérité sans être ébranlée dans ses certitudes. C'est pour porter des problèmes devant tous les camarades que j'ai été contraint de parler à l'extérieur, puisque, bien que membre du bureau politique, tout moyen d'expression m'était interdit dans la presse du parti.

« Ce fut un drame lorsque Khrouchtchev dévoila les erreurs qui avaient conduit au stalinisme, et les crimes qui en découlerent. C'était pourtant nécessaire et juste pour éviter le retour d'une telle perversion du marxisme et du léninisme. Ce fut un drame lorsque Arthur London témoigna publiquement, dans l'Aveu, des conséquences résultant de l'affirmation aveugle que « le parti a toujours raison » ou que « l'U.R.S.S. a toujours raison ». Ce témoignage était pourtant nécessaire et juste pour empêcher que l'on ne tourne trop vite la page et que l'on ne s'engage à nouveau dans une telle voie comme cela se produit en Tchécoslovaquie, et en ne cessant de s'aggraver, depuis août 1968. Ce fut un drame lorsque, en 1931, Maurice Thorez dénonça publiquement dans l'Humanité (14 août 1931) l'« esprit de secte » qui « aboutit peu à peu à faire du communisme un exécutant au lieu d'un entraîneur ». « Si quelqu'un sort une idée, on se demande tout de suite : quelle peut être sa déviation ? » De bons camarades lui écrivirent (cité par Maurice Thorez dans l'Humanité du 21 août 1931) : « Avec ces articles tous les « sa-lopards » vont parler », « des discussions malsaines s'organisent par les éléments d'opposition ». Maurice Thorez n'hésita pas à poursuivre cette campagne pour « que les bouches s'ouvrent ». L'un de ses articles (l'Humanité du 23 septembre 1931) s'intitulait même « Jetons la pagale », en réponse à un camarade appelant « la pagale » l'invitation à une discussion ouverte dans tout le parti.

du P.C.F. relatifs à la discipline, et précise qu'« il ne peut être fait état de l'exclusion éventuelle » de M. Roger Garaudy « qu'une fois que le comité central l'a ratifiée et qu'il a décidé de la rendre publique ». Il parle, d'autre part, de « démarches imaginaires du secrétariat du parti ».

La réalité de ces démarches est cependant confirmée par la lettre que M. Roger Garaudy a adressée à M. Henri Fichetpain, secrétaire de la cellule de Chennévières-sur-Marne, et dont voici le texte :

## L'affaire tchécoslovaque

« Il est vrai que toute la presse anticommuniste s'empara de ces déclarations de Maurice Thorez et gesticula. Mais il est vrai aussi que le redressement s'opéra. Le groupe sectaire Barbé-Célor, qui dirigeait et orientait la politique du parti depuis 1929, fut écarté en 1931. Notre parti en sortit plus fort et reprit sa marche en avant. Comme je l'ai dit à la cellule jeudi, aujourd'hui encore un groupe — très restreint d'ailleurs — manipule le secrétariat du parti : le groupe dirigé par Georges Marchais, qui s'est fait élire secrétaire général adjoint quinze jours après avoir proclamé sur toutes les radios que le problème d'une telle désignation ne se posait même pas. Pourquoi ce groupe s'acharne-t-il contre moi ?

« Au-delà de toute autre question, l'un des problèmes que je pose est, pour lui, un crime impardonnable. J'ai demandé obstinément que l'on dise clairement au peuple français : le socialisme que notre parti souhaite instaurer en France n'est pas celui que Brejnev impose aujourd'hui militairement à la Tchécoslovaquie. Ce groupe ne peut pas dire cela : il a apporté à Prague, à Bilak (c'est-à-dire à l'un de ceux qui, avec Indra, collaborèrent le plus efficacement à l'application en Tchécoslovaquie des ordres de l'occupant dont il avait, dès le 20 août, approuvé l'invasion et appliqué les consignes), les éléments du dossier qui a permis d'accabler Dubcek. Bilak a remercié publiquement (dans Rude Pravo) les « dirigeants français » de leur précieuse collaboration à sa politique de « normalisation » (celle que lui dicta l'occupant, avec son cortège de déclarations, d'exclusions, de répression politique et de marasme économique).

« Après une telle collaboration du groupe Marchais avec le groupe Bilak-Indra, il ne peut évidemment être question de dé-savouer le système que Brejnev impose militairement à la Tchécoslovaquie. Tout au plus peut-

on rappeler périodiquement que l'on a, le 21 août, désapprouvé la forme militaire de l'intervention. Mais on ne peut s'interroger sur les causes, ce qui impliquerait que l'on recherche les raisons profondes qui amenèrent Brejnev à pratiquer en 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie — et en l'aggravant — la politique pratiquée par Staline en 1948 à l'égard de la Yougoslavie. La politique du groupe Marchais interdit aussi de s'interroger sur les conséquences de l'intervention, c'est-à-dire sur l'aggravation constante de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie depuis août 1968.

Dès lors, comment le groupe pourrait-il accepter de discuter, comme je le propose, sur le modèle français, condamné par la même intervention ? Comment accepter que ces problèmes soient posés de manière objective (et non en tronquant et caricaturant les textes) à tous les militants de notre parti, et, au-delà, à tous ceux qui, en France, veulent honnêtement le socialisme ? Ce serait pourtant nécessaire si l'on veut, de façon positive, développer le mouvement d'unité au lieu de nous poser en censeurs des autres, comme le fait si souvent Marchais, qui semble ne pas pardonner à nos partenaires si simplement d'être différents de nous, d'être autres. Comment, dans de telles conditions, discuter sereinement du nouveau « bloc historique » dont l'analyse scientifique seule peut nous permettre de réfuter les argumentations néo-capitalistes sur le prétendu amenagement de la classe ouvrière et de son rôle révolutionnaire historique, et de poser les problèmes de l'unité à partir de leurs fondements objectifs ? Pour que notre parti accroisse son rayonnement et devienne, plus que jamais, un élément moteur du rassemblement de toutes les forces capables de présenter une alternative réelle à la politique actuelle du grand patronat et de son Etat, il faudra bien qu'un jour ces problèmes soient posés.

C'est pourquoi, cher camarade, je te laisse « en dépôt » ma carte.

de parti, qui symbolise, pour moi, trente-sept années de ma vie. Maintenant je te prie, cher camarade, de considérer que je demande ma réintégration dans le parti. Car à ce parti, à ses militants, je demeure attaché par tout ce qui a fait et ne cessera de faire le sens de ma vie : la lutte pour le

socialisme, pour le communisme. Les groupes passent, mais le parti et vivra. Plus le groupe sera vite isolé et écarté, plus vite notre parti connaîtra un épanouissement nouveau, et des centaines de milliers d'adhérents nouveaux participeront à son combat pour le rendre victorieux. Pendant ce

temps, je ne resterai pas inactif. J'essaierai de continuer à travailler comme toujours, même si ce travail m'a été rendu plus difficile encore par la situation qui m'est faite.

» Dis à mes camarades que je comprends très bien leur attitude lorsqu'ils ont été mis, par le secré-

tarat du parti en face de ce problème, de reprendre la discipline ou bien m'exclure. Tu peux, si tu le juges utile, leur communiquer ma lettre à la cellule, à la Fédération, ou à la direction centrale du parti.

» Fraternellement. »

LE MONDE, Paris  
7 May 1970

CPYRGHT

Excluded from His Cell

Mr. Roger Garaudy Declares "I Will Try  
To Serve Our Party As Always"

This Wednesday, L'Humanité published on Page 4 a short article relative to the situation of Mr. Roger Garaudy who, on 30 April, was expelled from the Gabriel-Péri cell of Chennevières-sur-Marne (Val-de-Marne), by eight votes to five, with one abstention (Le Monde for 6 May).

The central organ of the Communist Party writes ironically about "new speculations" of the "anti-communist press," recalls the articles of the French CP statutes relative to discipline and points out that "the eventual expulsion of Mr. Roger Garaudy cannot take place until the Central Committee has ratified it and decides to make it public." It speaks, furthermore, of "imaginary démarches of the Party Secretariat."

The reality of these démarches is confirmed, however, by the letter Mr. Roger Garaudy addressed to Mr. Henri Fichet, Secretary for the Chennevières-sur-Marne cell, the text of which follows:

"I shared, Thursday, the sadness of the entire cell, including those, among whom you number, who had just voted my ouster, and who showed themselves to be so fraternal with respect to me. The initiative for this measure did not come from our cell because the decision was made after you read a long document from the Party Secretariat which concluded: 'It is incontestable that his expulsion is now inscribed in the facts.'

"During the course of the cell meeting, I was able to refute at least the most flagrant lies of this document descended 'from on high,' and even to give material proof of the falseness of several of them. What remains is that a problem of discipline was raised: to refuse my expulsion would have been not only to oppose the directive of the highest authority of the Party, but also to recognize the deliberate bad faith of its argumentation. I understand perfectly that certain comrades retreated in the face of this statement of position and that eight of them -- against five and one abstention -- voted the ouster.

"I understand them for I know, for having defended discipline for 37 years already -- since my membership in our Party -- what it is, its necessity and the force it gives us in the daily combat

against the patronat and against the State, the only class organization, that of the union and that of the Party planted the hope of shattering the toils of a regime which crushes or devours the life of each of us. And this organization cannot be born, live and develop except by the discipline of all.

"It is thus of necessity a drama when one must publicly criticize his own party. I did it only because it was impossible for me to do otherwise. For three years I expressed my criticisms 'within' the Party but without being able to break the 'closed doors' of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. Never was it possible for me to carry this debate to the whole Party, that is, to all the cells, considered without doubt as 'minor' and incapable of recognizing the truth without being shaken from its certainties. It was to bring these problems before all the comrades that I was constrained to talk outside because, even though a member of the Political Bureau, any means of expression in the Party press was forbidden me.

"It was a drama when Khrushchev revealed the errors which led to Stalinism and the crimes that issued from it. It was, nevertheless, necessary and right in order to avoid the return of such a perversion of Marxism and Leninism. It was a drama when Artur London publicly testified in L'Aveu to the consequences resulting from a blind affirmation that 'the Party is always right' or that 'the USSR is always right.' This testimony was, nevertheless, necessary and right to prevent the too rapid turning of the page and that again one sets his foot on such a path as that which took place in Czechoslovakia, and in not ceasing to worsen since August 1968. It was a drama when, in 1931, Maurice Thorez denounced publicly in L'Humanité (14 August 1931) 'the spirit of sect' which 'leads little by little to make a communist a performer instead of a trainer.' 'If one expresses an idea, one immediately asks: what is his deviation?' Good comrades wrote him (cited by Maurice Thorez in L'Humanité of 21 August 1931): 'With these articles, all "dirty bastards" are going to talk,' 'pernicious discussions will be organized by opposition elements.' Maurice Thorez did not hesitate to pursue this campaign in order 'that mouths might be opened.' One of his articles (L'Humanité for 23 September 1931) was entitled even 'Let Us Create Confusion,' in response to a comrade calling 'confusion' the invitation to an open discussion in the entire Party.

#### Against the "Marchais Group"

"It is true that the entire anti-communist press seizes upon these declarations of Maurice Thorez and gesticulates. But it is also true that the improvement is taking place. The Barbé-Côlor sectarian group which directed and oriented the Party policy since 1929 was removed in 1931. Our Party came out of that stronger and resumed its forward march. As I said to the cell Thursday, again today a group -- very

restricted, moreover -- manipulates the Party's Secretariat: the group directed by Georges Marchais who had himself elected Assistant Secretary General two weeks after having proclaimed on all the radios that the problem of such a designation did not even arise. Why does this group have its knife out for me?

"Beyond any other question, one of the problems I raise is for it an unpardonable crime. I obstinately demanded that the French people be told clearly: the socialism our Party hopes to establish in France is not that which Brejnev is today militarily imposing upon Czechoslovakia. This group cannot say that: it gave Prague, Bilak (that is to say, one of those who, with Indra, collaborates the most efficiently in the application in Czechoslovakia of the orders of the occupier whose invasion he approved as of 20 August and whose orders he carried out), the elements of the dossier which made it possible to overwhelm Dubcek. Bilak publicly thanked (in Rude Pravo) the 'French leaders' for their precious collaboration with his policy of 'normalization' (that which the occupier dictated, with its cortège of denunciations, exclusions, political repression and economic stagnation).

"After such a collaboration of the Marchais group with the Bilak-Indra group, there can be no question of disavowing the system Brejnev imposed militarily in Czechoslovakia. Even more so, can one repeat periodically that on 21 August the military form of intervention was disapproved? But one cannot wonder about the causes which would imply that one was looking for the profound reasons that led Brejnev to practice in Czechoslovakia in 1968 -- and in aggravating it -- the policy practiced by Stalin in 1948 with respect to Yugoslavia. The policy of the Marchais group also prohibits wondering about the consequences of intervention, that is to say, on the constant aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia since August 1968.

"This being the case, how could the group agree to discuss, as I proposed, the French model, condemned by the same intervention? How could it be accepted that these problems be raised in an objective manner (and not by truncating and caricaturing the texts) with all the militants of our Party, and, beyond that, with all those who in France honestly want socialism? This would, however, be necessary if one wanted to develop in a positive fashion the unity movement instead of our posing as the censors of others as Marchais does so often, which seems not to forgive our partners so simply for being different from us, for being others. In such conditions, how can there be discussions carried on serenely about the new 'historical bloc' whose scientific analysis alone makes it possible to refute neo-capitalist argumentation on the alleged dwindling of the laboring class and its historical revolutionary role, and to raise the problems of unity on the basis of their objective foundations? In order that our Party increase its influence and become more than ever a motivating element for the gathering of all forces capable of presenting a real alternative to

the present policy of the great patronat and its State, these problems must one day be raised.

"This is why, dear comrade, I leave 'on deposit' with you my Party card which for me symbolizes 37 years of my life. As of now, I beg you, dear comrade, to consider that I am requesting my re-integration in the Party. Because to this Party and to its militants I remain attached by all that has made and will not cease to make sense in my life: the struggle for socialism, for communism. Groups pass. The Party lives and will live. The sooner the group is isolated and set aside, the sooner our Party will experience a new burgeoning and hundreds of thousands of new members will participate in its combat to make it victorious. During this time, I will not remain inactive. I will try to serve our Party as always, even if this work has been made more difficult for me again by the situation in which I find myself.

"Tell my comrades that I understand very well their attitude when the Party Secretariat confronted them with this choice: either break discipline or expel me. If you think it useful, you may convey my letter to them, to the cell, to the Federation or to the central leadership of the Party.

"Fraternalily."

13 May 1970

CPYRGHT

# Rendering the final service

Orthodox French Communists are outraged by a film just released in Paris that depicts with shocking realism the horror of the false charges, torture and political show trials that took place in Czechoslovakia in the early 1950s.

"L'Aveu" (The Confession) was directed by Constantin Costa Gavras, the director of "Z." The scenario by Jorge Semprun was based on the book of the same French title by Artur London which is to be published in Britain and the United States this autumn under the title "On Trial."

By BERNARD FERON

This account of the Stalinist terror comes not from the imagination but from the memory of Artur London, the former Czech Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs arrested in 1951, put on trial with thirteen others, including Party Secretary Rudolf Slansky, sentenced two years later to life imprisonment and finally rehabilitated in 1956. It is one of the few works that can legitimately be called both socialist and realist, though the official defenders of "socialist realism" are scandalized by it.

The film is in fact scandalous, for it recounts what happened. The book partially explains how the Communist secret police managed to break men who had been able to withstand Gestapo torture and how the Communist regimes for so many years duped apparently sensible people into refusing to believe that the political trials were nothing but bloody farces.

Confessions were extracted from men broken by ill-treatment, hunger and, above all, lack of sleep. Convinced Communists agreed to confess in order to render a final service to a party that could never be wrong; others accepted the allegations in the hope of saving their families. They were caught up in the machinery from the moment that, to gain a respite, they acknowledged one of their "errors," and they ended by signing any confession.

French Communists were able to accept the book when it came out in September 1968, but they are claiming that the director and scenarist have made an "anti-Communist film from a book that was intended to be Communist." This opinion was expressed in *L'Humanité*, the French party's official organ.

It is up to Artur London to say whether the film makers have been faithful to his book, but it seems that though they have simplified the work they have remained true to its spirit and cut nothing essential.

In East Europe today it is con-

sidered bad taste to dwell on the misdeeds of Stalinism. The party has definitively condemned the personality cult and now the question is closed.

When the book came out the Prague Spring had not been strangled and many Communists agreed on the necessity of putting a human face back on socialism. But the wind is blowing cold again and now the film makers are being accused of deforming the truth by taking it out of historical context. True, they have not said everything. Does that mean they should have added extenuating circumstances and presented the trials as a regrettable mistake devoid of major—and abiding—consequences?

## History of an invasion

It is true that the film has developed an episode only lightly sketched in the book, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia—further proof, for *L'Humanité*, of its anti-Soviet intentions.

The Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia to reestablish a socialism nearer to Stalinism than to the Prague Spring. While there is probably no question of mass purges and violations of legality as blatant as the practices of the Stalinist period, conditions in the jails do not seem to have improved much. The book *Mon Témoignage* ("My Testimony"), by Anatoli Marchenko, published recently in France after being smuggled out of Russia, is all the more horrifying because it tells what is taking place in the Soviet Union now.

Artur London still thought, at the time his book was being published, that Czechoslovakia had scored a victory over the occupiers because it had not allowed any of its citizens to be put on trial.

The makers of the film seem less optimistic. It is not their fault that, between the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1970, the last vestiges of hope were destroyed in Prague.

POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI, Paris  
April 1970

## ADIEU AU PARTI

CPYRGHT

~~theodor prager~~

Chers camarades,

Je crois que nous sommes arrivés à un point où nous n'avons plus rien à nous dire. Je tiens toutefois à vous faire connaître non seulement que je quitte le Parti, mais aussi pourquoi je le quitte.

1. Il est bien clair que vous êtes décidés, dans votre grande majorité, à suivre n'importe quelle orientation adoptée par les dirigeants soviétiques, si réactionnaire qu'elle puisse être ; les uns par opportunisme, les autres par aveuglement.

2. Il est bien clair que vous êtes décidés à écarter et, dans la mesure du possible, à réduire au silence tous les camarades qui désapprouvent cette orientation. Vous avez laissé exclure Ernst Fischer, vous avez « condamné » Franz Marek, invalidé l'élection de Zapf, écœuré jusqu'à ce qu'ils se retirent Kodicek, M. Urban, West, limogé les anciens secrétaires de l'organisation de Vienne et en revanche installé à des positions-clés des ultras-conservateurs comme Karger et Schätzl. Vous êtes assurés de la gratitude de la patrie socialiste, mais il est non moins assuré que le Parti court désormais définitivement à sa ruine.

Le regret que j'en éprouve est grand, car je considère toujours que nous avons besoin en Autriche d'une gauche révolutionnaire indépendante. Encore faut-il qu'elle soit digne de crédit.

*Quel crédit peut-on accorder à l'article accusateur de Fürnberg sur l'emprisonnement du jeune Genner, alors qu'il n'a même pas eu un froncement de sourcil devant les années de prison infligées à des centaines d'étudiants de Varsovie et de Cracovie, les centaines d'étudiants brutalement matraqués à Prague, le traitement barbare dont ont récemment été victimes des intellectuels soviétiques ?*

Quel crédit peut-on accorder aux déclarations répétées de Muhri assurant que le Parti maintient sans restriction sa résolution du 22 août 1968, alors que notre journal passe obstinément sous silence la liquidation totale du programme d'action du parti communiste de Tchécoslovaquie, ainsi que le limogeage, la diffamation et la persécution de tous les véritables réformateurs tchécoslovaques ? Quel crédit peut-on accorder à vos professions de foi sur la participation aux décisions et la démocratie, alors que vous voulez faire de nos journalistes des plumitifs tout juste bons à obéir ? Des jeunes communistes, de simples exécutants ? De l'unité syndicale, l'instrument docile de secrétaires régionaux bornés ?

Quel que soit le regret que j'éprouve devant la ruine d'un parti qui, au cours de son histoire, a attiré et a compté dans ses rangs des milliers de ceux qui étaient parmi les meilleurs des militants ouvriers, des intellectuels et des jeunes révolutionnaires, je ne peux pas dire que la séparation me soit maintenant pénible. Il suffit de promener son regard sur ce qui reste du Comité central et du parti pour s'en aller d'un cœur léger. Sans doute en est-il encore plus d'un que l'on estime, plus d'un aussi qui conserve tout au moins à son crédit un passé plus ancien ; mais dans l'ensemble, la note dominante du tableau est donnée par des gens avec lesquels on n'éprouve réellement aucun besoin et aucune envie de siéger.

Je ne parle naturellement qu'en mon seul nom.

En ce qui te concerne, camarade Muhri, je t'accorde que tu as fait plusieurs tentatives sérieuses en vue de réformer et de sauver notre parti. Mais ensuite, dans le plus pur style opportuniste, tu as fait la paix avec l'« establishment » soviétique et les surgeons qu'il pousse sur notre sol, et tu t'es laissé entraîner à la remorque des ultras. Il ne reste plus du XIX<sup>e</sup> Congrès du parti qu'un souvenir et du XX<sup>e</sup> qu'un mauvais goût ; le reste est silence.

J'en ai fini...

Même sans rancune du Parti, je reste fidèle au socialisme. Si l'on se bat pour le socialisme — pour un socialisme démocratique et humain — on peut compter sur moi. Mais je n'ai aucun goût pour ce qui n'est que façade et emblème.

Le Dr Theodor Prager, économiste, est âgé de cinquante-deux ans. Il appartenait au mouvement communiste depuis trente-cinq ans et était membre du Comité central du P.C.A. depuis 1959. Il est l'auteur de nombreux travaux d'économie politique. Au XX<sup>e</sup> Congrès du P.C.A., en janvier 1969, Prager fut écarté, ainsi que trois autres novateurs, du Comité central, mais le vote ayant été annulé, tous les quatre furent de nouveau réélus. Il était parmi les 27 membres du C.C. qui s'abstenaient d'assister aux sessions du Comité central depuis le mois de novembre. De 1946 à 1963, Prager a collaboré à la Section économique du C.C. du P.C.A. tout en assumant les fonctions de rédacteur en chef de la *Volksstimme*, l'organe central du Parti. (N.D.L.R.)

POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI, Paris

April 1970

CPYRGHT

"FAREWELL TO THE PARTY"

(Text of Dr. Theodor Prager's Letter of Resignation)

Dr Theodor Prager, a 52 year old economist, has belonged to the communist movement for 35 years and was a member of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party since 1959. He is the author of several works on political economy. In January 1969, at the 20th Congress of the Austrian Communist Party, Prager and three other innovators of the Central Committee were ousted from that organ. The ballot was annulled however and all four were re-elected. Prager was among 27 Central Committee members who boycotted that body's meetings since November. From 1946 to 1963, Prager worked in the Central Committee's economic section and also served as editor in chief of Volksstimme, the party's central organ.

Dear comrades:

I believe that we have reached the point where we have nothing more to say to each other. I wish to tell you, however, not only that I am leaving the party but also why I am leaving it.

1. It is quite evident that you have decided by a large majority to follow any orientation that is adopted by the Soviet leaders regardless of how reactionary it may be -- some of you through opportunism, others through blindness.

2. It is very clear that you have decided to brush aside and to silence whenever possible all comrades who disapprove of this line. You have permitted Ernst Fischer to be excluded from the party, you have "condemned" Franz Marek, invalidated the election of Zapf, disheartened Kodicek, M Urban, and West until they dropped out, removed the former organization secretaries of Vienna, yet, you installed in some key positions



CPYRGHT

ultra conservatives like Karger and Schatzl. You are assured of the gratitude of the Socialist homeland, but it is quite as certain that the party henceforth will definitively go to its ruin. I regret this greatly because I always considered that in Austria we need an independent revolutionary left which is worthy of trust.

How much faith can one place in Furnberg's accusatory article about the imprisonment of young Genner when he did not even raise an eyebrow at the years of imprisonment imposed on hundreds of students in Warsaw and Cracow, the hundreds of students brutally bludgeoned in Prague, and the barbarous treatment some Soviet intellectuals have received recently?

How much faith can one have in Muhri's repeated statements assuring us that the party is following without reservations its resolution of 22 August 1968, while our newspaper stubbornly and silently neglected to report the total liquidation of the action program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the ousting, defamation, and persecution of all true Czechoslovak reformers? How much faith can one place in your promises about participation in decisions and democratic procedures when you transform our journalists into clerks deemed suitable only to take orders, when you make our young communists simple automatons, our trade union unity, the docile instrument of narrow-minded regional secretaries?

Whatever regret I feel for the ruin of a party which during its history attracted and included in its ranks thousands of individuals who were the best activist workers, intellectuals, and young revolutionaries, I cannot say that the separation is painful to me now. It is sufficient to look at what remains of the Central Committee and the party to forsake them lightheartedly. Probably there is more than one of these comrades who deserves respect, more than one whose seniority is longer than mine. On the whole, however, the picture is dominated by people for whom one feels no real need or longing to be associated with. Naturally, I speak only for myself.

Comrade Muhri, I concede that on your part you made several serious attempts to reform and save our party. Subsequently, however, in the purest opportunistic style, you came to terms with the Soviet "establishment" and the stooges it thrusts upon our land, and you let yourself be dragged in the tow of the extremists. Only a memory of the 19th Austrian Communist Party Congress remains; only a bad taste of the 20th. The rest is silence. I have finished....

Even without a party card, however, I shall remain faithful to socialism. If you will fight for socialism -- for a democratic and human socialism -- you can count on me. But I have no taste for that which is only facade and symbolism.

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June 1970

THE SOVIETS IN POLITICS AGAIN

Following is a brief chronology of events leading up to the press conferences described in the final paragraph.

Since before Kenya's independence, various Communist states have been involved in Kenya's politics through the funding of politicians, principally one Oginga Odinga. However, it was not until April this year that the Government of Kenya released official proof of clandestine Communist funding given Odinga and his now defunct party; funding which until that time had been a matter for speculation and rumor.

Oginga Odinga was a close associate of President Jomo Kenyatta during the pre-independence movement and he became Kenya's first Vice President. While in the office Odinga devoted his efforts to handling Communist aid funds and to selecting the 800 or more students who were to receive training in Communist countries. Some of the students were selected and sent clandestinely without the knowledge of the Kenya Government. Odinga took advantage of these roles to build up his own status as an eventual contender for Kenyatta's leadership. By 1965, Kenyatta recognized Odinga's intent and began a successful campaign to brand him as a subversive. Odinga and other far-left-wingers were driven out of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and Odinga lost the vice presidency.

In an attempt to recoup some political influence, Odinga in 1966 formed his own party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU). It was at this point that sizeable "clandestine" Communist funding began. The KPU was not selective: it relied heavily on funding from the USSR and East Germany as well as from North Korea and Communist China. Such funding continued until the party was outlawed in October 1969.

The ruling KANU establishment tolerated the KPU because, in spite of its Communist backers, the party remained isolated and weak. After the 5 July 1969 assassination of Kenya's Minister for Economic Development Tom Mboya, Odinga tried to make political capital out of the resultant turmoil and tribal upheaval to fan suspicions among many that Mboya's assassin had been hired by the KANU establishment. Official tolerance ended on 25 October when President Jomo Kenyatta and his party were the target of organized rioters and demonstrators in Kisumu, the heart of Luo-land and Odinga's homeland. Odinga and most of the remaining KPU leaders were imprisoned.

On 3 April 1970, the government-controlled Kenya News Agency issued a report by a former KPU official giving many details of Odinga's foreign financial support mechanisms that were operating from 1967 through 1969. On 4 April Kenya's Vice President Daniel Arap Moi held a press conference to present additional details and furnish photostats of correspondence between Odinga and the Soviet Embassy in Nairobi. Attached are reprints of articles from the Kenya East African Standard and Daily Nation which describe data presented to the press.

# Mr. ODINGA GIVEN COMMUNIST CASH—Claim

CPYRGHT

## Former detainee tells of intrigues

A former K.P.U. official, recently released from detention, claimed in Nairobi yesterday that the detained ex-president of the defunct K.P.U., Mr. Oginga Odinga, received more than £50,000 from Communist sources between 1967 and 1969.

The money came from China, Russia and North Korea and was intended to help Mr. Odinga wage a militant political battle against the Kenya Government, he said.

According to a report issued by the Government-controlled Kenya News Agency, Mr. Christopher Were Olonde, a former Kanu member and later a K.P.U. branch secretary and a close confidant of Mr. Odinga, told a large group of foreign and Kenya Press representatives that he was personally used by Mr. Odinga as a contact with Chinese Embassy officials in Nairobi, Kampala and Dar es Salaam to collect money.

In May, 1967, he left Kenya to live in Kampala and Mr. Odinga, with whom he had worked for many years, especially when Mr. Odinga was organising student air-lifts to Eastern countries, began using him as a foreign contact.

That year Mr. Odinga wrote him a letter offering to send him to Peking and Shanghai as a guest of the Chinese Society for Friendship with Foreign Countries and to negotiate for more funds to be sent to him.

Mr. Olonde's trip to China was arranged through the Chinese Embassy in Kampala and, after a month there, he returned with a promise that Mr. Odinga would receive £20,000 through the Chinese Embassy in Dar es Salaam. This did not include another £8,000 sent to him earlier.

When he later met Mr. Odinga in a Tororo hotel, he was told that

the balance of £12,000 had already been received.

In April 1968, Mr. Oginga arranged for another trip to "China" during which Mr. Olonde would be given 50,000 U.S. Dollars, which were deposited in his safe in the Bank of Baroda.

In April 1969, he said Mr. Odinga received another £12,000 in mixed currency from the Chinese Embassy in Kampala and £5,000 came from the North Korean Embassy in Dar es Salaam in January, 1969.

Later in the year, a meeting took place at the Chinese Embassy in Kampala in which he, Mr. Odinga, Mr. Okech-Odongo, Mr. Ochoa Achola and other K.P.U. officials met and a row broke out because the Chinese Embassy officials refused to give any more money "because they did not see what Odinga was doing with the sums

already advanced to him".

Mr. Olonde charged that arms were being smuggled into Central Nyanza through the efforts of the then K.P.U. youth wing leader, Mr. Ochoa Achola, and that, for more than ten years, China and Russia had been supplying money to Mr. Odinga. Although the Kenya Government was aware of this there was no way to stop the operation, especially from China, which he termed the "biggest single donor to Odinga".

Mr. Olonde alleged that, because of the disappointments suffered by Russians over the Kenya Government's refusal to accept a consignment of arms, the delay in the opening of the Kisumu Hospital and the proposed irrigation scheme, the Russians were usually reluctant to give Odinga any money "because it was not being spent on militant political activities".

He said that, from his inside knowledge of the affair, North Korea and East Germany had also been disappointed with the Kenya Government and wanted to overthrow any foreign governments that did not recognise them.

North Korea was disappointed because Kenya refused recognition, and East Germany suffered in the same manner, but because of foreign exchange difficulties they were not able to send money to Kenya for subversion.

North Korea and East Germany had therefore been waging a "disruptive battle" against Kenya.

Mr. Olonde ended his speech by appealing to those who "had been misled by Odinga" to abandon their activities. He called on them to join the Government in building a stable, united Kenya for the benefit of all.

He thanked President Kenyatta and the Government for "my quick release from detention".

# Letters to Nairobi Embassy released

## O-O ASKED RUSSIA FOR £70,000 POLLS HELP

CPYRGHT

*Standard Staff Reporter.*  
Photostat copies of letters written by the leader of the banned K.P.U., Mr. Odinga, to the Russian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires in Nairobi were shown to the Press yesterday by the Vice-President, Mr. Moi.

One letter, written in 1968 to the Chargé d'Affaires, acknowledged receipt of "the consignment" and asked for 200,000 dollars (more than (£70,000) to see the K.P.U. through the local government elections of that year.

The same letter spoke of the K.P.U.'s "struggle against anti-nationalist elements" in Kenya and its need for outside support. Kanu also, it said, required outside support, mainly in dollars.

Mr. Moi did not say if the nature of the "consignment" was known but said that the suggestion made by one reporter that it could have been a case of vodka was unlikely.

A number of the letters were on stationery bearing Mr. Odinga's personal letterhead. Mr. Moi

showed them to journalists and asked: "Do you doubt the signature?" There was also one letter with the signature of another K.P.U. leader, Mr. Achieng Onyko.

Mr. Moi said this was a very small selection from the documents the Government had. There were plenty more which would be disclosed in due course.

He said him aim was to confirm previous Government statements on the activities of individuals involving subversion and dealings with foreign powers.

The Government's only aim was to secure peace for Kenya. Its activities against certain people, some of whom were detained, was not in any way designed to protect Kanu but to protect the interests of the people of Kenya. People were not detained for nothing.

Some people doubted the Government's motives and suggested it was being unfair to the people in detention. By disclosing some of the information it had, the Government could prove that it was acting for the good of the country and show the people what had been going on.

Now that the K.P.U. had ceased to exist, there were still certain people whom the Government was watching. It was possible that some appeals to free the detainees were part of the subversive plan by those who did not recognise that Kenya was a sovereign State.

Anybody, from Kanu or outside and irrespective of his status, would be dealt with if he attempted subversion.

Mr. Moi went on to say that he believed that, of late, the Russian Embassy — and other embassies — had refrained from having contacts of the type suggested by Mr. Odinga's letters.

The first letter produced by Mr. Moi — under Mr. Odinga's letterhead — was dated June 17, 1968, and referred to "abortive" searches carried out by the Government on Mr. Odinga's person and property and attempts to create disunity in the K.P.U.

It warned the Russian Ambassador against two K.P.U. members whose contacts with Kanu Ministers had alarmed the party. A letter from Mr. Onyko to the Ambassador on the same date said that one of the men no longer enjoyed the confidence of the party leadership.

On July 12, 1968, Mr. Odinga addressed the Russian Charge d'Affaires as "Dear Mwananchi" and thanked him for arrangements being made to help, as his (Mr. Odinga's) own arrangements for the local government elections had run into difficulties. He hoped his Soviet friends would not let him down when he was expecting an outstanding victory. "A friend in need is a friend indeed," he said.

The letter referring to the consignment, which was received "in its entirety", had no date. It said it was essential to "complete the work

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"I consider in the present situation if we receive immediately the sum of 200,000 dollars it will see us through the local government elections. This does not include expenditure on the general election about which our representative will soon come to see you." Mr. Odinga asked for a speedy reply to his request.

A letter to the Ambassador in April 1968 asked him to help by arranging for a Mrs. Sonia Okoth to be given Russian citizenship for a time. "I know that when we come to control this country she is one of the rare ladies whose services will be very valuable to us like those of Mrs. Caroline Okelo-Odongo." If she was not "absorbed" into Russia in a few weeks, it would be too late.

There were also letters to Mr. Odinga with the signature of Mrs. Okoth asking him to help because the C.I.D. were "waiting for her". The letters said she would be sent to America and dealt with there "in the same way as Caroline here". (Mrs. Okelo-Odongo spent some time in detention in Kenya.) Asked if it had been too late to help Mrs. Okoth, Mr. Moi replied: "I can't say," but added he thought she must have left Kenya.

He said all the letters had come into the Government's possession about the time they were written.

A reporter asked him if the letters had reached the Russian Ambassador. Mr. Moi countered by asking the reporter where he came from. "From Russia," he said amid laughter.

Mr. Moi told him that all countries had their intelligence services to keep them informed, but added that his concern was not with the Russian Ambassador if he was approached by people, but with the people who approached him.

There had been one occasion when the Ambassador reprimanded them and said he did not want to see them again.

Embassies accredited to Kenya should respect the country and its Government and they would be respected. There was no distinction between one or another.

Asked why embassies involved in subversion were not closed, Mr. Moi said that lately they had refrained from this kind of thing. Kenya wanted friends, not enemies, and would only close an embassy if pushed to the limit.

Mr. Moi did not say if any detainees would be brought to court but asked about their future he said: "We want them to reform. We want them to be true Kenyans". Many of them had admitted what they had done and, if they wanted the chance to forget the past and start afresh, they would get it.

Later, the Russian Embassy in Nairobi denied receiving the letters produced by Mr. Moi. An official said: "We haven't got any letters from Mr. Odinga. I guess the Vice-President did not produce any confirmation from the Russian

Embassy about receipt of those letters."

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"Anyone can write letters, but the embassy cannot be responsible for anyone who sends letters. I can officially state that I cannot find any such letters on my files."

The official said the embassy dealt with the Government and not with individuals.

Earlier, the embassy commented on allegations by Mr. Were Olonde, a former detainee, that Mr. Odinga had received money through Russian embassies in East Africa. It dismissed the allegations as false.

The Chinese Embassy, which was implicated in Mr. Olonde's allegations, also dismissed them. An official there said they had been put out "to wreck and sabotage friendly relations between the two countries."

[Editorial comment — Page 4]

## East African Standard

Saturday, April 4, 1970.

Nairobi, Tel. 57633 (City Office 26421)

Reporters 26421

CPYRGHT

### Subversion countered

Kenya wants to create friends, not make enemies. This was the Vice-President's dictum when he revealed a sheaf of letters written by Mr. Odinga to the Soviet Union's embassy in Nairobi. Mr. Moi was explaining the policy of non-alignment, saying no distinction exists. If the U.S. or Britain took part in such intrigues, he said, similar action would be taken.

However, the letters in question were severally addressed to the Soviet Ambassador or a Chargé d'Affaires, acknowledging aid (one mentioned that "the consignment" had arrived) and soliciting further aid (one asked for 200,000 dollars which would see the K.P.U. through the 1968 local government elections but did not take account of the General Election).

All Kenya asks of diplomatic missions is respect for Kenya. Mr. Moi insisted, exactly as Kenya respects other countries. This is why the Government feels "the Soviet or any other embassy should desist" from such practices. A Soviet official in Nairobi, and a Tass reporter, were among Pressmen sitting round Mr. Moi's conference table. It is hoped they got the message.

Mr. Moi thought the Press and *wananchi* might be curious to know why the disclosures made by the former K.P.U. official, Mr. Olonde, who has been released from detention, and the bunch of letters, were being made public property. The reason is to prove the Government possesses substantial evidence and has not acted against individuals vindictively or without due cause. The first duty of any Government is to protect law and order in the country and preserve the peace for the benefit of its people. So, Mr. Moi warned, no subversive element can be tolerated and no person who indulges in subversion will be exempt, whatever position he might hold.

Anxious to convince the public about some aspects of what has happened, Mr. Moi's disclosures, on top of the revelations of Communist cash and arms made the previous day, are more than sufficient to prove the gravity of the situation. Yet he confessed to having more examples "in reserve". Kenya has been passing through a long period of underground conspiracy, threatening its peaceful life and ordered progress. It is no exaggeration to say the purpose of the plotting was to overthrow the popularly elected Government, and with it the

people's President. That the conspiracy has failed is a monument to the awareness of the security forces and the Government's sagacity in dealing with one incident after another, political and physical.

Why, then, have the K.P.U. detainees not been brought to trial? The reason was more than hinted at by Mr. Moi. Rather than court hearings which could result in heavy sentences, the preference lies with reformation. Indeed, Mr. Moi said in as many words that the Government is hoping the detainees will repent and, forsaking past practices, offer their services in co-operation with nation-building. In a mood of sincerity, they could expect the past to be forgotten; but their sincerity has to be proved beyond any shaking.

There is much to incur mistrust and *wananchi* will take careful note of the use foreign elements have sought to make of their misguided agents. With the K.P.U. leadership in detention, the likelihood is that the Communist Powers have been casting around for other tools to use. Mr. Moi left no doubt that condign action will be taken against anybody found guilty of trying to undermine Kenya's stability.

The extent of Mr. Olonde's disclosures cannot be taken in at first glance. He accused Mr. Odinga of receiving more than £50,000 from Communist sources between 1967 and 1969. There is far more to it than mere money, or the arms which were mentioned as having been smuggled into Central Nyanza.

The reaction of the Soviet and Chinese embassies was predictable — denials all along the line. It is notable, however, that in the somewhat equivocal answer to questions about the letters, the Soviet embassy did not deny they had been written — saying only they had not been received.

Of course, there are denials. One could scarcely expect admissions. But, in both Mr. Olonde's confession and the letters, there are indications of infiltration by Communist influences in all manner of directions, including the hospital at Kisumu. One disturbing inference to be drawn is the existence of a spy organisation working to disrupt Kenya's tranquillity.

Not only the Soviet Union, but other Communist countries have been implicated, contacts with Peking having been disclosed, with North Korea and East Germans. It seems not improbable that some rivalry arose between the principal four, while other countries could conceivably have been involved. At all events, dissatisfaction began to show over the results achieved at so much expense; or, rather, the paucity of results. Reluctance grew about supplying money which was "not always spent on militant political activities", as Mr. Olonde put it.

A final question needing investigation deals with how foreign money is paid over. As the East African currencies are freely exchangeable, there can be no check on the transfer to individuals living in Kenya of credits paid to bank accounts in Kampala or Dar es Salaam. Cannot some procedure be devised to guard against this misuse of diplomatic privilege on the part of certain missions?

DAILY NATION, Tanzania  
4 April 1970

**GIVE US MONEY,**

**SAY DOCUMENTS RELEASED BY MOI**

# Odinga letters

CPYRGHT


## to the Russians

CPYRGHT

By NATION Reporter

**LESS than 24 hours after disclosures of alleged Communist aid to Mr. Oginga Odinga, the detained leader of the defunct Kenya People's Union, Vice-President Daniel arap Moi yesterday revealed correspondence between Mr. Odinga and the Soviet Ambassador in Nairobi.**

There was also some correspondence between the same Embassy and Mr. Achieng Oneko, who was the party's publicity secretary



Above, Mr. Odinga. Below, two letters produced by Mr. Moi, one signed by Mr. Achieng Oneko, the other by Mr. Odinga.

One of the letters, said to have been signed by Mr. Odinga himself and dated June 17, 1968, requested a sum of \$200,000 that would see the party "through the local government elections."

The letter added: "This does not include expenditure for general elections which our representative will soon come to discuss with you."

Another letter that Mr. Odinga allegedly wrote to the *Charge d'Affaires* in the Soviet Embassy in Nairobi read:

"It is with regret that I am writing to you that ever since my last letter and although your reply was verbally conveyed to me that I need not worry, that arrangements are on the way to help me; so far I am at a loss.

"All my forces who are doing very well on the campaign to Local Governments elections are now stranded do (sic) to

lack of transport, deposits and other necessary expenses.

"I am so much worried that I feel; friends are letting me down at a crucial time. When I am really assured of devastating victory. Is my Soviet friends going to let me down at this time? A friend in need is a friend in deed. Please let me have reply by return," ended the letter, which was signed by Mr. Odinga.

An extract from another letter told the Ambassador that the party did not accept individuals running to "Embassy for anything. We are a responsible party and would ask your Excellency to be cautious in dealing with such people even if they have been known to you in the past."

The letter from Achieng Oneko, dated June 15, 1968, said: "I understand that Oyange has been to your Embassy for reasons known to him. I feel it is important to keep you informed of the recent development.

"Oyange and one other person have been in very close touch with Kenya Attorney-General. The main purpose has been to keep the Attorney informed of what is going on in party.

"Oyange in fact has been working in close touch with Rading Omolo and those persons that have turned against this party. The main idea has been to establish the party's source of assistance from friends. Oyange has given the party a lot of trouble in spite of the fact that the party has done all it could to assist him.

### DOUBLE GAME

"He has made mistakes and is no longer in confidence with the leadership. He is responsible for spreading malicious rumours all over for his personal consideration. It would be ill-advised if you gave him audience.



SUBVERSION

RESPECT US

"He [Mr. Moi] is a person who aims to play double game to assist in destroying relationship that exist between us. We have tried to assist this man, but because of his pre-release commitments to KANU Government, he tries to deliver the goods to keep his position as an informer.

"When he came to your Embassy, he simply did so to establish that he was close to you and perhaps he had informers with him. It is true he forced himself in a party van, but this was an indication of establishment that KPU was closely in working association with the Soviet Embassy in Nairobi.

"What I am trying to convey will be confirmed next week when Hon. Oginga Odinga returns to Nairobi. However, I feel that I should give you some hint in this respect. I am sure you have had a lot in the past in dealing with such character and hope this move will not surprise you. Oyange's move has a deliberate motive — the main purpose is to marr the good understanding that exists between us for his personal consideration."

Mr. Moi also read a letter written to Mr. Odinga from a Mrs. Milisky Okoth, asking him to contact the Soviet Embassy in Nairobi with a view to making arrangements for her taking up Russian citizenship.

This was because according to the letter, the CID were waiting for her in Nairobi and would be deporting her to the United States on arrival.

Mr. Moi revealed the correspondence at a Press conference in Nairobi that was attended by the Minister of State, Mr. Mbiyu Koinange, and an Assistant Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Martin Shikuku. Mr. Moi said he wished to reaffirm the Government's previous statements on individual activities with regard to subversion and contacts with foreign powers.

"It is the objective of the Kenya Government under the leadership of President Kenyatta to make Kenya a peaceful country for all," he added.

The activities of some people, "some of whom we have detained," did not suggest that the Government was detaining them for the mere sake of detaining them. "We are merely protecting the interests of Kenya."

Some people, he stated, including the Press had been doubting the Government's stand. Some thought that the Government was only protecting Kanu.

Although the KPU did not exist, certain of its elements still existed, and the Government was on the look-out.

"We do not expect any person, be he in Kanu or otherwise, to subvert Kenya," he said, saying that the letters he had shown the Press endorsed Thursday's statement by a former KPU official that Mr. Odinga had received Communist funds to further the KPU's militant activities in Kenya.

Mr. Moi warned: "Anybody who is being used by foreign powers will be dealt with. Any Government worth its soul will have a responsible intelligence network.

"Our concern is not the Soviet Ambassador. He was contacted, and it could have been by anybody. And the British or American or the Chinese. Embassies can be contacted.

"But we want countries of respective embassies in Kenya to respect us and we shall respect them," he emphasised.

He added that knew the respective embassies giving "illegal aid" to some people had refrained from doing so, and opposed a suggestion that Kenya break off diplomatic relations with those countries.

"We don't want enemies with anybody. We want to make friends," he went on.

Asked if he would, now that he had evidence, bring those people in detention to court, he said: "I do not think so. This shows that the Government is lenient.

"All we want them to do is reform and become good citizens. All we want them to do is repent. Some have confessed that they realised they had gone beyond the limit, but we want genuine repentance... and a guarantee that they will be true Kenyans," Mr. Moi concluded.

this respect. I am sure you have had a lot in the past in dealing with such character and hope this move will not surprise you. Oyange's move has a deliberate motive— the main purpose is to marr the good understanding that exists between us for his personal consideration.

Thanks.

Yours sincerely,

*R. Achier*

R. Achier, Creko.

We are a responsible Party and would ask Your Excellency to be cautious in dealing with such people even if they have been known to you in the past.

*Yours sincerely*  
*H.E.*

CPYRGHT

## AJUMA OGINGA ODINGA, M.P.

President, Kenya Peoples' Union (K.P.U.)

Telephone:

Nairobi - 57720

32311

62207 (Home)

Kisumu - 69

2147 (Home)

P.O. Box 782, Kisumu, Kenya

P.O. Box 13079, Nairobi, Kenya

Nyumbura Kang'o, P.O. Bonda, Kenya

Dated Nairobi/Kisumu.....

12-7-66.

The Charge de Affairs  
Soviet Embassy  
Nairobi.

Dear Mr. Mamaishev,

It is with regret that I am writing to you that ever since my last letter, and although your reply was verbally conveyed to me that I need not worry, that arrangements are on the way to help me; so far I am at a loss. All my friends who are doing very well on the Campaign to Local Government elections, are now stranded do to lack of transport, deposits and other necessary expenses. I am so much worried that I feel friends are letting me down at a crucial time, when I am really assured of devastating victory. Is my Soviet friends going to let me down at this time? A friend in need is a friend in deed. Please let me hear reply by return.  
Yrs. J.O.

A photo-copy of the letter  
signed by Odinga asking for  
money.

CPYRGHT

in the General Election. Our plans and strategy are to intensify activities in the Urban and selected favourable rural areas which will be used as bases for the General Elections.

This is why I am appealing to the Committee to reconsider the assistance urgently. We have started the work and it must be completed and one can only assess the success on the outcome of the forthcoming local elections, notwithstanding the impediments and difficult placed before us. I consider in the present situation if we received a immediately a sum of 200,000 dollars will see us through the local Government elections. This does not include expenditure for General Elections which our representative will soon come to discuss with you.

With these remarks I end and hope to hear from you soon.

P/S.  
Local Election  
in August.  
Reply shd. be  
in June.

Yours

*Sincerely*  
*ASB*

A letter, bearing Mr. Odinga's initials, to the Russian Ambassador.

## FREED DETAINEE

### TELLS OF AID FROM CHINA AND RUSSIA

# 'Communists gave guns and cash to Odinga'

CPYRGHT

*By NATION Reporter*

**THE detained leader of the banned Kenya People's Union, Mr. Oginga Odinga, was yesterday alleged to have received £55,000 from the Soviet Union and China between 1967 and 1969 to further militant activities in Kenya.**

Mr. Christopher Were Olonde, a former KPU supporter and associate of Mr. Odinga and one-time chairman and secretary of the Central Nyanza branch of Kanu, said at a Press conference called by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in Nairobi that he had himself been sent twice to negotiate for funds with the Russian and Chinese authorities.

The £55,000, he said he knew of, allegedly came through the embassies of these two countries in Dar es Salaam and Kampala. Some of the money had been deposited in the Kampala branch of the Bank of Baroda, he asserted.

Mr. Olonde, who was in detention in Kenya and released three weeks ago, denounced Mr. Odinga and apologised to the Government and the President, saying he had learnt his mistakes. He thanked the Government for releasing him from detention.

Mr. Olonde said he had known and worked with Mr. Odinga for many years, and 1967 was the turning point when Mr. Odinga reproached him for his continuous association with Mr. Tom Mboya, the late Minister for Economic Planning and Development.

"When I went to live in Uganda in May, 1967, Mr. Odinga came to me and said I was not of much use because I was staying outside Kenya.

"He, however, later made arrangements for my trip to China through the Chinese Embassy in Kampala to negotiate funds for him.

"I went to the Chinese Embassy (in Kampala), and I was informed I had been invited and should prepare to go at any moment. I was to be met by Mr. East Africa DP 79-01194A000400090001-3

"On August 19, 1968, I arrived in Peking and the following day I met officials of the Chinese Government. They asked me about the situation in Kenya which I explained.

"They asked me also about the strength of the KPU and the welfare of Oginga Odinga, and asked me to state his problems. Mr. Olonde told the Press conference: "They asked me to

state the figure of the financial aid, and they told me the money would be sent to the appropriate people in Kenya for consideration.

"I went to Shanghai Airport where an official of the Chinese Government told me that £20,000 would be sent to Mr. Oginga and received in Dar es Salaam. Some £8,000 had been received earlier.

"On September 1, I came back and explained to Mr. Oginga and outcome of the trip and that the 20,000 would be received in October." The meeting took place at an hotel in Tororo.

"Mr. Oginga suggested that I should go back and negotiate for more. I went back, but this time the Chinese refused to meet me.

"By this time, Oginga had already received £50,000 from the Soviet Embassy in Kampala. This money was deposited in the Bank of Baroda in Kampala.

"On October 4, 1969, he again received £12,000 in dollar and pound denominations from the Soviet Embassy in Kampala.

"When he visited Kampala after the Pope's visit, he received £5,000 and also £4,000 from North Korea.

"He disclosed this to me while he was blaming me for doing nothing in Kampala. When in Kampala, my job was only to negotiate for funds.

"Between 1967 and 1969, £55,000 came to Mr. Oginga through my negotiations and knowledge," Mr. Olonde said.

Mr. Olonde went on: "Mr. Oginga at the time introduced a topic while at the Chinese Embassy in Kampala that they had neglected him and not given him funds. The Chinese said that they knew Mr. Odinga owned some businesses in Kenya. They wanted to know what he had done with the sums already advanced to him.

"My job with the KPU was to handle matters concerning party organisation."

Mr. Olonde also charged that he knew of an "arms racket" and that arms were being smuggled into Central Nyanza through the efforts of the then KPU Youth Wing leader, Mr. Ochola Achola, and that for more than ten years China and Russia had been supplying money to Mr. Odinga. Although the Kenya Government was aware of this, there was no way to stop the operation.

"I was a close relative of Mr. Odinga, but my relation with him has come to an end. He has been receiving foreign funds, and he might do so in the future.

"The Chinese had said they were very disappointed with the way Odinga spent the money.

"Kenya had angered Russia by expelling her diplomats. Arms that were sent were rejected, the Kisumu Hospital

opened after a considerable delay and an irrigation scheme was rejected.

"North Korea was to open an Embassy in Nairobi immediately after independence, but the embassy was refused. It was the bitterest diplomatic setback in the whole of Africa.

"It (North Korea) would have liked to support Odinga, but foreign exchange was the problem. I know they sometimes sent Mr. Odinga some goods but they never reached him."

He said he understood that both North Korea and East Germany had also been disappointed with the Kenya Government and their wish had been to overthrow any foreign governments that did not recognise them.

North Korea and East Germany therefore had been waging "a disruptive battle against Kenya."

A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi, when contacted last night, said he did not understand English, adding: "Office is over."

And at the Russian Embassy, a spokesman said: "It is very difficult at this time to say anything."

10 April 1970

CPYRGHT

# Government hopes for change of heart by Odinga

Standard Staff Reporter,  
London.

The Kenya Government hoped that Mr. Odinga, the detained former Leader of the Opposition, would soon see the error of his ways and return to society to help in the country's development.

This was said in London yesterday by the Kenya Minister for Agriculture, Mr. McKenzie, speaking in the B.B.C. World Service programme "Focus on Africa".

Mr. McKenzie, who called for greater inter-territorial co-operation on security matters, said that the former K.P.U. leader had recently been visited by friends, was in good health and was being well cared for.

Asked why Mr. Odinga and other

detainees had not been brought to trial, the Minister said the Government believed that corrective treatment in detention was a better course to pursue to encourage people to see the error of their ways.

"Once they have done so there is no reason why they should not be accepted back into society."

He dismissed a suggestion that the hoped-for change of heart might not be genuine. It was difficult, he said, for non-Africans to understand the Africans' capacity to forgive and forget. The President himself had suffered long years of detention but had shown, especially to non-Africans, that he could put the past behind him.

"I sincerely hope that a change of heart takes place," he added. If

it did he did not rule out Mr. Odinga's return to public life.

He did not consider the Luo would take the Vice-President's disclosures about Mr. Odinga's alleged money deals or the revelations by the former detainee, Mr. Olonde, as an attack on the tribe.

"I personally have great admiration for the Luo people."

The way in which they had conducted themselves during the elections and the quality of those they returned to Parliament showed their strength and capabilities.

He believed that the Luo "will accept that all the Kenya Government wants is for the K.P.U. leaders to have a change of heart and denounce what they have been doing and help in the development of the country."

Returning to the Odinga letters, the Minister added that the Government had other information in its possession, which it would publish if further evidence was required.

Mr. Olonde was free to do what he pleased, "an example of the great trait of our President to forgive people."

Mr. McKenzie hoped that other K.P.U. leaders would now "come clean, and come back into society."

Questioned on the authenticity of the Odinga letters, he said: "We can easily recognise Odinga's writing, and also his signature."

He stressed that the case highlighted the need for closer co-operation on security matters between certain African States. Information should be exchanged on escapees and nationals of one country operating in another.

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TRICONTINENTAL, Havana  
January-February 1970

CPYRGHT

### Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla

To the reader: The front and back covers of our issue number 16 are dedicated to the urban actions that are occurring in various Latin-American countries -- Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, etc. -- because of those who have said "enough!" to exploitation and have decided to forge a new destiny for our peoples. Outstanding in guerrilla warfare was Carlos Marighella, who was one of its strongest advocates, in theory and in practice. Months before he fell, struck down by the Brazilian dictatorship's bullet, Marighella left the summary of his rich combat experience in Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. Conceived as an instrument of the armed struggle in the cities of Brazil, the Minimanual contains valuable lessons useful to any revolutionary. By publishing it in its entirety in "Starting Points," Tricontinental fulfills its mission of spreading to the fullest extent possible revolutionary ideas, strategy, and tactics.

On Tuesday, November 4, 1969, Carlos Marighella fell assassinated in Sao Paulo. On that day, two lives were simultaneously interrupted: the life of a man who for close to 40 years had been shaped in opposing reaction, in public or clandestine struggle against the dominant system; and that of the urban guerrilla hounded by implacable persecution, killed in an ambush just as he is at the point of beginning rural guerrilla warfare, the next step in his liberation cycle.

Marighella had the merit of making valuable contribution to the revolutionary cause in both theory and practice. During the last years of his life, as a parallel to the action he undertook, he wrote intensively to support his theories about the liberation of Brazil.

Among his writings, his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla which Tricontinental offers in its pages, has a special importance. The work examines exhaustively the conditions, characteristics, necessities, and methods of the guerrilla war and the urban guerrillas, broadly demonstrating his sense of detail, of organization, and his mental clarity. It also shows, in passing, that Marighella was endowed with inexhaustible confidence and affection for man, and with a youthfulness that negated his 58 years and death.

For the experiences it turns over in its pages and for its detailed foresight, the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla will become one of the principal books of every man who, as a consequence of the inevitable battle against the bourgeoisie and imperialism, takes the road of armed rebellion.



I WOULD LIKE to make a twofold dedication of this work: first to the memories of Edson Souto, Marco Antonio Brás de Carvalho, Nelson José de Almeida ("Escoteiro"), and so many other heroic fighters and urban guerrillas who fell at the hands of assassins of the Military Police, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the DOPS,<sup>1</sup> hated instruments of the repressive military dictatorship.

Second, to the brave comrades -- men and women -- imprisoned in the medieval dungeons of the Brazilian Government and subjected to tortures that even surpass the horrendous crimes practiced by the Nazis.

Like those comrades whose memory we revere, as well as those taken prisoner in battle, what we must do is fight.

Each comrade who opposes the military dictatorship and wants to fight it can do something, however insignificant the task may seem.

I urge all who read this minimanual and reach the conclusion that they cannot remain inactive, to follow its instructions and join the fight now. I do so because, under whatever hypothesis and in whatever circumstances, the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.

Another important problem is not merely to read the minimanual here and now, but to circulate its contents. This circulation will be possible if those who agree with its ideas make mimeographed copies or print it in a pamphlet, though in this latter case, armed struggle itself will be necessary.

Finally, the reason that the present minimanual bears my signature, is that the ideas expressed or systematized here reflect the personal experience of a group of men engaged in armed struggle in Brazil, among whom I have the honor to be included. So that certain individuals will have no doubt about what this minimanual proclaims and can no longer deny the facts or continue to state that the conditions for the struggle do not exist, it is necessary to assume responsibility for what is said and done. Hence anonymity becomes a problem in a work such as this. The important fact is that there are patriots prepared to fight like ordinary soldiers, and the more there are the better.

The accusation of assault or terrorism no longer has the pejorative meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing, a new coloration. It does not factionalize, it does not discredit; on the contrary it represents a focal point of attraction.

Today to be an assailant or a terrorist is a quality that ennoble any honorable man because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its monstrosities.

#### **A Definition of the Urban Guerrilla**

The chronic structural crisis characteristic of Brazil today, and its resultant political instability, are what have brought about the upsurge of revolutionary war in the country. The revolutionary war manifests itself in the form of urban guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, or rural guerrilla warfare. Urban guerrilla warfare or psychological warfare in the city depends on the urban guerrilla.

The urban guerrilla is a man who fights the military dictatorship with arms, using unconventional methods. A political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. The area in which the urban guerrilla acts is in the large Brazilian cities. There are also bandits, commonly known as outlaws, who work in the big cities. Many times assaults by outlaws are taken as actions by urban guerrillas.

The urban guerrilla, however, differs radically from the outlaw. The outlaw benefits personally from the action, and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploited and the exploiters, which is why there are so many ordinary men and women among his victims.

<sup>1</sup> Department of Public and Social Order. (Editor's note)

The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans.

Another element just as prejudicial as the outlaw and also operating in the urban area is the right-wing counterrevolutionary who creates confusion, assaults banks, hurls bombs, kidnaps, assassinates, and commits the worst imaginable crimes against urban guerrillas, revolutionary priests, students, and citizens who oppose fascism and seek liberty.

The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the men who dominate the country and exercise power. The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers, and the Brazilian upper class.

The urban guerrilla is not afraid of dismantling and destroying the present Brazilian economic, political, and social system, for his aim is to help the rural guerrilla and to collaborate in the creation of a totally new and revolutionary social and political structure, with the armed people in power.

The urban guerrilla must have a certain minimal political understanding. To gain that he must read certain printed or mimeographed works such as:

*Guerrilla Warfare* by Che Guevara

*Memories of a Terrorist*

*Some Questions about the Brazilian*

*Guerrilla Operations and Tactics*

*On Strategic Problems and Principles*

*Certain Tactical Principles for Comrades Undertaking*

*Guerrilla Operations*

*Organizational Questions*

*O Guerrilheiro*, newspaper of the Brazilian revolutionary groups.

#### **Personal Qualities of the Urban Guerrilla**

The urban guerrilla is characterized by his bravery and decisive nature. He must be a good tactician and a good shot. The urban guerrilla must be a person of great astuteness to compensate for the fact that he is not sufficiently strong in arms, ammunition, and equipment.

The career militarists or the government police have modern arms and transport, and can go about anywhere freely, using the force of their power. The urban guerrilla does not have such resources at his disposal and leads a clandestine existence. Sometimes he is a convicted person or is out on parole, and is obliged to use false documents.

Nevertheless, the urban guerrilla has a certain advantage over the conventional military or the police. It is that, while the military and the police act on behalf of the enemy, whom the people hate, the urban guerrilla defends a just cause, which is the people's cause.

The urban guerrilla's arms are inferior to the enemy's, but from a moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority.

This moral superiority is what sustains the urban guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his principal duty, which is to attack and to survive.

The urban guerrilla has to capture or divert arms from the enemy to be able to fight. Because his arms are not uniform, since what he has are expropriated or have fallen into his hands in different ways, the urban guerrilla faces the problem of a variety of arms and a shortage of ammunition. Moreover, he has no place to practice shooting and marksmanship.

These difficulties are not insurmountable. The urban guerrilla must be imaginative and creative, qualities without which it would be impossible for him to carry out his role as a revolutionary.

The urban guerrilla must possess initiative, mobility, and flexibility, as well as versatility and a command of any situation. Initiative especially is an indispensable quality. It is not always possible to foresee everything, and the urban guerrilla cannot let himself become confused; or wait for orders. His duty is to act, to find adequate solutions for each problem he faces, and not to retreat. It is better to err acting than to do nothing for fear of erring. Without initiative there is no urban guerrilla warfare.

Other important qualities in the urban guerrilla are the following: to be a good walker, to be able to stand up against fatigue, hunger, rain, heat. To know how to hide and to be vigilant. To conquer the art of dissembling. Never to fear danger. To behave the same by day as by night. Not to act impetuously. To have unlimited patience. To remain calm and cool in the worst conditions and situations. Never to leave a track or trail. Not to get discouraged.

In the face of the almost insurmountable difficulties of urban warfare, sometimes comrades weaken, leave, give up the work.

The urban guerrilla is not a businessman in a commercial firm nor is he a character in a play. Urban guerrilla warfare, like rural guerrilla warfare, is a pledge the guerrilla makes to himself. When he cannot face the difficulties, or knows that he lacks the patience to wait, then it is better to relinquish his role before he betrays his pledge, for he clearly lacks the basic qualities necessary to be a guerrilla.

#### How the Urban Guerrilla Lives and Subsists

The urban guerrilla must know how to live among the people and must be careful not to appear strange and separated from ordinary city life.

He should not wear clothes that are different from those that other people wear. Elaborate and high fashion clothing for men or women may often be a handicap if the urban guerrilla's mission takes him into working class neighborhoods or sections where such dress is uncommon. The same care has to be taken if the urban guerrilla moves from the South to the North or vice versa.

The urban guerrilla must live by his work or professional activity. If he is known and sought by the police, if he is convicted or is on parole, he must go underground and sometimes must live hidden. Under such circumstances, the urban guerrilla cannot reveal his activity to anyone, since that is always and only the responsibility of the revolutionary organization in which he is participating.

The urban guerrilla must have a great capacity for observation, must be well informed about everything, principally about the enemy's movements, and must be very searching and knowledgeable about the area in which he lives, operates, or through which he moves.

But the fundamental and decisive characteristic of the urban guerrilla is that he is a man who fights with arms; given this condition, there is very little likelihood that he will be able to follow his normal profession for long without being identified. The role of expropriation thus looms as clear as high noon. It is impossible for the urban guerrilla to exist and survive without fighting to expropriate.

Thus, within the framework of the class struggle, as it inevitably and necessarily sharpens, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives:

- a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police;
- b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself.

It is clear that the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla also has other objectives. But here we are referring to the two basic objectives, above all expropriation. It is necessary for every urban guerrilla to keep in mind always that he can only maintain his existence if he is disposed to kill the police and those dedicated to repression, and if he is determined — truly determined — to expropriate the wealth of the big capitalists, the latifundists, and the imperialists.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the Brazilian revolution is that from the beginning it developed around the expropriation of the wealth of the major bourgeois, imperialist, and latifundist interests, without excluding the richest and most powerful commercial elements engaged in the import-export business.

And by expropriating the wealth of the principal enemies of the people, the Brazilian revolution was able to hit them at their vital center, with preferential and systematic attacks on the banking network — that is to say, the most telling blows were leveled against capitalism's nerve system.

The bank robberies carried out by the Brazilian urban guerrillas hurt such big capitalists as Moreira Salles and others, the foreign firms which insure and reinsure the banking capital, the imperialist companies, the federal and state governments — all of them systematically expropriated as of now.

The fruit of these expropriations has been devoted to the work of learning and perfecting urban guerrilla techniques, the purchase, the production, and the transportation of arms and ammunition for the rural areas, the security apparatus of the revolutionaries, the daily maintenance of the fighters, of those who have been liberated from prison by armed force and those who are wounded or persecuted by the police, or to any kind of problem concerning comrades liberated from jail, or assassinated by the police and the military dictatorship.

The tremendous costs of the revolutionary war must fall on the big capitalists, on imperialism, and the latifundists and on the government too, both federal and state, since they are all exploiters and oppressors of the people.

Men of the government, agents of the dictatorship and of North American imperialism principally, must pay with their lives for the crimes committed against the Brazilian people.

In Brazil, the number of violent actions carried out by urban guerrillas, including deaths, explosions, seizures of arms, ammunition, and explosives, assaults on banks and prisons, etc., is significant enough to leave no room for doubt as to the actual aims of the revolutionaries. The execution of the CIA spy Charles Chandler, a member of the US Army who came from the war in Viet-Nam to infiltrate the Brazilian student movement, the military henchmen killed in bloody encounters with urban guerrillas, all are witness to the fact that we are in full revolutionary war and that the war can be waged only by violent means.

This is the reason why the urban guerrilla uses armed struggle and why he continues to concentrate his activity on the physical extermination of the agents of repression, and to dedicate twenty-four hours a day to expropriation from the people's exploiters.

#### Technical Preparation of the Urban Guerrilla

No one can become an urban guerrilla without paying special attention to technical preparation.

The technical preparation of the urban guerrilla runs from the concern for his physical preparedness, to knowledge of and apprenticeship in professions and skills of all kinds, particularly manual skills.

The urban guerrilla can have strong physical resistance only if he trains systematically. He cannot be a good fighter if he has not

learned the art of fighting. For that reason the urban guerrilla must learn and practice various kinds of fighting, of attack, and personal defense.

Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking, camping, and practice in survival in the woods, mountain climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving, training as a frogman, fishing, harpooning, and the hunting of birds, small and big game.

It is very important to learn how to drive, pilot a plane, handle a motor boat and a sail boat, understand mechanics, radio, telephone, electricity, and have some knowledge of electronic techniques.

It is also important to have a knowledge of topographical information, to be able to locate one's position by instruments or other available resources, to calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale, make timings, work with an angle protractor, a compass, etc.

A knowledge of chemistry and of color combination, of stamp-making, the domination of the technique of calligraphy and the copying of letters and other skills are part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obliged to falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy.

In the area of auxiliary medicine he has the special role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, drugs, elemental surgery, and emergency first aid.

The basic question in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla is nevertheless to know how to handle arms such as the machine gun, revolver, automatic, FAL, various types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, bazookas, etc.

A knowledge of various types of ammunition and explosives is another aspect to consider. Among the explosives, dynamite must be well understood. The use of incendiary bombs, of smoke bombs, and other types are indispensable prior knowledge.

To know how to make and repair arms, prepare Molotov cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destructive devices, how to blow up bridges, tear up and put out of service rails and sleepers, these are requisites in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla that can never be considered unimportant.

The highest level of preparation for the urban guerrilla is the center for technical training. But only the guerrilla who has already passed the preliminary examination can go on to this school --- that is to say, one who has passed the proof of fire in revolutionary action, in actual combat against the enemy.

#### **The Urban Guerrilla's Arms**

The urban guerrilla's arms are light arms, easily exchanged, usually captured from the enemy, purchased, or made on the spot.

Light arms have the advantage of fast handling and easy transport. In general, light arms are characterized as short barreled. This includes many automatic arms.

Automatic and semiautomatic arms considerably increase the fighting power of the urban guerrilla. The disadvantage of this type of arm for us is the difficulty in controlling it, resulting in wasted rounds or in a prodigious use of ammunition, compensated for only by optimal aim and firing precision. Men who are poorly trained convert automatic weapons into an ammunition drain.

Experience has shown that the basic arm of the urban guerrilla is the light machine gun. This arm, in addition to being efficient and easy to shoot in an urban area, has the advantage of being greatly respected by the enemy. The guerrilla must know thoroughly how to handle the machine gun, now so popular and indispensable to the Brazilian urban guerrilla.

The ideal machine gun for the urban guerrilla is the Ina 45 calibre. Other types of machine guns of different calibres can be used

-- understanding, of course, the problem of ammunition. Thus it is preferable that the industrial potential of the urban guerrilla permit the production of a single machine gun so that the ammunition used can be standardized.

Each firing group of urban guerrillas must have a machine gun managed by a good marksman. The other components of the group must be armed with .38 revolvers, our standard arm. The .32 is also useful for those who want to participate. But the .38 is preferable since its impact usually puts the enemy out of action.

Hand grenades and conventional smoke bombs can be considered light arms, with defensive power for cover and withdrawal.

Long barrel arms are more difficult for the urban guerrilla to transport and attract much attention because of their size. Among the long barrel arms are the FAL, the Mauser guns or rifles, hunting guns such as the Winchester, and others.

Shotguns can be useful if used at close range and point blank. They are useful even for a poor shot, especially at night when precision isn't much help. A pressure airgun can be useful for training in marksmanship. Bazookas and mortars can also be used in action but the conditions for using them have to be prepared and the people who use them must be trained.

The urban guerrilla should not try to base his actions on the use of heavy arms, which have major drawbacks in a type of fighting that demands lightweight weapons to insure mobility and speed.

Homemade weapons are often as efficient as the best arms produced in conventional factories, and even a cut-off shotgun is a good arm for the urban guerrilla.

The urban guerrilla's role as gunsmith has a fundamental importance. As gunsmith he takes care of the arms, knows how to repair them, and in many cases can set up a small shop for improvising and producing efficient small arms.

Work in metallurgy and on the mechanical lathe are basic skills the urban guerrilla should incorporate into his industrial planning, which is the construction of homemade weapons.

This construction and courses in explosives and sabotage must be organized. The primary materials for practice in these courses must be obtained ahead of time to prevent an incomplete apprenticeship -- that is to say, so as to leave no room for experimentation.

Molotov cocktails, gasoline, homemade contrivances such as catapults and mortars for firing explosives, grenades made of tubes and cans, smoke bombs, mines, conventional explosives such as dynamite and potassium chloride, plastic explosives, gelatine capsules, ammunition of every kind are indispensable to the success of the urban guerrilla's mission.

The method of obtaining the necessary materials and munitions will be to buy them or to take them by force in expropriation actions especially planned and carried out.

The urban guerrilla will be careful not to keep explosives and materials that can cause accidents around for very long, but will try always to use them immediately on their destined targets.

The urban guerrilla's arms and his ability to maintain them constitute his fire power. By taking advantage of modern arms and introducing innovations in his fire power and in the use of certain arms, the urban guerrilla can change many of the tactics of city warfare. An example of this was the innovation made by the urban guerrillas in Brazil when they introduced the machine gun in their attacks on banks.

When the massive use of uniform machine guns becomes possible, there will be new changes in urban guerrilla warfare tactics. The firing group that utilizes uniform weapons and corresponding ammunition, with reasonable support for their maintenance, will reach a considerable level of efficiency. The urban guerrilla increases his efficiency as he improves his firing potential.

**The Shot: the Urban Guerrilla's Reason for Existence**

The urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and survives, is to shoot. The urban guerrilla must know how to shoot well because it is required by his type of combat.

In conventional warfare, combat is generally at a distance with long range arms. In unconventional warfare, in which urban guerrilla warfare is included, the combat is at close range, often very close. To prevent his own extinction, the urban guerrilla has to shoot first and he cannot err in his shot. He cannot waste his ammunition because he doesn't have large amounts, so he must save it. Nor can he replace his ammunition quickly, since he is part of a small group in which each guerrilla has to take care of himself. The urban guerrilla can lose no time and must be able to shoot at once.

One fundamental fact, which we want to emphasize fully and whose particular importance cannot be overestimated, is that the urban guerrilla must not fire continuously, using up his ammunition. It may be that the enemy is not responding to the fire precisely because he is waiting until the guerrilla's ammunition is used up. At such a moment, without having time to replace his ammunition, the urban guerrilla faces a rain of enemy fire and can be taken prisoner or be killed.

In spite of the value of the surprise factor which many times makes it unnecessary for the urban guerrilla to use his arms, he cannot be allowed the luxury of entering combat without knowing how to shoot. And face to face with the enemy, he must always be moving from one position to another, because to stay in one position makes him a fixed target and, as such, very vulnerable.

The urban guerrilla's life depends on shooting, on his ability to handle his arms well and to avoid being hit. When we speak of shooting, we speak of marksmanship as well. Shooting must be learned until it becomes a reflex action on the part of the urban guerrilla.

To learn how to shoot and to have good aim, the urban guerrilla must train himself systematically, utilizing every apprenticeship method, shooting at targets, even in amusement parks and at home.

Shooting and marksmanship are the urban guerrilla's water and air. His perfection of the art of shooting makes him a special type of urban guerrilla — that is, a sniper, a category of solitary combatant indispensable in isolated actions. The sniper knows how to shoot, at close range and at long range, and his arms are appropriate for either type of shooting.

**The Firing Group**

In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized in small groups. A group of no more than four or five is called the *firing group*.

A minimum of two firing groups, separated and sealed off from other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two persons, this is what makes a *firing team*.

Within the firing group there must be complete confidence among the comrades. The best shot and the one who best knows how to manage the machine gun is the person in charge of operations.

The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and guards arms, studies and corrects its own tactics.

When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But there is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the organization in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the firing group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional left doesn't exist in our organization.

This means that, except for the priority of objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to assault a bank, to kidnap or to execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified

kind of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy without the need to consult the general command.

No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so and thus become a part of the organization.

This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to increase substantially the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it onto the defensive.

The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched, and carried through to success.

The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, it helps the firing groups with their difficulties and their needs.

The organization is an indestructible network of firing groups, and of coordinations among them, that functions simply and practically with a general command that also participates in the attacks; an organization which exists for no purpose other than pure and simple revolutionary action.

#### **The Logistics of the Urban Guerrilla**

Conventional logistics can be expressed by the formula CCEM:

- C — food (*comida*)
- C — fuel (*combustivel*)
- E — equipment
- M — ammunition (*munições*)

Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles with fixed bases and supply lines.

Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have no vehicles nor fixed bases. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient, and have no established base except in the rudimentary sense of an arms factory within a house.

While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the gorillas to be used to repress urban and rural rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics which have nothing in common with a conventional war and are directed against the military dictatorship and North American domination of the country.

For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and has no support at the beginning, logistics are expressed by the formula MDAME, which is:

- M — mechanization
- D — money (*dinheiro*)
- A — arms
- M — ammunition (*munições*)
- E — explosives

Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseparable from the driver. The urban guerrilla-driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and as such the automobile like the machine gun becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day and the apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a good driver. As to the vehicle, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs.

When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with other methods of acquisition.



must be expropriated. And the urban guerrilla must rob banks and armories and seize explosives and ammunition wherever he finds them.

None of these operations is undertaken for just one purpose. Even when the assault is for money, the arms that the guards bear must also be taken.

Expropriation is the first step in the organization of our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character.

The second step is to reinforce and extend logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy will be surprised and his arms, ammunition, vehicles, and other resources can be captured.

Once he has the arms, ammunition, and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems the urban guerrilla faces at any time and in any situation, is a hiding place in which to leave the material and appropriate means for transporting it and assembling it where it is needed. This has to be accomplished even when the enemy is on the lookout and has the roads blocked.

The knowledge that the urban guerrilla has of the terrain, and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as guides especially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in the solution of the eternal logistics problem the revolutionary faces.

#### **The Technique of the Urban Guerrilla**

In its most general sense, technique is the combination of methods, man uses to carry out any activity. The activity of the urban guerrilla consists in waging guerrilla warfare and psychological warfare.

The urban guerrilla technique has five basic components:

- a) one part is related to the specific characteristics of the situation;
- b) one part is related to the requisites that match these characteristics, requisites represented by a series of initial advantages without which the urban guerrilla cannot achieve his objectives;
- c) one part concerns certain and definite objectives in the actions initiated by the urban guerrilla;
- d) one part is related to the types and characteristic modes of action for the urban guerrilla;
- e) one part is concerned with the urban guerrilla's method of carrying out his specific actions.

#### **Characteristics of the Urban Guerrilla's Technique**

The technique of the urban guerrilla has the following characteristics:

- a) it is an aggressive technique, or in other words, it has an offensive character. As is well known, defensive action means death for us. Since we are inferior to the enemy in fire power and have neither his resources nor his power force, we cannot defend ourselves against an offensive or a concentrated attack by the gorillas. And that is the reason why our urban technique can never be permanent, can never defend a fixed base nor remain in any one spot waiting to repel the circle of reaction;
- b) it is a technique of attack and retreat by which we preserve our forces;
- c) it is a technique that aims at the development of urban guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize, and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war.

#### **The Initial Advantages of the Urban Guerrilla**

The dynamics of urban guerrilla warfare lie in the urban guerrilla's violent clash with the military and police forces of the dictatorship.

In this clash, the police have the superiority. The urban guerrilla has inferior forces. The paradox is that the urban guerrilla, although weaker, is nevertheless the attacker.

The military and police forces, for their part, respond to the attack by mobilizing and concentrating infinitely superior forces in the persecution and destruction of the urban guerrilla. He can only avoid defeat if he counts on the initial advantages he has and knows how to exploit them to the end to compensate for his weaknesses and lack of matériel.

The initial advantages are:

- 1) he must take the enemy by surprise;
- 2) he must know the terrain of the encounter better than the enemy;
- 3) he must have greater mobility and speed than the police and the other repressive forces;
- 4) his information service must be better than the enemy's;
- 5) he must be in command of the situation and demonstrate a decisiveness so great that everyone on our side is inspired and never thinks of hesitating, while on the other side the enemy is stunned and incapable of responding.

#### Surprise

To compensate for his general weakness and shortage of arms compared to the enemy, the urban guerrilla uses surprise. The enemy has no way to fight surprise and becomes confused or is destroyed.

When urban guerrilla warfare broke out in Brazil, experience proved that surprise was essential to the success of any urban guerrilla operation.

The technique of surprise is based on four essential requisites:

- a) we know the situation of the enemy we are going to attack, usually by means of precise information and meticulous observation, while the enemy does not know he is going to be attacked and knows nothing about the attacker;
- b) we know the force of the enemy that is going to be attacked and the enemy knows nothing about our force;
- c) attacking by surprise, we save and conserve our forces, while the enemy is unable to do the same and is left at the mercy of events;
- d) we determine the hour and the place of the attack, fix its duration, and establish its objective. The enemy remains ignorant of all this.

#### Knowledge of the Terrain

The urban guerrilla's best ally is the terrain and because this is so he must know it like the palm of his hand.

To have the terrain as an ally means to know how to use with intelligence its unevenness, its high and its low points, its turns, its irregularities, its regular and its secret passages, abandoned areas, its thickets, etc., taking maximum advantage of all this for the success of armed actions, escapes, retreats, cover, and hiding places.

Its impasses and narrow spots, its gorges, its streets under repair, police control points, military zones and closed off streets, the entrances and exits of tunnels and those that the enemy can close off, viaducts to be crossed, corners controlled by the police or watched, its lights and signals, all this must be thoroughly known and studied in order to avoid fatal errors.

Our problem is to get through and to know where and how to hide, leaving the enemy bewildered in areas he doesn't know.

Familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, ins. and outs, and corners of the urban centers, its paths and shortcuts, its empty lots, its underground passages, its pipes and sewer system, the urban guerrilla safely crosses through the irregular and difficult terrain

unfamiliar to the police, where they can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trapped at any moment.

Because he knows the terrain the guerrilla can go through it on foot, on bicycle, in automobile, jeep, or truck and never be trapped. Acting in small groups with only a few people, the guerrillas can reunite at an hour and place determined beforehand, following up the attack with new guerrilla operations, or evading the police circle and disorienting the enemy with their unprecedented audacity.

It is an insoluble problem for the police in the labyrinthian terrain of the urban guerrilla, to get someone they can't see, to repress someone they can't catch, to close in on someone they can't find.

Our experience is that the ideal urban guerrilla is one who operates in his own city and knows thoroughly its streets, its neighborhoods, its transit problems, and other peculiarities.

The guerrilla outsider, who comes to a city whose corners are unfamiliar to him, is a weak spot and if he is assigned certain operations, can endanger them. To avoid grave errors, it is necessary for him to get to know well the layout of the streets.

#### **Mobility and Speed**

To insure a mobility and speed that the police cannot match, the urban guerrilla needs the following prerequisites:

- a) mechanization;
- b) knowledge of the terrain;
- c) a rupture or suspension of enemy communications and transport;
- d) light arms.

By carefully carrying through operations that last only a few moments, and leaving the site in mechanized vehicles, the urban guerrilla beats a rapid retreat, escaping persecution.

The urban guerrilla must know the way in detail and, in this sense, must go through the schedule ahead of time as a training to avoid entering alleyways that have no exit, or running into traffic jams, or becoming paralyzed by the Transit Department's traffic signals.

The police pursue the urban guerrilla blindly without knowing which road he is using for his escape.

While the urban guerrilla quickly flees because he knows the terrain, the police lose the trail and give up the chase.

The urban guerrilla must launch his operations far from the logistics base of the police. An initial advantage of this method of operation is that it places us at a reasonable distance from the possibility of persecution, which facilitates the evasion.

In addition to this necessary precaution, the urban guerrilla must be concerned with the enemy's communication system. The telephone is the primary target in preventing the enemy from access to information by knocking out his communication system.

Even if he knows about the guerrilla operation, the enemy depends on modern transport for his logistics support, and his vehicles necessarily lose time carrying him through the heavy traffic of the large cities.

It is clear that the tangled and treacherous traffic is a disadvantage for the enemy, as it would be for us if we were not ahead of him.

If we want to have a safe margin of security and be certain to leave no tracks for the future, we can adopt the following methods:

- a) purposely intercept the police with other vehicles or by apparently casual inconveniences and damages; but in this case the vehicles in question should not be legal nor should they have real license numbers;
- b) obstruct the road with fallen trees, rocks, ditches, false traffic signs, dead ends or detours, and other ingenious methods;
- c) place homemade mines in the way of the police, use gasoline, or throw Molotov cocktails to set their vehicles on fire;
- d) set off a burst of machine-gun fire or arms such as the FAL.

aimed at the motor and the tires of the cars engaged in pursuit. With the arrogance typical of the police and the military fascist authorities, the enemy will come to fight us with heavy guns and equipment and with elaborate maneuvers by men armed to the teeth. The urban guerrilla must respond to this with light weapons easily transported, so he can always escape with maximum speed, without ever accepting open fighting. The urban guerrilla has no mission other than to attack and retreat.

We would leave ourselves open to the most stunning defeats if we burdened ourselves with heavy arms and with the tremendous weight of the ammunition necessary to fire them, at the same time losing our precious gift of mobility.

When the enemy fights against us with cavalry we are at no disadvantage as long as we are mechanized. The automobile goes faster than the horse. From within the car we also have the target of the mounted police, knocking him down with machine gun and revolver fire or with Molotov cocktails and grenades.

On the other hand, it is not so difficult for an urban guerrilla on foot to make a target of a policeman on horseback. Moreover, ropes across the streets, marbles, cork stoppers are very efficient methods of making them both fall. The great disadvantage of the mounted police is that he presents the urban guerrilla with two excellent targets: the horse and its rider.

Apart from being faster than the horseman, the helicopter has no better chance in persecution. If the horse is too slow compared to the urban guerrilla's automobile, the helicopter is too fast. Moving at 200 kilometers an hour it will never succeed in hitting from above a target lost among the crowds and the street vehicles, nor can it land in public streets in order to catch someone. At the same time, whenever it tries to fly low, it will be excessively vulnerable to the fire of the urban guerrilla.

#### Information

The possibilities that the government has for discovering and destroying the urban guerrillas lessen as the potential of the dictatorship's enemies becomes greater and more concentrated among the popular masses.

This concentration of opponents of the dictatorship plays a very important role in providing information as to moves on the part of the police and men in government, as well as in hiding our activities. The enemy can also be thrown off by false information, which is worse for him because it is a tremendous waste.

By whatever means, the sources of information at the disposal of the urban guerrilla are potentially better than those of the police. The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people transmits information to the urban guerrilla. The military and the police are hated for the injustices and violence they commit against the people, and this facilitates obtaining information prejudicial to the activities of government agents.

The information, which is only a small area of popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla. The creation of an intelligence service with an organized structure is a basic need for us. The urban guerrilla has to have essential information about the plans and movements of the enemy, where they are, and how they move, the resources of the banking network, the means of communication, and the secret moves the enemy makes.

The trustworthy information passed along to the urban guerrilla represents a well-aimed blow at the dictatorship. It has no way to defend itself in the face of an important leak that jeopardizes its interests and facilitates our destructive attack.

The enemy also wants to know what steps we are taking so he can destroy us or prevent us from acting. In this sense the danger of betrayal is present and the enemy encourages betrayal or infiltrates spies into the organization. The urban guerrilla's technique

against this enemy tactic is to denounce publicly the traitors, spies, informers, and provocateurs.

Since our struggle takes place among the masses and depends on their sympathy — while the government has a bad reputation because of its brutality, corruption, and incompetence — the informers, spies, traitors, and the police come to be enemies of the people without supporters, denounced to the urban guerrillas, and, in many cases, properly punished.

For their part the urban guerrilla must not evade the duty — once he knows who the spy or informer is — of wiping him out physically. This is the correct method, approved by the people, and it minimizes considerably the incidence of infiltration or enemy spying.

For the complete success of the battle against spies and informers, it is essential to organize a counterespionage or counterintelligence service. Nevertheless, as far as information is concerned, it cannot all be reduced to a question of knowing the enemy's moves and avoiding the infiltration of spies. Information must be broad, it must embrace everything, including the most insignificant matters. There is a technique of obtaining information and the urban guerrilla must master it. Following this technique, information is obtained naturally, as a part of the life of the people.

The urban guerrilla, living in the midst of the people and moving about among them, must be attentive to all types of conversations and human relations, learning how to disguise his interest with great skill and judgment.

In places where people work, study, live, it is easy to collect all kinds of information on payments, business, plans of all types, points of view, opinions, people's state of mind, trips, interiors of buildings, offices and rooms, operation centers, etc.

Observation, investigation, reconnaissance, and exploration of the terrain are also excellent sources of information. The urban guerrilla never goes anywhere absentmindedly and without revolutionary precaution, always on the lookout lest something occur. Eyes and ears open, senses alert, his memory engraved with everything necessary, now or in the future, to the uninterrupted activity of the fighter.

Careful reading of the press with particular attention to the organs of mass communication, the investigation of accumulated data, the transmission of news and everything of note, a persistence in being informed and in informing others, all this makes up the intricate and immensely complicated question of information which gives the urban guerrilla a decisive advantage.

#### Decision

It is not enough for the urban guerrilla to have in his favor surprise, speed, knowledge of the terrain, and information. He must also demonstrate his command of any situation and a capacity for decision without which all other advantages will prove useless.

It is impossible to carry out any action, however well planned, if the urban guerrilla turns out to be indecisive, uncertain, irresolute.

Even an action successfully begun can end in defeat if the command of the situation and the capacity for decision falter in the middle of the actual execution of the plan. When this command of the situation and a capacity for decision are absent, the void is filled with vacillation and terror. The enemy takes advantage of this failure and is able to liquidate us.

The secret for the success of any operation, simple or complicated, easy or difficult, is to rely on determined men. Strictly speaking, there are no easy operations. All must be carried out with the same care exercised in the case of the most difficult, beginning with the choice of the human element, which means relying on leadership and capacity for decision in every test.

One can see ahead of time whether an action will be successful or not by the way its participants act during the preparatory period.

Those who are behind, who fail to make designated contacts, are easily confused, forget things, fail to complete the basic elements of the work, possibly are indecisive men and can be a danger. It is better not to include them.

Decision means to put into practice the plan that has been devised with determination, with audacity, and with an absolute firmness. It takes only one person who vacillates to lose all.

#### **Objectives of the Urban Guerrilla's Actions**

With his technique developed and established, the urban guerrilla bases himself on models of action leading to attack and, in Brazil, with the following objectives:

- a) to threaten the triangle in which the Brazilian state system and North American domination are maintained in Brazil, a triangle whose points are Rio, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte and whose base is the axle Rio-São Paulo, where the giant industrial-financial-economic-political-cultural-military-police complex, that holds the entire decisive power of the country is located;
- b) to weaken the local guards or the security system of the dictatorship, given the fact that we are attacking and the guerrillas defending, which means catching the government in a defensive position with its troops immobilized in defense of the entire complex of national maintenance, with its ever-present fears of an attack on its strategic nerve centers, and without ever knowing where, how, and when that attack will come;
- c) to attack on every side with many different armed groups, few in number, each self-contained and operating separately, to disperse the government forces in their pursuit of a thoroughly fragmented organization instead of offering the dictatorship the opportunity to concentrate its forces of repression on the destruction of one tightly organized system operating throughout the country;
- d) to give proof of its combativeness, decision, firmness, determination, and persistence in the attack on the military dictatorship in order to permit all malcontents to follow our example and fight with urban guerrilla tactics. Meanwhile, the government, with all its problems, incapable of halting guerrilla operations in the city, will lose time and suffer endless attrition and will finally be forced to pull back its repressive troops in order to mount guard over the banks, industries, armories, military barracks, prisons, public offices, radio and television stations, North American firms, gas storage tanks, oil refineries, ships, airplanes, ports, airports, hospitals, health centers, blood banks, stores, garages, embassies, residences of outstanding members of the regime, such as ministers and generals, police stations, and official organizations, etc;
- e) to increase urban guerrilla disturbances gradually in an endless ascendancy of unforeseen actions such that the government troops cannot leave the urban area to pursue the guerrillas in the interior without running the risk of abandoning the cities and permitting rebellion to increase on the coast as well as in the interior of the country;
- f) to oblige the army and the police, with the commanders and their assistants, to change the relative comfort and tranquillity of their barracks and their usual rest, for a state of alarm and growing tension in the expectation of attack or in search for tracks that vanish without a trace;
- g) to avoid open battle and decisive combat with the government, limiting the struggle to brief and rapid attacks with lightning results;
- h) to assure for the urban guerrilla a maximum freedom of maneuvers and of action without ever relinquishing the use of armed violence, remaining firmly oriented toward helping the beginning of rural guerrilla warfare and supporting the construction of the revolutionary army for national liberation.

In order to achieve the objectives previously enumerated, the urban guerrilla is obliged, in his technique, to follow an action whose nature is as different and as diversified as possible. The urban guerrilla does not arbitrarily choose this or that action model. Some actions are simple, others are complicated. The urban guerrilla without experience must be incorporated gradually into actions and operations that run from the simple to the complex. He begins with small missions and tasks until he becomes a completely experienced urban guerrilla.

Before any action, the urban guerrilla must think of the methods and the personnel at his disposal to carry out the action. Operations and actions that demand the urban guerrilla's technical preparation cannot be carried out by someone who lacks that technical skill. With these cautions, the action models which the urban guerrilla can carry out are the following:

- a) assaults;
- b) raids and penetrations;
- c) occupations;
- d) ambush;
- e) street tactics;
- f) strikes and work interruptions;
- g) desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriations of arms, ammunition, explosives;
- h) liberation of prisoners;
- i) executions;
- j) kidnappings;
- k) sabotage;
- l) terrorism;
- m) armed propaganda;
- n) war of nerves.

#### Assaults

Assault is the armed attack which we make to expropriate funds, liberate prisoners, capture explosives, machine guns, and other types of arms and ammunition.

Assaults can take place in broad daylight or at night.

Daytime assaults are made when the objective cannot be achieved at any other hour, as for example, the transport of money by the banks, which is not done at night.

Night assault is usually the most advantageous to the urban guerrilla. The ideal is for all assaults to take place at night when conditions for a surprise attack are most favorable and the darkness facilitates flight and hides the identity of the participants. The urban guerrilla must prepare himself, nevertheless, to act under all conditions, daytime as well as nighttime.

The most vulnerable targets for assault are the following:

- a) credit establishments;
- b) commercial and industrial enterprises, including the production of arms and explosives;
- c) military establishments;
- d) commissaries and police stations;
- e) jails;
- f) government property;
- g) mass communication media;
- h) North American firms and properties;
- i) government vehicles, including military and police vehicles, trucks, armored vehicles, money carriers, trains, ships, and planes.

The assaults on establishments are of the same nature because in every case the property and buildings represent a fixed target.

Assaults on buildings are conceived as guerrilla operations, varied

according to whether they are against banks, a commercial enterprise, industries, military camps, commissaries, prisons, radio stations, warehouses for imperialist firms, etc.

The assaults on vehicles — money-carriers, armored cars, trains, ships, airplanes — are of another nature since they are moving targets. The nature of the operations varies according to the situation and the possibility — that is, whether the target is stationary or moving.

Armored cars, including military cars, are not immune to mines. Obstructed roads, traps, ruses, interception of other vehicles, Molotov cocktails, shooting with heavy arms, are efficient methods of assaulting vehicles.

Heavy vehicles, grounded planes, anchored ships can be seized and their crews and guards overcome. Airplanes in flight can be diverted from their course by guerrilla action or by one person.

Ships and trains in movement can be assaulted or taken by guerrilla operations in order to capture the arms and munitions or to prevent troop displacement.

#### **The Bank Assault as Popular Model**

The most popular assault model is the bank assault. In Brazil, the urban guerrilla has begun a type of organized assault on the banks as a guerrilla operation. Today this type of assault is widely used and has served as a sort of preliminary examination for the urban guerrilla in his apprenticeship for the techniques of revolutionary warfare.

Important innovations in the technique of assaulting banks have developed, guaranteeing flight, the withdrawal of money, and the anonymity of those involved. Among these innovations we cite shooting the tires of cars to prevent pursuit; locking people in the bank bathroom, making them sit on the floor; immobilizing the bank guards and removing their arms, forcing someone to open the coffer or the strong box; using disguises.

Attempts to install bank alarms, to use guards or electronic detection devices of US origin, prove fruitless when the assault is political and is carried out according to urban guerrilla warfare technique. This technique tries to utilize new resources to meet the enemy's tactical changes, has access to a fire power that is growing every day, becomes increasingly astute and audacious, and uses a larger number of revolutionaries every time; all to guarantee the success of operations planned down to the last detail.

The bank assault is a typical expropriation. But, as is true in any kind of armed expropriatory action, the revolutionary is handicapped by a two-fold competition:

- a) competition from the outlaw;
- b) competition from the right-wing counterrevolutionary.

This competition produces confusion, which is reflected in the people's uncertainty. It is up to the urban guerrilla to prevent this from happening, and to accomplish this he must use two methods:

- a) he must avoid the outlaw's technique, which is one of unnecessary violence and appropriation of goods and possessions belonging to the people;
- b) he must use the assault for propaganda purposes, at the very moment it is taking place, and later distribute material, leaflets, every possible means of explaining the objectives and the principles of the urban guerrilla as expropriator of the government, the ruling classes, and imperialism.

#### **Raids and Penetration**

Raids and penetrations are quick attacks on establishments located in neighborhoods or even in the center of the city, such as small military units, commissaries, hospitals, to cause trouble, seize arms, punish and terrorize the enemy, take reprisal, or rescue wounded prisoners, or those hospitalized under police vigilance.



destroy vehicles and damage installations, especially if they are North American firms and property.

When they take place on certain stretches of the highway or in certain distant neighborhoods, the raids can serve to force the enemy to move great numbers of troops, a totally useless effort since he will find nobody there to fight.

When they are carried out in certain houses, offices, archives, or public offices, their purpose is to capture or search for secret papers and documents with which to denounce involvements, compromises, and the corruption of men in government, their dirty deals and criminal transactions with the North Americans.

Raids and penetrations are most effective if they are carried out at night.

#### Occupations

Occupations are a type of attack carried out when the urban guerrilla stations himself in specific establishments and locations for a temporary resistance against the enemy or for some propaganda purpose.

The occupation of factories and schools during strikes or at other times is a method of protest or of distracting the enemy's attention.

The occupation of radio stations is for propaganda purposes.

Occupation is a highly effective model for action but, in order to prevent losses and material damage to our ranks, it is always a good idea to count on the possibility of withdrawal. It must always be meticulously planned and carried out at the opportune moment.

Occupation always has a time limit and the faster it is completed, the better.

#### Ambush

Ambushes are attacks typified by surprise when the enemy is trapped across a road or when he makes a police net surrounding a house or an estate. A false message can bring the enemy to the spot where he falls into the trap.

The principal object of the ambush tactic is to capture enemy arms and punish him with death.

Ambushes to halt passenger trains are for propaganda purposes and, when they are troop trains, the object is to annihilate the enemy and seize his arms.

The urban guerrilla sniper is the kind of fighter especially suited for ambush because he can hide easily in the irregularities of the terrain, on the roofs and the tops of buildings and apartments under construction. From windows and dark places, he can take careful aim at his chosen target.

Ambush has devastating effects on the enemy, leaving him unnerved, insecure, and fearful.

#### Street Tactics

Street tactics are used to fight the enemy in the streets, utilizing the participation of the masses against him.

In 1968 the Brazilian students used excellent street tactics against police troops, such as marching down streets against traffic, utilizing slings and marbles as arms against the mounted police.

Other street tactics consist in constructing barricades; pulling up paving blocks and hurling them at the police; throwing bottles, bricks, paperweights, and other projectiles from the top of apartment and office buildings against the police; using buildings under construction for flight, for hiding, and for supporting surprise attacks.

It is equally necessary to know how to respond to enemy tactics. When the police troops come protected with helmets to defend themselves against flying objects, we have to divide ourselves into two teams: one to attack the enemy from the front, the other to attack him in the rear, withdrawing one as the other goes into action to prevent the first from becoming a target for projectiles hurled by the second.

By the same token it is important to know how to respond to the police net. When the police designate certain of their men to go into the masses to arrest a demonstrator, a larger group of urban guerrillas must surround the police group, disarming and beating them and at the same time letting the prisoner escape. This urban guerrilla operation is called the *net within the net*.

When the police net is formed at a school building, a factory, a place where the masses assemble, or some other point, the urban guerrilla must not give up or allow himself to be taken by surprise. To make his net work the enemy is obliged to transport the police in vehicles and special cars to occupy strategic points in the streets in order to invade the building or chosen locale. The urban guerrilla, for his part, must never clear a building or an area and meet in it without first knowing its exits, the way to break the circle, the strategic points that the police might occupy, and the roads that inevitably lead into the net, and he must hold other strategic points from which to strike at the enemy.

The roads followed by the police vehicles must be mined at key points along the way and at forced stopping points. When the mines explode, the vehicles will fly into the air. The police will be caught in the trap and will suffer losses or will be victims of ambush. The net must be broken by escape routes unknown to the police. The rigorous planning of the retreat is the best way of frustrating any encircling effort on the part of the enemy.

When there is no possibility of a flight plan, the urban guerrilla must not hold meetings, assemblies, or do anything else since to do so will prevent him from breaking through the net the enemy will surely try to throw around him.

Street tactics have revealed a new type of urban guerrilla, the urban guerrilla who participates in mass demonstrations. This is the type we designate as the urban guerrilla demonstrator, who joins the ranks and participates in popular marches with specific and definite aims.

These aims consist in hurling stones and projectiles of every type, using gasoline to start fires, using the police as a target for their fire arms, capturing police arms, kidnapping agents of the enemy and provocateurs, shooting with careful aim at the henchmen torturers and the police chiefs who come in special cars with false plates in order not to attract attention.

The urban guerrilla demonstrator shows groups in the mass demonstration the flight route if that is necessary. He plants mines, throws Molotov cocktails, prepares ambushes and explosions.

The urban guerrilla demonstrator must also initiate the *net within the net*, going through government vehicles, official cars, and police vehicles before turning them over or setting them on fire, to see if any of them have money and arms.

Snipers are very good for mass demonstrations and, along with the urban guerrilla demonstrators, can play a valuable role.

Hidden at strategic points, the snipers have complete success, using shotguns, machine guns, etc. whose fire and recoil easily cause losses among the enemy.

#### Strikes and Work Interruptions

The strike is a model of action employed by the urban guerrilla in work centers and schools to damage the enemy by stopping work and study activities. Because it is one of the weapons most feared by the exploiters and oppressors, the enemy uses tremendous fighting power and incredible violence against it. The strikers are taken to prison, suffer beatings, and many of them wind up assassinated.

The urban guerrilla must prepare the strike in such a way as to leave no tracks or clues that identify the leaders of the action. A strike is successful when it is organized through the action of a small group, if it is carefully prepared in secret and by the most clandestine methods.

and attack, all this must be supplied beforehand in order to meet the enemy. So that it can do the greatest possible damage, it is a good idea to study and put into effect a sabotage plan.

Work and study interruptions, although they are of brief duration, cause severe damage to the enemy. It is enough for them to crop up at different points and in different sections of the same area, disrupting daily life, occurring endlessly one after the other, in authentic guerrilla fashion.

In strikes or simple work interruptions, the urban guerrilla has recourse to occupation or penetration of the locale or can simply make a raid. In that case his objective is to take hostages, to capture prisoners or to kidnap enemy agents and propose an exchange for the arrested strikers.

In certain cases, strikes and brief work interruptions can offer an excellent opportunity for preparing ambushes or traps whose aim is the physical liquidation of the cruel bloody police.

The basic fact is that the enemy suffers losses and material and moral damage, and is weakened by the action.

#### **Desertions, Diversions, Seizures, Expropriations of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives**

Desertion and the diversion of arms are actions effected in military camps, ships, military hospitals, etc. The urban guerrilla soldier, chief, sergeant, subofficial, and official must desert at the most opportune moment with modern arms and ammunition to hand them over for the use of the Brazilian revolution.

One of the opportune moments is when the military urban guerrilla is called upon to pursue and to fight his guerrilla comrades outside the military quarters. Instead of following the orders of the gorillas, the military urban guerrilla must join the revolutionaries by handing over the arms and ammunition he carries, or the military plane he pilots.

The advantage of this method is that the revolutionaries receive arms and ammunition from the army, the navy, and the air force, the military police, the civilian guard, or the firemen without any great work, since it reaches their hands by government transport.

Other opportunities may occur in the barracks, and the military urban guerrilla must always be alert to this. In case of carelessness on the part of the commanders or in other favorable conditions, such as bureaucratic attitudes and behavior or relaxation of discipline on the part of sublieutenants and other internal personnel, the military urban guerrilla must no longer wait but must try to advise the organizations and desert alone or accompanied, but with as large a supply of arms as possible.

With information from and participation of the military urban guerrilla, raids on barracks and other military establishments for the purpose of capturing arms can be organized.

When there is no possibility of deserting and taking arms and ammunition, the military urban guerrilla must engage in sabotage, starting explosions and fires in munitions and gunpowder.

This technique of deserting with arms and ammunition, of raiding and sabotaging the military centers, is the best way of wearing out and demoralizing the gorillas and of leaving them confused.

The urban guerrilla's purpose in disarming an individual enemy is to capture his arms. These arms are usually in the hands of sentinels or others whose task is guard duty or repression.

The capture of arms may be accomplished by violent means or by astuteness and by tricks or traps. When the enemy is disarmed, he must be searched for arms other than those already taken from him. If we are careless, he can use the arms that were not seized to shoot the urban guerrilla.

The seizure of arms is an efficient method of acquiring machine guns, the urban guerrilla's most important arms.

When we carry out small operations or actions to seize arms and ammunitions, the material captured may be for personal use or for armaments and supplies for the firing groups.

The necessity to provide firing power for the urban guerrilla is so great that, in order to take off from zero point we often have to purchase one weapon, divert or capture a single arm. The basic point is to begin, and to begin with a great spirit of decisiveness and of boldness. The possession of a single arm multiplies our forces.

In a bank assault, we must be careful to seize the arm or arms of the bank guard. The remainder of the arms we find with the treasurer, the bank teller, or the manager must also be seized ahead of time.

The other method we can use to capture arms is the preparation of ambushes against the police and the cars they use to move around in.

Quite often we succeed in capturing arms in the police commissaries as a result of raids from outside.

The expropriation of arms, ammunition, and explosives is the urban guerrilla's goal in assaulting commercial houses, industries, and quarries.

#### Liberation of Prisoners

The liberation of prisoners is an armed operation designed to free the jailed urban guerrilla. In daily struggle against the enemy, the urban guerrilla is subject to arrest and can be sentenced to unlimited years in jail. This does not mean that the revolutionary battle stops here. For the guerrilla, his experience is deepened by prison and continues even in the dungeons where he is held.

The imprisoned urban guerrilla views jail as a terrain he must dominate and understand in order to free himself by a guerrilla operation. There is no prison, either on an island, in a city penitentiary, or on a farm, that is impregnable to the slyness, the cleverness, and the firing potential of the revolutionaries.

The urban guerrilla who is free views the penal establishments of the enemy as the inevitable site of guerrilla action designed to liberate his ideological brothers from prison.

It is this combination of the urban guerrilla in freedom and the urban guerrilla in jail that results in the armed operations we refer to as the liberation of prisoners.

The guerrilla operations that can be used in liberating prisoners are the following:

- a) riots in penal establishments, in correctional colonies and islands, or on transport or prison ships;
- b) assaults on urban or rural penitentiaries, houses of detention, commissaries, prisoner depots, or any other permanent, occasional, or temporary place where prisoners are held;
- c) assaults on prisoner transport trains and cars;
- d) raids and penetrations of prisons;
- e) ambushing of guards who are moving prisoners.

#### Execution

Execution is the killing of a North American spy, of an agent of the dictatorship, of a police torturer, of a fascist personality in the government involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots, of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent, or police provocateur.

Those who go to the police of their own free will to make denunciations and accusations, who supply clues and information and finger people, must also be executed when they are caught by the urban guerrilla.

Execution is a secret action in which the least possible number of urban guerrillas are involved. In many cases, the execution can be carried out by one sniper, patiently, alone and unknown, and operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood.

Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret spot a police agent, a North American spy, a political personality, or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement.

Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned revolutionary comrades, or to force suspension of torture in the jail cells of the military dictatorship.

The kidnapping of personalities who are known artists, sports figures, or are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary and patriotic principles of the urban guerrilla provided it occurs under special circumstances, and the kidnapping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it.

The kidnapping of North American residents or visitors in Brazil constitutes a form of protest against the penetration and domination of United States imperialism in our country.

#### Sabotage

Sabotage is a highly destructive type of attack using very few persons and sometimes requiring only one to accomplish the desired result. When the urban guerrilla uses sabotage, the first phase is isolated sabotage. Then comes the phase of dispersed and generalized sabotage, carried out by the people.

Well-executed sabotage demands study, planning, and careful execution. A characteristic form of sabotage is explosion using dynamite, fire, and the placing of mines.

A little sand, a trickle of any kind of combustible, a poor lubrication, a screw removed, a short circuit, pieces of wood or of iron, can cause irreparable damage.

The objective of sabotage is to hurt, to damage, to make useless and to destroy vital enemy points such as the following:

- a) the economy of the country;
- b) agricultural or industrial production;
- c) transport and communication systems;
- d) the military and police systems and their establishments and deposits;
- e) the repressive military-police system;
- f) the firms and properties of North Americans in the country.

The urban guerrilla should endanger the economy of the country, particularly its economic and financial aspects, such as its domestic and foreign commercial network, its exchange and banking systems, its tax collection system, and others.

Public offices, centers of government services, government warehouses, are easy targets for sabotage.

Nor will it be easy to prevent the sabotage of agricultural and industrial production by the urban guerrilla, with his thorough knowledge of the local situation.

Industrial workers acting as urban guerrillas are excellent industrial saboteurs since they, better than anyone, understand the industry, the factory, the machine, or the part most likely to destroy an entire operation, doing far more damage than a poorly informed layman could do.

With respect to the enemy's transport and communication systems, beginning with railway traffic, it is necessary to attack them systematically with sabotage arms.

The only caution is against causing death and fatal injury to passengers, especially regular commuters on suburban and long-distance trains.

Attacks on freight trains, rolling or stationary stock, stoppage of military transport and communication systems, these are the major sabotage objectives in this area.

Sleepers can be damaged and pulled up, as can rails. A tunnel blocked by a barrier after an explosion, an obstruction by a derailed car, cause tremendous harm.

The derailment of a cargo train carrying fuel is of major damage to the enemy. So is dynamiting railway bridges. In a system where the weight and the size of the rolling equipment is enormous, it takes months for workers to repair or rebuild the destruction and damage.

As for highways, they can be obstructed by trees, stationary vehicles, ditches, dislocations of barriers by dynamite and bridges blown up by explosion.

Ships can be damaged at anchor in seaports and river ports or in the shipyards. Airplanes can be destroyed or sabotaged on the ground.

Telephonic and telegraphic lines can be systematically damaged, their towers blown up, and their lines made useless.

Transport and communications must be sabotaged at once because the revolutionary war has already begun in Brazil and it is essential to impede the enemy's movement of troops and munitions.

Oil lines, fuel plants, depots for bombs and ammunition, powder magazines and arsenals, military camps, commissaries must become targets par excellence in sabotage operations, while vehicles, army trucks, and other military and police cars must be destroyed wherever they are found.

The military and police repression centers and their specific and specialized organs, must also claim the attention of the urban guerrilla saboteur.

North American firms and properties in the country, for their part, must become such frequent targets of sabotage that the volume of actions directed against them surpasses the total of all other actions against vital enemy points.

#### **Terrorism**

Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of a bomb or fire explosion of great destructive power, which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the enemy.

Terrorism requires that the urban guerrilla should have an adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of how to make explosives.

The terroristic act, apart from the apparent facility with which it can be carried out, is no different from other urban guerrilla acts and actions whose success depends on the planning and determination of the revolutionary organization. It is an action the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest cold bloodedness, calmness, and decision.

Although terrorism generally involves an explosion, there are cases in which it may also be carried out by execution and the systematic burning of installations, properties, and North American depots, plantations, etc. It is essential to point out the importance of fires and the construction of incendiary bombs such as gasoline bombs in the technique of revolutionary terrorism. Another thing is the importance of the material the urban guerrilla can persuade the people to expropriate in moments of hunger and scarcity resulting from the greed of the big commercial interests.

Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish.

#### **Armed Propaganda**

The coordination of urban guerrilla actions, including each armed action, is the principal way of making armed propaganda.

These actions, carried out with specific and determined objectives, inevitably become propaganda material for the mass communications system.

Bank assaults, ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism, and the war of nerves, are all cases in point.

Airplanes diverted in flight by revolutionary action, moving ships and trains assaulted and seized by guerrillas, can also be solely for propaganda effects.

But the urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press and must be able to turn out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electric plates and other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine newspapers, pamphlets, flyers, and stamps for propaganda and agitation against the dictatorship.

The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the incorporation of large numbers of people into the revolutionary struggle, by opening a permanent work front for those willing to carry on revolutionary propaganda, even when to do so means acting alone and risking their lives as revolutionaries.

With the existence of clandestine propaganda and agitational material, the inventive spirit of the urban guerrilla expands and creates catapults, artifacts, mortars, and other instruments with which to distribute the antigovernment pamphlets at a distance.

Tape recordings, the occupation of radio stations, and the use of loudspeakers, drawings on walls and in other inaccessible places are other forms of propaganda.

In using them, the urban guerrilla should give them the character of armed operations.

A consistent propaganda by letters sent to specific addresses, explaining the meaning of the urban guerrillas' armed actions, produces considerable results and is one method of influencing certain segments of the population.

Even this influence exercised in the heart of the people by every possible propaganda device revolving around the activity of the urban guerrilla does not indicate that our forces have everyone's support.

It is enough to win the support of a part of the people and this can be done by popularizing the following slogan: "Let he who does not wish to do anything for the revolutionaries, do nothing against them."

#### **The War of Nerves**

The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally in order to demoralize the government.

In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage since it imposes censorship on the mass media and winds up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through.

At this point it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is subject to being broken at any moment.

The object of the war of nerves is to misinform, spreading lies among the authorities, in which everyone can participate, thus creating an air of nervousness, discredit, insecurity, uncertainty, and concern on the part of the government.

The best methods used by the urban guerrilla in the war of nerves are the following:

- a) using the telephone and the mail to announce false clues to the police and the government, including information on the planting of bombs and any other act of terrorism in public offices and other places, kidnapping and assassination plans, etc., to oblige the authorities to wear themselves out, following up the information fed them;

- b) letting false plans fall into the hands of the police to divert their attention;
- c) planting rumors to make the government uneasy;
- d) exploiting by every means possible the corruption, the errors, and the failures of the government and its representatives, forcing them into demoralizing explanations and justifications in the very mass communication media they maintain under censorship;
- e) presenting denunciations to foreign embassies, the United Nations, the papal nunciature, and the international judicial commissions defending human rights or freedom of the press, exposing each concrete violation and use of violence by the military dictatorship and making it known that the revolutionary war will continue its course with serious danger for the enemies of the people.

#### How to Carry Out the Action

The urban guerrilla who correctly carries through his apprenticeship and training must give the greatest importance to his method of carrying out action, for in this he cannot commit the slightest error.

Any carelessness in the assimilation of the method and its use invites certain disaster, as experience teaches every day.

The outlaws commit errors frequently because of their methods, and this is one of the reasons why the urban guerrilla must be so insistently preoccupied with following the revolutionary technique and not the technique of the bandits.

And not only for that reason. There is no urban guerrilla worthy of the name who ignores the revolutionary method of action and fails to practice it rigorously in the planning and execution of his activity.

The giant is known by his toe. The same can be said of the urban guerrilla who is known from afar for his correct methods and his absolute fidelity to principles.

The revolutionary method of carrying out action is strongly and forcefully based on the knowledge and use of the following elements:

- a) investigation of information;
- b) observation or *paquera* <sup>2</sup>;
- c) reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain;
- d) study and timing of routes;
- e) mapping;
- f) mechanization;
- g) selection of personnel and relief;
- h) selection of firing capacity;
- i) study and practice in completion;
- j) completion;
- k) cover;
- l) retreat;
- m) dispersal;
- n) liberation or transfer of prisoners;
- o) elimination of clues;
- p) rescue of wounded.

#### Some Observations on the Method

When there is no information, the point of departure for the planning of the action must be investigation, observation, or *paquera*. This method also has good results.

In any event, including when there is information, it is essential to take observations or *paquera*, to see that the information is not at odds with observation or vice versa.

Reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain, study and timing of routes are so important that to omit them is to make a stab in the dark.

<sup>2</sup> In Brazil the expression *fazer a paquera* is used to designate the preparations for hunting *paca*, a mammal rodent of South American origin. By extension, the term *paquera* is used as a synonym for checking or vigilance.  
(Editor's note)



Mechanization, in general, is an underestimated factor in the method of conducting the action. Frequently mechanization is left to the end, to the eve of the action, before anything is done about it.

This is an error. Mechanization must be considered seriously, must be undertaken with considerable foresight and according to careful planning, also based on information, observation, or *paquera*, and must be carried out with rigorous care and precision. The care, conservation, maintenance, and camouflaging of the vehicles expropriated are very important details of mechanization.

When transport fails, the principal action fails with serious moral and material consequences for the urban guerrilla activity.

The selection of personnel requires great care to avoid the inclusion of indecisive or vacillating personnel with the danger of contaminating the other participants; a difficulty that must be avoided.

The withdrawal is equally or more important than the operation itself, to the point that it must be rigorously planned, including the possibility of failure.

One must avoid rescue or transfer of prisoners with children present, or anything to attract the attention of people in casual transit through the area. The best thing is to make the rescue as natural as possible, always winding through, or using different routes or narrow streets that scarcely permit passage on foot, to avoid an encounter of two cars. The elimination of tracks is obligatory and demands the greatest caution in hiding fingerprints and any other sign that could give the enemy information. Lack of care in the elimination of tracks and clues is a factor that increases nervousness in our ranks and which the enemy often exploits.

#### Rescue of the Wounded

The problem of the wounded in urban guerrilla warfare merits special attention. During guerrilla operations in the urban area it may happen that some comrade is accidentally wounded or shot by the police. When a guerrilla in the firing group has a knowledge of first aid he can do something for the wounded comrade on the spot. In no circumstances can the wounded urban guerrilla be abandoned at the site of the battle or left to the enemy's hands.

One of the precautions we must take is to set up nursing courses for men and women, courses in which the urban guerrilla can matriculate and learn the elementary techniques of first aid.

The urban guerrilla doctor, student of medicine, nurse, pharmacologist, or simply the person trained in first aid, is a necessity in modern revolutionary struggle.

A small manual of first aid for the urban guerrilla, printed on mimeographed sheets, can also be undertaken by anyone who has enough knowledge.

In planning and completing an armed action, the urban guerrilla cannot forget the organization of medical logistics. This will be accomplished by means of a mobile or motorized clinic. You can also set up a mobile first aid station. Another solution is to utilize the skills of a nursing comrade who waits with his bag of equipment in a designated house to which the wounded are brought.

The ideal would be to have our own well equipped clinic, but this is very costly unless we use expropriated materials.

When all else fails, it is often necessary to resort to legal clinics, using armed force if necessary to demand that the doctors attend to our wounded.

In the eventuality that we fall back on blood banks to buy blood or whole plasma, we must not use legal addresses and certainly not

addresses where the wounded can really be found, since they are under our care and protection. Nor should we supply addresses of those involved in the organization's clandestine work to the hospitals and health centers where we take them. Such concerns are indispensable to cover any track or clue.

The houses in which the wounded stay cannot be known to anybody with the unique and exclusive exception of the small group of comrades responsible for their treatment and transport.

Sheets, bloody clothing, medicine, and any other indication of treatment of the comrades wounded in combat with the police, must be completely eliminated from any place they visit to receive medical treatment.

#### **Guerrilla Security**

The urban guerrilla lives in constant danger of the possibility of being discovered or denounced. The chief security problem is to make certain that we are well hidden and well guarded, and that there are secure methods to keep the police from locating us or our whereabouts.

The worst enemy of the urban guerrilla and the major danger we run is infiltration into our organization by a spy or an informer.

The spy trapped within the organization will be punished with death. The same goes for those who desert and inform to the police.

A good security is the certainty that the enemy has no spies and agents infiltrated in our midst and can receive no information about us even by indirect or distant means. The fundamental way to insure this is to be cautious and strict in recruiting.

Nor is it permissible for everyone to know everyone and everything else. Each person should know only what relates to his work. This rule is a fundamental point in the abc's of urban guerrilla security.

The battle that we are waging against the enemy is arduous and difficult because it is a class struggle. Every class struggle is a battle of life or death when the classes are antagonistic.

The enemy wants to annihilate us and fights relentlessly to find us and destroy us, so that our great weapon consists in hiding from him and attacking him by surprise.

The danger to the urban guerrilla is that he may reveal himself through imprudence or allow himself to be discovered through lack of class vigilance. It is inadmissible for the urban guerrilla to give out his own or any other clandestine address to the enemy or to talk too much. Annotations in the margins of newspapers, lost documents, calling cards, letters or notes, all these are clues that the police never underestimate.

Address and telephone books must be destroyed and one must not write or hold papers; it is necessary to avoid keeping archives of legal or illegal names, biographical information, maps, and plans. The points of contact should not be written down but simply committed to memory.

The urban guerrilla who violates these rules must be warned by the first one who notes his infraction and, if he repeats it, we must avoid working with him.

The need of the urban guerrilla to move about constantly and the relative proximity of the police, given the circumstances of the strategic police net which surrounds the city, forces him to adopt variable security methods depending on the enemy's movements.

For this reason it is necessary to maintain a service of daily news about what the enemy appears to be doing, where his police net is operating and what gorges and points of strangulation are being watched. The daily reading of police news in the newspapers is a great fountain of information in these cases.

The most important lesson for guerrilla security is never, under any circumstances, to permit the slightest sign of laxity in the maintenance of security measures and regulations within the organization.

Guerrilla security must be maintained also and principally in cases of arrest. The arrested guerrilla can reveal nothing to the police that will jeopardize the organization. He can say nothing that may lead, as a consequence, to the arrest of other comrades, the discovery of addresses and hiding places, the loss of arms and ammunition.

#### **The Seven Sins of the Urban Guerrilla**

Even when the urban guerrilla applies his revolutionary technique with precision and rigorously abides by security rules, he can still be vulnerable to errors. There is no perfect urban guerrilla. The most he can do is to make every effort to diminish the margin of error since he cannot be perfect.

One of the methods we should use to diminish the margin of error is to know thoroughly the seven sins of the urban guerrilla and try to fight them.

The first sin of the urban guerrilla is inexperience. The urban guerrilla, blinded by this sin, thinks the enemy is stupid, underestimates his intelligence, believes everything is easy and, as a result, leaves clues that can lead to his disaster.

Because of his inexperience, the urban guerrilla can also overestimate the forces of the enemy, believing them to be stronger than they really are. Allowing himself to be fooled by this presumption, the urban guerrilla becomes intimidated, and remains insecure and indecisive, paralyzed and lacking in audacity.

The second sin of the urban guerrilla is to boast about the actions he has completed and broadcast them to the four winds.

The third sin of the urban guerrilla is vanity. The urban guerrilla who suffers from this sin tries to solve the problems of the revolution by actions erupting in the city, but without bothering about the beginnings and the survival of the guerrilla in rural areas. Blinded by success, he winds up organizing an action that he considers decisive and that puts into play all the forces and resources of the organization. Since the city is the area of the strategic circle which we cannot avoid or break while rural guerrilla warfare has not yet erupted and is not at the point of triumph, we always run the fatal error of permitting the enemy to attack us with decisive blows.

The fourth sin of the urban guerrilla is to exaggerate his strength and to undertake projects for which he lacks forces and, as yet, does not have the required infrastructure.

The fifth sin of the urban guerrilla is precipitous action. The urban guerrilla who commits this sin loses patience, suffers an attack of nerves, does not wait for anything, and impetuously throws himself into action, suffering untold reverses.

The sixth sin of the urban guerrilla is to attack the enemy when he is most angry.

The seventh sin of the urban guerrilla is to fail to plan things, and to act out of improvisation.

#### **Popular Support**

One of the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to win public support.

Where government actions become inept and corrupt, the urban guerrilla should not hesitate to step in to show that he opposes the government and to gain mass sympathy. The present government, for example, imposes heavy financial burdens and excessively high taxes on the people. It is up to the urban guerrilla to attack the dictatorship's tax collection system and to obstruct its financial activity, throwing all the weight of violent revolutionary action against it.

The urban guerrilla fights not only to upset the tax and collection system; the aim of revolutionary violence must also be directed against those government organs that raise prices and those who direct them, as well as against the wealthiest of the national and foreign profiteers and the important property owners; in short, against all those who accumulate huge fortunes out of the high cost of living, the wages of hunger, excessive prices and rents.

Foreign trusts, such as refrigeration and other North American plants that monopolize the market and the manufacture of general food supplies, must be systematically attacked by the urban guerrilla.

The rebellion of the urban guerrilla and his persistence in intervening in public questions is the best way of insuring public support of the cause we defend. We repeat and insist on repeating: *it is the best way of insuring public support*. As soon as a reasonable section of the population begins to take seriously the action of the urban guerrilla, his success is guaranteed.

The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine.

In spite of all this, the police systematically fail. The armed forces, the navy, and the air force are mobilized and undertake routine police functions. Even so they find no way to halt guerrilla operations, nor to wipe out the revolutionary organization with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the national territory persistently and contagiously.

The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.

The political situation in the country is transformed into a military situation in which the guerrillas appear more and more to be the ones responsible for errors and violence, while the problems in the lives of the people become truly catastrophic.

When they see the militarists and the dictatorship on the brink of the abyss, and fearing the consequences of a revolutionary war which is already at a fairly advanced and irreversible level, the pacifiers, always to be found within the ruling classes, and the right-wing opportunists, partisans of nonviolent struggle, join hands and circulate rumors behind the scenes, begging the hangmen for elections, "redemocratization," constitutional reforms, and other tripe designed to fool the masses and make them stop the revolutionary rebellion in the cities and the rural areas of the country.

But, watching the revolutionaries, the people now understand that it is a farce to vote in elections which have as their sole objective, guaranteeing the continuation of the military dictatorship and covering up its crimes.

Attacking wholeheartedly this election farce and the so-called "political solution" so appealing to the opportunists, the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings, executions, etc.

This answers any attempt to fool the masses with the opening of Congress and the reorganization of political parties — parties of the government and of the opposition it allows — when all the time the parliament and the so-called parties function thanks to the license of the military dictatorship in a true spectacle of marionettes and dogs on a leash.

The role of the urban guerrilla, in order to win the support of the people, is to continue fighting, keeping in mind the interests of the masses and heightening the disastrous situation in which the gov-

dictatorship, which permit the revolutionaries to open rural guerrilla warfare in the midst of the uncontrollable expansion of urban rebellion.

The urban guerrilla is engaged in revolutionary action in favor of the people and with it seeks the participation of the masses in the struggle against the military dictatorship and for the liberation of the country from the yoke of the United States. Beginning with the city and with the support of the people, the rural guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion.

#### **Urban Guerrilla Warfare, School for Selecting the Guerrilla**

Revolution is a social phenomenon that depends on men, arms, and resources. Arms and resources exist in the country and can be taken and used, but to do this it is necessary to count on men. Without them, the arms and the resources have no use and no value. For their part, the men must have two basic and indispensable obligatory qualities:

- a) they must have a politico-revolutionary motivation;
- b) they must have the necessary technical-revolutionary preparation.

Men with a politico-revolutionary motivation are found among the vast and clearheaded contingents of enemies of the military dictatorship and of the domination of US imperialism.

Almost daily such men gravitate to urban guerrilla warfare, and it is for this reason that the reaction no longer announces that it has thwarted the revolutionaries and goes through the unpleasantness of seeing them rise up again out of their own ashes.

The men who are best trained, most experienced, and dedicated to urban guerrilla warfare and at the same time to rural guerrilla warfare, constitute the backbone of the revolutionary war and, therefore, of the Brazilian revolution. From this backbone will come the marrow of the revolutionary army of national liberation, rising out of guerrilla warfare.

This is the central nucleus, not the bureaucrats and opportunists hidden in the organizational structure, not the empty conferees, the clichéd writers of resolutions that remain on paper, but rather the men who fight. The men who from the very first have been determined and ready for anything, who personally participate in revolutionary actions, who do not waver or deceive.

This is the nucleus indoctrinated and disciplined with a long-range strategic and tactical vision consistent with the application of Marxist theory, of Leninism and of Castro-Guevara developments, applied to the specific conditions of the Brazilian situation. This is the nucleus that will lead the rebellion through its guerrilla phase.

From it will come men and women with politico-military development, one and indivisible, whose task will be that of future leaders after the triumph of the revolution, in the construction of the new Brazilian society.

As of now, the men and women chosen for urban guerrilla warfare are workers; peasants whom the city has attracted as a market for man power and who return to the countryside indoctrinated and politically and technically prepared; students, intellectuals, priests. This is the material with which we are building -- starting with urban guerrilla warfare -- the armed alliance of workers and peasants, with students, intellectuals, priests.

Workers have infinite knowledge in the industrial sphere and are best for urban revolutionary tasks. The urban guerrilla worker participates in the struggle by constructing arms, sabotaging and preparing

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saboteurs and dynamiters, and personally participating in actions involving hand arms, or organizing strikes and partial paralysis with the characteristics of mass violence in factories, workshops, and other work centers.

The peasants have an extraordinary intuition for knowledge of the land, judgment in confronting the enemy, and the indispensable ability to communicate with the humble masses. The peasant guerrilla is already participating in our struggle and it is he who reaches the guerrilla core, establishes support points in the countryside, finds hiding places for individuals, arms, munitions, supplies, organizes the sowing and harvesting of grain for use in the guerrilla war, chooses the points of transport, cattle raising posts, and sources of meat supplies, trains the guides that show the rural guerrillas the road, and creates an information service in the countryside.

Students are noted for being politically crude and coarse and thus they break all the taboos. When they are integrated into urban guerrilla warfare, as is now occurring on a wide scale, they show a special talent for revolutionary violence and soon acquire a high level of political-technical-military skill. Students have plenty of free time on their hands because they are systematically separated, suspended, and expelled from school by the dictatorship and so they begin to spend their time advantageously, in behalf of the revolution.

The intellectuals constitute the vanguard of resistance to arbitrary acts, social injustice, and the terrible inhumanity of the dictatorship of the gorillas. They spread the revolutionary call and they have great influence on people. The urban guerrilla intellectual or artist is the most modern of the Brazilian revolution's adherents.

Churchmen — that is to say, those ministers or priests and religious men of various hierarchies and persuasions — represent a sector that has special ability to communicate with the people, particularly with workers, peasants, and the Brazilian woman. The priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingredient in the ongoing Brazilian revolutionary war, and constitutes a powerful arm in the struggle against military power and North American imperialism.

As for the Brazilian woman, her participation in the revolutionary war, and particularly in urban guerrilla warfare, has been marked by an unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity, and it is not by chance that so many women have been accused of participation in guerrilla actions against banks, quarries, military centers, etc., and that so many are in prison while others are sought by the police.

As a school for choosing the guerrilla, urban guerrilla warfare prepares and places at the same level of responsibility and efficiency the men and women who share the same dangers fighting, rounding up supplies, serving as messengers or runners, as drivers, sailors, or airplane pilots, obtaining secret information, and helping with propaganda and the task of indoctrination.

Carlos Marighella  
June 1969

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17 May 1970

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# Soviet Dissenter Speaks Out

## 'No Matter What, I'm Free Inside,' He Told Judge Sentencing Him

By Holger Jensen

MOSCOW, May 16 (AP)—Meet Vladimir Bukovsky, dissident. He has spent six of his 27 years in Soviet prisons, asylums and labor camps.

He is currently free, but expects to be arrested again. Agents of KGB, the committee of state security, keep him under surveillance.

The son of privileged Communist party members, he was a bright and promising scholar at Moscow High School No. 59. Then he found repression and inequities in the "classless society." The teen-ager could not remain silent and in 1960, his final school year, he published an underground satirical humor magazine called *Martyr*.

The school principal and several teachers were dismissed. Bukovsky's parents received a reprimand from their local party committee for "failure to raise the boy in the proper spirit." Bukovsky was expelled and told he could never study in a Soviet university.

He registered anyway at Moscow University and studied biophysics for a year before they learned who he was. From then on he spent his days working as a museum handyman, and his nights on Mayakovsky Square meeting other young people opposed to the system.

This was "the Movement," a loosely knit group of young people who liked to discuss things they could not read about in the government-controlled press.

In 1962, Bukovsky organized an illegal exhibition of paintings by abstract artists not approved by state censors. The exhibition was shut down by the authorities and an order was issued for Bukovsky's arrest. But he fled the Soviet capital and joined a six-month geological expedition to Siberia.

He returned when things cooled off and worked as a programmer in a computer center. In May 1963 the KGB caught up with him.

Bukovsky was sent to the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute and declared insane. That December he was transferred to a prison asylum in Leningrad, where he spent, in his own words, "15 months of Hell."

"There were about 1,000 men in the asylum, political prisoners and insane murderers," says Bukovsky. "The sick raved, the healthy suffered."

"I had two wardmates—an old Ukrainian nationalist who'd been there 16 years, and a maniac who murdered his children, then cut off his own ears. The Ukrainian spent every waking minute yelling about Ukrainian independence. The murderer just sat and smiled all day."

Bukovsky kept out of their way and taught himself English.

### Foreign Communists

Later, he was moved to a larger ward and made new friends. They included a French Communist and an Australian of Latvian origin. Both had belived Communist writings about the good life in the Soviet Union and emigrated to see it first-hand.

Shocked at the pay in a

Moldavian shoe factory, the Frenchman had urged workers to strike. "Communism will never condemn the working class fighting for its rights," he argued. He was condemned to three years in the asylum.

The Australian, disillusioned by life in Moscow, had simply tried to leave. He was told that since he was of Latvian origin, he was a Soviet citizen and could not go. He persisted and was put in the Leningrad asylum for contacting foreign embassies.

Doctors were technically in charge of the inmates, but the real masters were brutal turnkeys and prisoner trustees, criminals from the regular part of the Leningrad prison.

"Only the crafty survived," Bukovsky says. "You had to be nice to the guards, you had to make friends with them, you had to bribe them. Otherwise they can beat you until you're nearly dead and tell the doctors you misbehaved. Or they could recommend medical punishment."

"They beat the Ukrainian every day, just tied him up and kicked him in the stomach. Sometimes they would put inmates in padded isolation cells and beat them almost continuously. I knew of several men who died after this, and the clinic on the floor above us was always full."

### Three Punishments

The worst was medical punishment. Bukovsky describes three methods:

- On the recommendation of a trusty or turnkey, doctors would inject a drug

that produced severe stomach cramps, fever, intense pain and a temperature of 104. The sickness lasted two or three days and left the inmate very weak.

- Another drug reserved for serious misbehavior induced sleep and dulled the brain. Inmates were punished with ten days of daily injections. They woke up as human vegetables. Some regained their senses after two months, others did not.

- The third punishment was the canvas bandage. An inmate would be tightly swathed in wet canvas from neck to toes while others in his ward were forced to watch.

"The canvas shrinks as it dries. It is not a pretty sight. They usually only do it for two or three hours. A nurse is always in attendance, and the bandages are loosened when the pulse grows weak."

Asylum food consisted of thin oatmeal, cabbage soup that was "mostly water and no cabbage," bread and fish once a week. There was never any meat.

### Sick But Sane

Bukovsky was released in February, 1965, shortly before his 22nd birthday. He had lost weight, he had a heart murmur and rheumatism, "but otherwise I was all right. I was still sane."

In Moscow, he plunged back into the dissident movement, circulating underground manuscripts, reading prohibited Western books, organizing demonstrations, informing foreign newsmen of new arrests, attending trials and keeping track of friends who had been imprisoned.



"You must have friends in this type of work," he explains. "The KGB follows you all the time and sometimes they pull you in for questioning. If no one knows about it, you just disappear."

"But if your friends know you've been arrested, you're reasonably safe. They tell others. They attend your trial. They know the length of your sentence, and they know when you are supposed to be released. Stalinist methods don't work anymore. The authorities don't want a big scandal. They have to maintain a semblance of legality."

Dissidents never go anywhere alone. They never live alone and they always tell others what they are doing. All arrests and trials are recorded by "Samizdat," the chain-letter underground news letters.

On Dec. 2, 1965, after nine months of freedom, Bukovsky was arrested for organizing a demonstration protesting the imprisonment of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, two writers, whose work was considered anti-Soviet. Again Bukovsky was sent to the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute.

#### Amnesty International

Friends smuggled to London on account of his plight. Amnesty International sent a representative to Moscow to plead for his release. Bukovsky theorizes the Amnesty people "probably threatened to make a big scandal about it." He was released without explanation in August, 1966.

But his freedom was short. On Jan. 26, 1967, he was arrested for organizing another demonstration protesting that Soviet intellectuals were repressed. He was convicted by a criminal court of "hooliganism" and sentenced to three years at the Borr labor camp in the Voronezhskaya district, 300 miles south of Moscow.

But Bukovsky's spirit wasn't broken. At the trial he told the judge: "No matter what you do to me I'm a free man inside. And I'll do

exactly the same things when I get out again."

There are 10 labor camps and two prisons in the Voronezhskaya district. The Russian Federation, which covers 90 per cent of the Soviet Union, is divided into more than 65 districts.

The Borr camp with 1,500 men, was surrounded by watchtowers with armed guards, coils of barbed wire and a free-fire zone. The guards could shoot any inmate seen in the zone.

#### 'Son, Please Work'

The prisoners lived in barracks and had to work for their keep. Posters admonished: "Those who don't work don't eat" and "Remember that hard work is the only way home." Bukovsky's barracks had a picture of a tearful mother beseeching: "Son, please work to regain your freedom."

Most of the inmates were country people, locked up for petty thievery. Bukovsky's bunkmates included a peasant sent up for three years for stealing a chicken and a man imprisoned for a year for fighting with his wife.

Bukovsky managed to talk his way into one of the few "skilled" jobs at the camp, polishing the edges of tables in the carpentry shop. He received 60 rubles a month—\$66 at the official exchange rate.

Half of this was deducted as a contribution to the state. Another 12 rubles paid the monthly food bill in the camp dining room. The rest went for clothing, bribes for the guards and purchasing extra food at the camp store.

Prisoners were allowed one package from home every four months and an annual visit by relatives. When not being punished, they could make one monthly purchase not exceeding seven rubles, at the camp store.

Few could afford such luxury. Most worked as unskilled laborers earning only enough for the 12-ruble food bill.

"Not even a dog could live

on 12 rubles a month. And when we were punished with strict regime, which was often, the monthly ration was reduced to seven rubles and no store privileges. We lived on smelly porridge and water with a cabbage leaf. Any man who rolled just on the camp food would have been dead in six months. The only way to eat was to bribe the guards or get packages from home."

#### Smuggled Money

On their annual visits relatives would also smuggle in money. "One favorite method was to shake the tobacco out of cigarettes and substitute a rolled-up 10-ruble bill. The guards who searched us were stumped and never caught on. I won't tell the other ways because I don't want my friends to starve."

Prisoners who bought extra food shared it with other inmates. The code of the labor camps, Bukovsky says is: "Those who have give to those who don't."

There were not many beatings at the labor camp. "Whenever the prisoners heard of a man beaten up by guards we would riot. We just screamed, banged things, broke chairs and doors and made a racket. After a few riots like that they stopped beating us."

However, more refined punishments were used. Littering "unproductively," failure to doff one's hat to a guard, talking back, all merited being placed on "strict regime." "They got you where it really hurts most, in the belly," Bukovsky observes.

More serious misbehavior earned 15 days "confinement in solitary—small unlit cages without toilet facilities and with virtually no food. Bukovsky was in solitary five times and he insists, "I was not a particularly troublesome prisoner."

He lives in a small apartment with his mother, sister, her husband and their baby. He earns 50 rubles as secretary to a sympathetic writer.

The apartment and telephone are bugged. Bukovsky feels he is trailed every

where he goes. Every time he passes on an underground newspaper or talks to a foreigner he risks arrest. But he insists: "The people have to know what is happening here. The world has to know."

Bukovsky makes one thing clear: He does not want to live in the West. He does want to try to improve life in the Soviet Union. He admits he belongs to a very small minority with little chance of success. He estimates that there are about 2,000 other persons like himself in major Soviet cities.

Norwegian Press Service Summary of Tshikhvadse (Chkhikvadze)  
Press Conference, Oslo  
20 April 1970

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Soviet Legal Expert in Oslo

A leading Soviet legal expert today termed as "pure fabrications" accusations by the British section of Amnesty International that Soviet authorities were locking up political prisoners in mental hospitals to avoid publicity.

Professor Victor Tshikhvadse, Director of the Institute of Law at the Soviet Academy of Science, speaking at a press conference here also denied accusations by an unofficial Soviet journal, Chronicle of Current Events, which claimed that many dissenting intellectuals were diagnosed as insane and given forcible treatment for their supposed mental ailments.

Asked about the position of Jews in the Soviet Union he said any Jew who wished to leave the Soviet Union and go to Israel could do so, and that quite a number did leave to join their families.

He also said many Jews, especially of the younger generation, wished to return to the Soviet Union, a fact which the Western press ignored. Professor Tshikhvadse said Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, was exploiting the position of the Jews purely for propaganda purposes. He claimed that she did not actually wish to have more people into Israel.

We condemn zionism in the same way as we condemn anti-semitism. We do not like the present government in Israel but we support the idea of a free and independent Israeli state, he added.

Professor Tshikhvadse also denied allegations that the Crimean Tartars were being prosecuted in the Soviet Union. Anybody among them could choose to live anywhere, and the Crimean Tartars were now living a happy life in various Soviet republics, he said.

Professor Tshikhvadse is visiting Oslo in connection with the Lenin centenary.

Vladimir Bukovskiy, born 1941. Writer, son of an orthodox journalist associated with the highly conservative journal, Oktyabr. In 1961, contributed to Phoenix, an underground literary magazine, took part in unauthorized poetry readings in Maiakovsky Square in Moscow, and also made critical speeches at Komsomol meetings at Moscow University. Expelled from the university and the Komsomol, then committed from 1963 until the spring of 1965 to a mental asylum. Participated in the December 5, 1965, public demonstration calling for an open trial for Sinyavsky and Daniel and in 1966 was again detained in a mental asylum for six months. In January 1967, took part in a demonstration in support of Galanskov and Dobrovolsky and subsequently received the maximum sentence of three years at hard labor.

Viktor Mikhailovich Chkhikvadze, born 1912. Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Chkhikvadze has directed the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law since 1964; previously he had been a deputy director of the institute for seven years. June 1947, elected scientific secretary of the law section of the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). On editorial board of Soviet State and Law, 1948 to 1953, during which time published several articles in this journal on the propaganda role of a jurist and on the necessity for maintaining discipline in the Army. Secretary of the Soviet World Peace Council from 1958 to 1962; since November 1963, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. Vice President, 1959 to 1962, of International Institute for Peace in Vienna (an institute established in 1957 after activities of the Soviet-supported World Peace Council were curtailed by the Austrian Government). In 1965 served as alternate delegate to 20th session of United Nations General Assembly. Presidium Member, Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity. Has published over 100 works on general theory of state and law and theory of criminal code.

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# RUSSIA TORTURES PRISONER PATIENTS, SAYS AMNESTY

CPYRGHT

By STEPHEN CONSTANT, Communist Affairs Staff

**T**HE plight of thousands of prisoners of conscience in Russia and Eastern Europe is the subject of a report published yesterday by Amnesty International to mark the centenary of the birth of Lenin this week.

The publishers of the report declared that it "pinpoints the irony of the situation in which, 50 years after a revolution to set men free, thousands are in prison merely for their beliefs, or for holding views contrary to those held by the people in power."

Amnesty International has noted the "tremendous improvement" in the flow of information about prisoners in Russia due to the circulation of "underground" literature there at the moment, especially of the so-called "Chronicle of Current Events" with reliable first-hand information.

The report pays particular attention to the great number of prisoners of conscience in Russia who are confined to the special psychiatric hospitals.

"Often it seems that a decision to confine a patient to a mental hospital is taken merely to avoid the publicity a trial would attract among protest circles in the Soviet intelligensia."

## Torture "treatment"

Conditions in the psychiatric hospitals are considerably more severe than those in jails and camps. The "patients" are subjected to physical torture by way of "treatment."

The report gives the names of several of these special institutions, which are controlled by the KGB, the Russian Secret Police.

"All these institutions have the following features in common: Political prisoners, although of sound mind, are kept in the same cells as seriously disturbed patients with psychiatric illnesses.

"If they will not renounce their convictions, they are subjected to physical torture, on the pretext of treatment, to injections of large doses of 'aminazin' and 'sulfazin,' which cause depressive shock reaction and serious physical disorders."

"The régime is the same as for closed prisons, with one hour's exercise a day. Sometimes sodium amobarbital, a strong narcotic, is administered by injection to weaken the patient, and after injection he is interrogated."

In some of the institutions, both the sick patients and the political prisoners are the "victims of daily beatings and sadistic humiliations on the part of the supervisory personnel and the nurses, whose rights are absolutely unlimited."

Prisoners in special or strict-régime camps who felt they could not bear conditions sometimes tried to simulate madness.

But when, if they succeeded, they got to a prison psychiatric hospital, they immediately realised that "it is far worse than the severest camps."

The report says that Amnesty has adopted some 250 Russian prisoners. The total of political prisoners is unknown.

## Other countries

The bulk of Amnesty's findings deal with Russia. The report, however, also deals briefly with some other Communist countries.

**East Germany:** Here Amnesty has adopted 70 prisoners, most of whom tried to leave the country. The report states that large numbers of people were arrested in East Germany for protesting against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

**Czechoslovakia:** Anybody who criticises the State, an official or another Communist country can be arrested.

**Rumania:** Conditions are reported to have improved, somewhat, but Amnesty has still 30 adopted cases, some of them people arrested on charges of illegal religious activity.

**Poland:** The persecution of Poles of Jewish origin has lost most of its impetus, says the report, but Poles of Jewish descent are still arriving in Denmark and Sweden as refugees.

**Hungary:** Fifty cases have been taken up by Amnesty. Among them are a number of people convicted on religious grounds.

**Yugoslavia:** The report says that "liberalisation" in the past decade had reduced the number of prisoners of conscience, but that Amnesty was still concerned about the fate of conscientious objectors to military service on religious grounds, and of some Albanian and Croat nationalists.